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KENNErnD. CREWS· 
Several "official" andformal guidelines that attempt to define the scope affair use 
for specific applications-notablyfOr education, research, and library services-have 
emerged in the years since passage of the Copyright Act of 1976. Although some 
interested parties and some governmental agencies have wekomed these guidelines, 
none of them ever has had the force of law. This article analyzes the origins of 
guidelines, the various governmental documents and court rulings that reference the 
guidelines, and the substantive content of the guidelines themselves to demonstrate 
that in fact the guidelines bear little relationship, ifany, to the law offair use. The 
guidelines are negotiated resolutions ofconflicts regardingfair use, andyet they are 
often presented as standards to which one must adhere in order to remain within the 
law. This article fUrther analyzes the guidelines from a conceptual perspective and 
finds that the process ofdeveloping the guidelines gives them the appearance ofa 
normative quality, while the portrayal of the guidelines as formal standards 
sanctioned by authoritative structures gives them the appearance ofpositive law. 
These qualities are merely illusory, and consequently the guidelines have had a 
seriously detrimental effect. They inteifere with an actual understanding ofthe law 
and erode confidence in the law as created by Congress and the courts. Because 
pressure to develop additional guidelines appears inevitable, this article identifies 
deficiencies in the guidelines of the past and concludes with recommendations for 
improving the processes for, and the outcome of, fUture efforts to development new 
guidelines that interpret and apply the law offair use. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Early fair-use guidelines failed to reflect accurately the law or to embody 
workable standards, yet they have persisted as models for a new generation of 
interpretations applicable to the extraordinary demands of digital technology.) 
The newest incarnations of guidelines perpetuate deficiencies of the past and 
create new hazards for copyright owners, users, and anyone else seeking to 
understand the law.2 Guidelines also have been the source of misconstructions of 
fair use in judicial rulings. This article will scrutinize the origins and application 
of the various guidelines from the past to reveal the limits and weaknesses of 
these standards of fair use. This analysis will also posit an innovative legal 
construct to underscore the deficiencies of formally recognized guidelines3 and 
1 Gregory K. Klingsporn, The ConJerence on Fair Use (CONFU) and the Future oJFair 
Use Guidelines, 23 COWM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 101, 101 (1999) ("Yet, despite this criticism, 
guidelines have remained a preferred method of applying the Copyright Act (or related 
regulation) to new technologies not envisioned by the drafters of the 1976 revisions.''); DanThu 
Thi Phan, Note, Will Fair Use Function on the Internet?, 98 COWM. L. REv. 169, 198 (1998) 
(CONFU Guidelines are "modeled after the 1976 Fair Use Guidelines, also known as the 
Classroom Guidelines"). Future guidelines appear to be imminent, if not inevitable. See infra 
note 520. A central point of this article is that new guidelines can avoid the pitfalls and 
problems ofthe past, but only if the process ofdevelopment is greatly revised. See infra Part VI 
ofthis article. 
2 Kym Carrier, Note, Right oJ Publicity: Cardtoons, L.e. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Association, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 159, 171-73 (1998) (demonstrating confusion over the 
concept of guidelines, this article uses the word "guideline" in reference to the factors in the 
fair-use statute itself). 
3 The guidelines addressed in this article are significantly different from the many other 
"gUidelines" that exist in other areas for the law. For example, judges apply "federal sentencing 
guidelines" in criminal cases and use guidelines to help determine the "best interests of the 
child" or the appropriate award of child support in family matters. See generally Marsha 
Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33 FAM. L.Q. 157 (1999); Debra H. 
Lehrmann, Who are We Protecting?: An Analysis oJLaw Regarding the Duties oJAttorneys 
and Guardians Ad Litem, 63 TEx. BJ. 123, 126 (2000) ("These guidelines are not meant to 
contravene state law, but to fill in gaps where they exist.''). The U.S. Department ofJustice uses 
guidelines to examine whether corporate mergers may violate antitrust standards. The fair-use 
guidelines generally differ in at least two respects. First, except for the CONlU Guidelines, 
they are drafted by interested parties who have chosen to participate in the effort. Guidelines for 
other applications are usually drafted by appointed or invited experts, or they are developed and 
issued by commissions or agencies authorized to implement the law. See, e.g., BUREAU OF 
COMPETITION, U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GuIDELINES [with 
April 8, 1997 Revisions to §4 Efficiencies] (1992), http://www.ftc.gov/bcldocslhorizmer.htm. 
Second, guidelines in other areas of the law are often specifically authorized by law, such as the 
sentencing guidelines. Federal statutes provide for the development of the sentencing 
guidelines, and a duly appointed commission creates them with judicial oversight. See Stephen 
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 
17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1988) (noting that these guidelines have mandatory authority and 
were developed by a statutorily established commission). See also Stephen Breyer, Justice 
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the pitfalls of accepting them as an adequate measure for understanding the law. 
Finally, this article closes with suggestions for better comprehending the nature of 
guidelines and for developing improved guidelines in the future. 
For more than twenty years, various "official" guidelines have offered to 
define or at least explain the pmctical scope of fair-use law.4 The best-known of 
Breyer: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 14 CRIM. JUST. 28, 28-35 (1999). The 
guidelines in some other areas of the law are also different in that they often are indicators to 
decision makers about the law, but usually do not purport to have legal force or create the 
appearance of setting a definitive legal standard. See generally SAMUEL C. THoMPsoN, JR., A 
PRAcrrrIONER'S GUIDE TO mE ECONOMICS OF mE ANTITRUST MERGER GUIDELINES (1997). 
4 This article will focus especially on the following seven guidelines: 
Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-Jor-Projit Educational 
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976) 
(hereinafter Classroom Guidelines]. 
Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music, H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 70-71 (1976) 
(hereinafter Music Guidelines]. 
Guidelines for OfJ-Air Recordings ofBroadcast Programmingfor Educational Purposes, 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-495, at 8-9 (1982) (hereinafter Off-Air Guidelines]. These guidelines first 
appeared in 127 Cong. Rec. 18, at 24,048-49 (1981 ). 
CONTU Guidelines on Photocopying Under Interlibrary Loan Arrangements, in 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TEcHNOLOOICAL USES OF COPYRIGlITED WORKS, FINAL 
REPoRT OF TIm NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TEcHNOLOOICAL USES OF COPYRIGlITED 
WORKS, July 31, 1978 (hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT] 54-55 (hereinafter CONTU 
Guidelines]. 
Proposal for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Digital Images, in INFoRMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON lNTELLECfUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE: FINAL REPORT TO mE COMMISSIONER ON mE CONCWSION OF mE 
CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE, November 1998 (hereinafter CONFU FINAL REPoRT] 3~1 
(hereinafter Digital-Images Guidelines]. 
Proposal for Educational Fair Use Guidelines for Distance Learning, in CONFU FINAL 
REPORT 4~8 (hereinafter Distance-Learning Guidelines]. 
Proposalfor Fair Use Guidelines for Educational Multimedia, in CONFU FINAL REPoRT 
49-59 (hereinafter Multimedia Guidelines]. A slightly different version of the Multimedia 
Guidelines were the subject of a "nonlegislative report" issued by a congressional 
subconnnittee in December 1996. See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON COURTS AND 
lNTELLECIUAL PRoP. OF mE HOUSE COMM. ON mE JUDICIARY, 104TH CONG., FAIR USE 
GUIDELINES FOR EDUCATIONAL MULTIMEDIA (Comm. Print 1996) (hereinafter MULTIMEDIA 
COMMITfEE PRINT]. For a discussion of the origins of this MULTIMEDIA COMMITTEE PRINT, see 
infra text accompanying notes 215-16. For a discussion of one critical way that the guidelines 
in the nonlegislative report differ from the "final" version published in the CONFU FINAL 
REPORT, see infra note 431. 
The Digital-Images Guidelines, the Distance-Learning Guidelines. and the Multimedia 
Guidelines are collectively referred to on occasion as the "CONFU Guidelines." 
These guidelines share these common characteristics: they interpret either sections I07 or 
108 of the U.S. Copyright Act, and they have been endorsed or supported or ratified by a 
governmental body. In those respects they are different from other possible guidelines that 
could also be the subject ofstudy. For example, the report from the Conference on Fair Use also 
included a document entitled Statement on Use ofCopyrighted Computer Programs (Software) 
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such guidelines---addressing issues of photocopied handouts for classroom 
teaching5-has been available for scrutiny and application since passage of the 
first fair-use statute in 1976. Fundamentally, these and other guidelines respond to 
the fact that fair-use law is subject to many different and reasonable 
interpretations. In an attempt to address and relieve that uncertainty, interested 
parties have met periodically to develop guidelines detailing fair use, particularly 
for applications related to education.6 Stakeholders in the debate over the 
resulting guidelines have given them diverse descriptions and characterizations. 
The guidelines sometimes have been identified as "merely advisory" and at other 
times declared as the true meaning of fair-use law. In the context of fair-use law, 
however, each of those characterizations proves faulty, and most of them are not 
sustainable by any legal interpretation. This article will offer a legal analysis that 
can more accurately identifY the legal significance of the guidelines, and that can 
provide a more reliable foundation for the emergence of inevitable guidelines in 
the future. 
An enormous difficulty in coming to tenns with the role offair-use guidelines 
is that the literature of the law has largely neglected them and left them without a 
clear and meaningful conceptualization.7 That lack of clarity, nevertheless, has 
in Libraries-&enarios. See CONFU FINAL REPORT, at 61-65. That document, however, is 
principally an application of sections 108 through 109 of the Copyright Act. Further, the 
American Library Association and other organizations have issued interpretations of fair use 
that have been adopted by some educational institutions and other organizations, but not 
supported by governmental agencies. See, e.g., AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, MODEL 
POLICY CONCERNING COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY PHOTOCOPYlNG FOR CLASSROOM, REsEARCH 
AND LmRARY REsERVE USE (1982) [hereinafter ALA MODEL PoLJCY]. 
5See infra text accompanying notes 56-80. 
6 Klingsporn, supra note 1, at 101 (stating, "copyright owners, copyright users, and 
legislators have attempted to increase the predictability offair use through 'guidelines"'). 
7No law review article has made a systematic study of the guidelines, although the 
guidelines have received moderate attention in the standard treatises on copyright and fair use. 
See, e.g., PAUL GoLDSTEIN, 2 COPYRIGHT § 10.2.2(b) (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1998); MELVILLE 
B. & DAVID NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2000) [hereinafter NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT]; Wn..LlAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRMLEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAw (1995) 
[hereinafter PATRY, FAIR USE] (covers only the earlier guidelines). On the other hand, the 
guidelines have been the subject of considerable discussion, but usually with little critical 
analysis, in numerous books that seek to apply fair use in the education or library setting. See, 
e.g., ARLENE BIELEFIELD & LAWRENCE CHEEsEMAN, LmRARIES & COPYRIGHT LAw (1993); 
JANIS H. BRUWELHEIDE, THE COPYRIGHT PRIMER FOR LmRARlANS AND EDUCATORS (1995); 
LAURA N. GASAWAY & SARAH K. WIANT, LmRARIES AND COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE TO 
COPYRIGHT LAw IN THE 19908 (1994); MARy BRANDT JENSEN, DoEs YOURPROJECrHAVEA 
COPYRIGHT PROBLEM? (1996). A few books, on the other hand, have offered some critical 
analysis. See, e.g., GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING COPYRIGHT FOR LmRARIES, EDUCATION, AND 
SOCIETY (Laura N. Gasaway, ed., 1997) [hereinafter GASAWAY, GROWING PAINS]; EsTHER R. 
SlNOFSKY, OFF-AIR VIDEOTAPING IN EDUCATION: COPYRIGHT ISSUES, DECISIONS, 
IMPLICATIONS 98-102 (1984). Various articles have offered different insights, and many of 
them are cited throughout this work. 
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not stalled efforts to devise new guidelines. Indeed, recent efforts to devise new 
fair-use guidelines have been built explicitly on guidelines of the past as 
models--even though the merits ofearlier guidelines never have been the subject 
ofdetailed legal scrutiny.8 This article will attempt the needed analysis. 
This article will examine the manner in which fair-use guidelines have been 
characterized by interested parties and in court cases in order to test the validity of 
many of those portrayals and to discern the legal status and significance of the 
guidelines. The analysis is rooted in legal theory. This article will examine the 
several cases that have referenced any of the guidelines,9 and it will posit an 
understanding of the guidelines not only from the view of courts attempting to 
apply fair use, but also in the context of legal theories relating to positive law, 
normative law, and the significance of legislative history in the interpretation of 
statutes.10 This article will ultimately demonstrate that most ofthe guidelines that 
purport to interpret fair use in fact bear little credible relationship to the law, and 
that the guidelines of the past are a weak foundation for developing new 
interpretations for the future. 
A Background ofFair-Use Law and Guidelines 
The fair-use doctrine of American copyright law has been derided as among 
the most hopelessly vague of legal standards, requiring complex and often 
subjective interpretation.t t It has been scorned as the last, desperate defense from 
a scoundrel, who only claims fair use to avoid wanton liability.12 It has been 
attacked as a lure that draws into its trap fools who underestimate the wrath that 
the doctrine incurs among the circles of many copyright proprietors. t 3 The 
8 The final report from the Conference on Fair Use, see infra text accompanying notes 
116-51, includes several references to earlier guidelines as models for new guidelines. See, e.g., 
CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 6 ("Participants were encouraged to follow the 
example ofprevious successful efforts to develop voluntary fair use guidelines-the Classroom 
Guidelines in 1976, and the National Commission on New Technological Uses ofCopyrighted 
Works ... which dealt with the issues raised by photocopiers and computers in 1978."). 
9 See infra Part III. Of particular importance in this analysis will be the following cases, 
which give considerable attention to the fair-use guidelines: Princeton University Press v. Mich. 
Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane); Am. Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995); Marcus v. 
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. 
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
10 See infra Part V.
 
II DeJlarv. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d661 (2d Cir. 1939).
 
12 Jeremy Phillips, Nimmer on Copyright: David Nimmer Discusses Current US
 
Copyright Law, and Possible Changes to It. MANAGING lNTELL.. PROP., Feb. 1995, at 17 
(Nimmer calls fair use "the last resort ofscoundrels."). 
t 3 One article suggests that the application offair use is inevitably amorphous: 
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doctrine of fair use is also the cause of ample confusion among lawyers and 
laypersons alike, who often need to tmderstand its nuances and live by its tenuous 
and fragile principles. A determination of whether or not some activity mayor 
may not be fair use is actually akin to a prediction ofhow Ii judge might decide 
the same question, based on limited precedent and wide variations in possible 
interpretations.14 
From another perspective, fair use is an essential element of effective 
commtmication and education, and it is a crucial bridge for the widespread 
sharing of ideas.1S Fair use allows an author to borrow a meaningful quotation 
from another source and to comment upon and share messages and missives 
exchanged on the Internet.16 Among the principal beneficiaries of fair use for the 
public interest have been the education and library commtmities.17 Indeed, fair 
Many who have looked at the relationship between copyright protection and the fair use defense 
have concluded that finding a fair use is, at best, a matter of balancing bard-to-define equitable 
considerations, or at worst, a matter of luck. Additionally, for those of the orthodox school, 
obtaining a fair use exception in court is simply a matter of marshalling more emotionally 
appealing equitiesfor fair use than the creator ofthe work can offer against fitir use. 
Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics behind Copyright Fair Use: A 
Principled and Predictable Body ofLaw, 24 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 143, 144 (1993) (footnotes 
omitted). 
14 Lisa M. Babiskin, Case Comment, Oh, Pretty Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., 8 HARv. J.L. & TEcH. 193,223 (1994) ("In the absence of clear guidelines, fair use is 
essentially a rule of reason, the outcome depending on the facts and circumstances in each 
case."). 
15 CONSORTIUM FOR EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY IN UNIVERSITY SYSTEMS, FAIR USE OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS: A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN EDUCATING AMERICA (1995) (This pamphlet 
was written in large part by the author of the present article; text of the work is available at 
http://www.cetus.orglfairindex.html (last visited April 4, 2001». The purpose of fair use has 
been articulated in many ways. See. e.g., Elliott Epstein & Andrew J. Zulieve, The Fair Use 
Doctrine: Commercial Misappropriation and Market Diversion. 13 ME. BJ. 142, 142 (1998) 
("The 'Fair Use Doctrine' ameliorates the potentially suffocating effect on creative expression 
of the monopolistic rights conferred by the Copyright Act on authors of original works. In 
essence, the doctrine allows certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted work for criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and other 'transformative' purposes."); Phan, 
supra note 1, at 169. ('The copyright regime seeks to balance the public's desire for broad 
access to copyrighted works with the need to provide a pecuniary incentive for the copyright 
holder to disseminate her work.'). 
16 Although, just making this statement is a highly presumptive act. The two common 
activities mentioned are not explicitly established as fair use in any statement of law from 
Congress or the courts, but they may be nearly universally acknowledged as fair use. That is: 
nearly universally. Open discussion at the CONFU meetings revealed that someone is always 
prepared to contest even the seemingly clearest example offair use. See infra notes 141-46. 
17 These communities are hardly the only groups benefiting enonnously and importantly 
from fair use. Individuals who make copies at their loeal public library are exercising fair use. 
Lawyers who attach documents to court pleadings are engaged in fair use. Commercial 
publishers that excerpt sentences and other materials into new publications often depend on fair 
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use is specifically applicable to teaching, scholarship, and research-the main 
objectives ofeducational institutions and of the users of libraries of all types-as 
they access information resources for their own learning and progress.18 In that 
regard, fair use is also consistent with the constitutional objectives of copyright in 
general: to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.19 The :framers of 
the U.s. Constitution clearly intended that the law of copyright-including fair 
use-would be tailored to serve the advancement oflmowledge.2o 
use. Indeed, the co~cial publishing industry may be the greatest beneficiary of fair use, and 
it certainly has litigated its claim to fair use more often and with greater zeal than most parties. 
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that 
quotations from an unpublished book manuscript used in a magazine are not fair use); Wright v. 
Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that quotations from unpublished 
journal in a commercially published book are fair use); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), em. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987) (holding that quotations from 
unpublished letters for a commercially published biography are not fair use); Maxtone-Graharn 
v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), em. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987) (book including 
extensive quotations successfully defended as fair use); Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publ'g Co., 836 
F. Supp. 909 (D. Mass. 1993) (reprinting a psychology test scale in a commercial textbook is 
fair use); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (sketches from 
the Zapruder film included in a book as fair use). For a general study offair use in the context of 
commercial applications, see Steven D. Smit, "Make a Copy for the File . .. ": Copyright 
Infringement by Attorneys, 46 BAYWR L. REv. 1 (1994). 
18 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994)(descnbing in the preamble that fair use is "for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research''). 
19 The clause ofthe U.S. Constitution that empowers Congress to enact copyright law sets 
forth a policy for the law: "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Despite 
strenuous arguments to the contrary, a recent court ruling has held that the preamble language 
for this provision in fact has little substantive constraint on congressional authority to make 
copyright law. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For a strong argument that 
the Copyright Clause is a limit on Congress, see Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied 
Limits on the Legislative Power: The IntelJectUill Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on 
Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119. 
20 In 1984 the Supreme Court made this statement about the social objective of limiting 
the rights of copyright owners: ''The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are 
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited 
grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved." Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). In 1994, the Court made a more 
direct statement about the constitutional purposes that fair use serves: "From the infancy of 
copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought 
necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.'" Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S. CONST., 
art. I, §8, d. 8). 
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When Congress fully revised the Copyright Act in 1976, it added for the first 
time a statutory provision on fair use.21 After many years of hearings and 
recommendations,22 Congress ultimately chose to give fair use little definition.23 
The fair-use statute specifies that fair use applies to teaching, research, 
scholarship, and other educational needs, but the detennination of fair use in any 
particular case depends on an application of four factors. The text of section 107 
ofthe Copyright Act articulates those principles: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and l06A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or 
by any other means specified by that section, for pUIpOses such as criticism, 
connnent, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement ofcopyright In determining whether 
the use made ofa work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include­
(1) the pUIpOSe and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature ofthe copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. . 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration ofall the above factors.24 
Because case law in 1976 had not begun to address common educational 
needs, and because the four factors in the statute could be interpreted differently 
to produce divergent outcomes, educators and other parties were resolved to 
identify with some greater certainty the meaning and scope of fair use.25 
21 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 
17U.S.C.) 
22 The effort in Congress that led to passage of the Copyright Act of 1976 began in 1955 
when Congress authorized the U.S. Copyright Office to conduct studies of various copyright 
issues. The Copyright Office delivered those studies in 1960 and 1961, which began the process 
of legislation in earnest. Thirty-four studies were reprinted in SENATE CoMM. ON TIlE 
JUDICIARY, 86m CONG., CoPYRIGHT LAw REvIsiON STUDY (Cotnm. Print 1960). The thirty­
fifth study was published in 1963. For the congressional appropriation that is generally credited 
with initiating these studies, see Legislative Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1956, 69 Stat. 
499,517 (1955). 
23 H.R. REP. No. 94--1476, at 66 (1976) ('''The statement ofthe fair use doctrine in section 
107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the principles of the doctrine apply. 
However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in 
particular cases precludes the fonnulation ofexact roles in the statute:). 
24 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
25 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66-67 (1976). 
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Congress was not prepared to include further details in the law, but it urged the 
stakeholders to negotiate their concerns and to reach agreement about the 
meaning of the law.26 The outcome of that effort was the series of early 
guidelines.27 Negotiations in the mid-1970s gave rise to the first set ofguidelines 
on the issue ofphotocopying for classroom handouts.28 Soon came guidelines on 
making copies ofmusical works for education,29 and later emerged guidelines on 
sending copies ofjournal articles for interlibrary loans30 and recording television 
broadcasts off-air for classroom use.31 Once these guidelines were developed, 
Congress usually gave them a gesture of acceptance, but little substantive 
scrutiny. A few court decisions since then have relied on them, although with 
mixed impressions.32 Despite the legal ambiguity of guidelines, the impetus to 
devise guidelines for fair use has accelerated in recent years as interested parties 
struggle with new applications ofcopyright law.33 
Three proposals for new fair-use guidelines were included in a December 
1998 report of the Conference on Fair Use, also known as CONFU.34 Issued by 
26 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66-67 (1976); H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 62 (1966). 
Professor Jessica Litman has been less patient with the pressures from Congress. She has 
written that Congress "encouraged, cajoled, bullied, and threatened the parties through 
continuing negotiations." Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 
72 CoRNELLL. REv. 857,871 (1987). See also Ojf-Air Tapingfor Educational Use: Hearings 
Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice, 96th 
Congo 3-4 (1979). With respect to negotiating guidelines for off-air videotaping, Thomas E. 
Mooney, Associate Counsel to the Subcommittee, made this statement: "This is an area which I 
am afraid we are going to have to revisit and revisit, and then revisit again, until hopefully a 
solution of sorts emerges." [d. A recent Register of Copyrights made this sweeping statement: 
"It is our perception ... that in the past the Congress in general and this subcommittee in 
particular have expressed their preference and desire for the interested parties in the various 
copyright issues voluntarily to resolve them among themselves." Copyright Office/Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration ofJustice, 98th Congo 5 (1983) (remarks of David L. Ladd). This statement 
suggests that, despite the many purposes and characterizations attributed to the guidelines, see 
infra Part IV, one additional underlying purpose ofthe guidelines is to help Congress avoid the 
need to address the issue in a level ofdetail demanded by some interested parties. 
27 Those guidelines are listed at supra note 4. 
28 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4. 
29 Music Guidelines, supra note 4. 
30 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4. 
31 Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4. 
32 See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. V. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535-37 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (referring to the Classroom Guidelines). See infra Part 1lI ofthis article. 
33 Of particular importance in recent years has been the work of the Conference on Fair 
Use to devise a new generation ofguidelines. See infra text accompanying notes 116-96. 
34 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 31-59. See also INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUcrtJRE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECIUAL PROPERTY RlGI-ITS, 
CoNFERENCE ON FAIR USE: REPORT TO THE CoMMISSIONER ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST 
610 OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 62:599 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the report included proposals for 
guidelines on the issues of multimedia development, digitizing of visual images, 
and distance leaming.35 Those proposed guidelines have been the subject of 
conflicting and sometimes hostile debate. Many of the major education and 
library associations opposed them,36 and many publishers and other proprietor 
groups have given the guidelines their endorsement.37 Despite the good intentions 
of CONFU organizers, the planned effort to reach consensus seems in some 
respects finther away today than it did when CONFU first convened in 1994.38 
PHAsE OF mE CONFERENCE ON FAIR USE, (1997) [hereinafter CONFU INTERIM REPoRT]. This 
report is similar in many respects to the report issued nearly two years later, and includes the 
text ofthe same three proposed guidelines. 
35 CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 33-59. 
36 For example, among the groups opposing some or all of1he CONFU Guidelines were: 
American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU), American Council on 
Education (ACE), American Historical Society (AHS), American Library Association (ALA), 
Association of American Universities (AAU), Association of Research Libraries (ARL), 
Medical Library Association (MLA), National Association of State Universities and Land­
Grant Colleges, and the American Association of Law Libraries (AALL). See NOTIFICATIONS 
RECEIVED FROM ORGANIZATIONS ON mE PROPOSALS FOR FAIR USE GUIDELINES, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/officesldcomlolialconfulnotif.htm Qast visited April 4, 2001). 
37 Support for 1he various CONFU Guidelines was diffused. Numerous organizations 
noted on 1he public record 1heir support for 1he Multimedia Guidelines, but most of 1hose 
groups did hOt take a public position on the o1her guidelines. Among 1hose supporters, 
particularly of 1he Multimedia Guidelines, were: Association of American Publishers (AAP), 
Association of American University Presses, Inc. (AAUP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMl), 
Consortium of College and University Media Centers (CCUMC), American Society of 
Composers, Au1hors and Publishers (ASCAP), Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA), Software Publishers Association (SPA), Association of American Colleges and 
Universities (AAC&U), American Association of Conununity Colleges (AACC). See 
NOTIFICATIONS REcEIVED FROM ORGANIZATIONS ON mE PROPOSALS FOR FAIR USE 
GuIDELINES, at http://www.uspto.gov/weblofficesldcomlolialconfulnotif.htm Qast visited April 
4, 200I). The list ofendorsers of the Multimedia Guidelines also appears in 1he CONFU FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 56-57. 
38 CONFU convened at 1he behest of 1he U.S. Infonnation Infrastructure Task Force, 
which issued 1he "Green Paper" report in July 1994 calling on the diverse interest groups to 
negotiate an understanding of fair use for educational needs in lieu of any proposal for 
legislative action on fair use. INFORMATION lNFRAsTRUCTIJRE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP 
ON INTELLECIUAL PROPERlY RIGIITS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERlY AND mE NATIONAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTIJRE: A PREUMINARY DRAFT OF mE REPoRT OF mE WORKING 
GROUP ON INTELLECI1JAL PROPERlY RIGHTS (1994) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER]. According to 
1he GREEN PAPER: '''Therefore, the Working Group will sponsor a conference to bring toge1her 
copyright owner and user interests to develop guidelines for fair uses of copyrighted works by 
and in public libraries and schools." Id. at 134. In September 1995, the IITF issued a final 
"White Paper" that emphasized the hopes that CONFU would resolve 1he conflicts over fair use 
relatively quickly: "[Ilt appears reasonable to anticipate 1hat drafts now in preparation may be 
fonnalized as guidelines before 1he end of 1995." INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTIJRE TASK 
FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECI1JAL PROPERlY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERlY AND 
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This article will suggest that the fractured outcome of CONFU may be traced to 
the lack ofobjective legal analysis offair-use law and guidelines.39 
This article reflects on almost twenty-five years of experience with existing 
guidelines, with the hope that experience will offer insights about their 
significance-or lack of significance. A better understanding of the record of 
existing guidelines should also help address the fundamental questions about 
future guidelines: Do fair-use guidelines offer an appropriate standard for 
copyright owners and users who must make frequent fair-use detenninations? 
What are the qualities or attributes of guidelines that make them successful or 
unsuccessful in the context of fair-use applications? To facilitate the creation of 
more effective guidelines and to better scrutinize guidelines that are offered to 
universities and others for implementation, copyright owners and users alike need 
a fresh look at, and a critical framework for, understanding guidelines. 
Despite the weak platform from which guidelines are promoted, they 
continue to have appeal in the marketplace simply because the unsettled nature of 
fair use leaves many individuals uncomfortable with applying the law.4o The law 
of fair use regularly leaves lawyers, judges, and the public in turmoil and debate 
over its meaning and application. The u.s. Copyright Act now codifies broad 
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTIJRE: THE REPORT OF' TIlE WORKING GROUP ON 
lNTELLECTIJAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 83 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. The first meeting of 
CONFU was held in September 1994, more than two years before issuance of the three 
proposed guidelines in the CONFU 1NrERIM REPORT, supra note 34. For the announcement of 
the first CONFU meeting, see Conference on "Fair Use" and the National Information 
Infrastructure (NIl), 59 Fed. Reg. 46,823 (Sept. 12, 1994). The WHITE PAPER from 1995 added 
this motivation for the CONFU participants: "Should the participants in the Conference on Fair 
Use fail to agree on appropriate guidelines, the Working Group may conclude that the 
importance of such guidelines may necessitate regulatory or legislative action in that area." 
WHITE PAPER, supra, at 84. 
39 Readers should know that 1participated in most of the meetings ofCONFU on behalf 
of Indiana University and the Indiana Partnership for Statewide Education. The experience 
proved to be of utmost importance in reshaping my understanding of fair use and the role and 
nature of guidelines. See Kenneth D. Crews, Electronic Reserves and Fair Use: The Outer 
Limits ofCONFU, 50 1. AM. Soc'Y FOR INFO. SCI. 1342 (1999); Kenneth D. Crews, What 
Qualifies as "Fair Use"?, CHRON. HIGHER En., May 17, 1996, at Bl. Because the guidelines 
for electronic reserves, on which this author focused considerable effort, were never formalized 
and accepted by the CONFU participants, they are not included among the policies analyzed in 
this article. For an overview ofelectronic reserves and associated copyright issues, see Steven 1. 
Melamut, Pursuing Fair Use, Law Libraries, and Electronic Reserves, 92 L. LIB. 1. 157 (2000). 
40 During hearings that eventually led to enactment of the Copyright Revision Act of 
1976, an attorney representing a coalition of educators stated: "What education needs is a 
statute which will enable teachers easily to know when they can use copyrighted materials. 
Proposed section 6 [on fair use] does not give this certainty, but means that a teacher in 
preparing every single lesson must either consult a lawyer or act at her risk." STAFF' OF' TIlE 
HOUSE COMM. ON TIlE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRlGHT LAw REvIsION PART 5: 1964 
REVISION Bu..L WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 97 (Comm. Print 1965) (Statement of Harry 
N. Rosenfield). 
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principles underlying fair use, but ultimately offers few details for understanding 
its meaning in specific applications.41 Yet each day thousands of individuals 
depend on fair use for the furtherance ofeducation, research, and public service­
exactly the pursuits that the law was intended to support. But they may often 
make their decisions based on speculation and erroneous information. Many 
individuals also make decisions at their peril; articulations of fair use by 
educators, librarians, researchers, and students are the object of hostile criticism 
and even threats oflitigation from groups representing copyright owners. The law 
affords ample opportunity for reasonable people to differ widely about fair use, 
but the law also gives copyright owners the ability to threaten lawsuits when 
differing views are otherwise unresolved. 
B. Perceptions ofthe Guidelines 
In a lineage of diverse sources-from informal essays to institutional 
policies-fair-use guidelines have been given a wide range of characterizations 
and appellations. These descriptions have come from many diverse perspectives 
and have continued from the inception of the first guidelines in 1976 through 
today. These characterizations also reflect the complex relationship that the 
guidelines have with the law, with the parties who created them, and with the 
marketplace where difficult fair-use decisions occur. Those decisions need to be 
made by individuals who may benefit from fair use or who may be adversely 
affected by the exercise offair use. The decisions also signal whether a copyright 
owner may want to consider bringing an infringement action. The decisions 
further indicate a great deal about the mutual relationships among copyright 
owners and users and the terms on which they may find themselves agreeing to 
co-exist in a complex environment of competing pressures and often opposing 
ideals. Guidelines are specifically intended to shape those decisions. How one 
understands and characterizes the guidelines, therefore, will consequently shape 
the fair-use decision based upon them. 
Part IV of this article will examine the validity of the many ways that the 
guidelines have been perceived and characterized since their inception in 1976. In 
broad terms, the guidelines have been described in terms of their relationship to 
the law offair use itself. Ifthe guidelines bear no relationship to fair use law, they 
are futile or perhaps even a fraud.42 In their strongest endorsement, they are 
described as an accurate statement offair use law. The "Uniform Preamble" to the 
CONFU guidelines, for example, states: ''The purpose of these guidelines is to 
41 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
42 See L. RAy PAITERSON & STANLEY W. LiNDBERO, 1lIE NATURE OF COPYRIOHT: A 
LAw OF USERS' RIOHTS, 8-9 (1991). 
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provide guidance on the application of fair use principles ...."43 The connection 
to the law cannot be overlooked. 
More often, the guidelines are portrayed as a "minimum" measure of fair use, 
or are a "safe harbor" from infringement.44 The earliest guidelines, from 1976, 
include a declaration that they "state the minimum and not the maximum 
standards of educational fair use tmder section 107."45 In that regard, the 
guidelines apparently offer a "safe harbor" from infringement.46 On the other 
hand, tmless the guidelines are some statement of security from litigation, then 
they are not even a minimum standard.47 Whether minimum, maximum, or 
definitive, the various guidelines clearly claim to be some version of fair-use 
law.48 
If the guidelines are not about the law, they may instead define the private 
relationship between parties to the guidelines themselves. The earliest of the 
guidelines, the Classroom Guidelines, were formally entitled an "agreement," and 
parties to the CONFU guidelines are described as "endorsers."49 This language 
suggests assent to terms, whether contractual or not. The guidelines perhaps have 
been most significant in shaping institutional policy. In that regard, they may well 
be binding on the parties that agree to accept them as standards of behavior for 
members of an educational institution that uses the guidelines as formal policy.50 
These possible perceptions of the guidelines only hint at the confusion that 
sUlTotmds them. 
43 CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 31. 
44 See infra Part N .A.2. 
45 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 68. 
46 See infra Part N.A.2. 
47 This particular clause in the preamble has been a point of serious contention among 
CONFU participants. Some negotiators have understood it as a generous expression of 
openness to possible fair use beyond the defined limits of the guidelines; as the CONFU 
preamble does make explicit that something beyond the limits ofthe guidelines may still be fair 
use. See CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 31-32. Other negotiators have seen the 
language as an anchor on the flexibility of fair use, constantly pulling one back to the 
gravitational center ofthe stated limits in the guidelines. 
48 The concept of guidelines as minimum standards is discussed infra Part N.A.2. The 
concept ofguidelines as maximum standards is discussed infra Part N -A,3. 
49 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4; see also infra note 431. 
50 An analysis of fair-use policies at leading research universities revealed that 
approximately eighty percent of the institutions incorporated some of the early guidelines into 
their formal policy statements on fair use. KENNETH D. CREws, COPYRlGlIT, FAIR USE, AND 
THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIVERSITIES 73 (1993) (The Classroom Guidelines "are the foundation 
for the policies at approximately eighty percent ofthe universities that address either classroom 
or research copying."). See also id. at 98 (Ofthe fifty-four policies addressing interlibrary loans 
"all but eight are rooted in the CONTU Guidelines."). 
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A Emergence ofFair-Use Guidelines (1935-1981) 
Despite the essential relationship between fair use, educational institutions, 
and libraries, remarkably little legislation or litigation has dealt with even the 
most common examples of possible fair use, ranging from simple photocopying 
to customary uses of the Internet.51 Given the relative void of true legal guidance, 
stakeholders in the enterprise of teaching, learning, and librarianship have met 
periodically during the last few decades to negotiate "guidelines" that attempt to 
define an understanding of fair use as it may apply to frequently occurring 
situations.52 Part II of this article will survey the origins and content of the 
guidelines. Critical analysis ofthe relationship between the guidelines and the law 
offair use will be set forth in Parts IV and V. 
1. Gentlemen's Agreement (1935) 
The earliest example of such a fair-use guideline was the so-called 
"Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1935 that identified instances of reproduction of 
short copyrighted works that would be allowed under the law at that time.53 The 
relatively simple standard was a response to the introduction ofphotographic and 
other photo-duplication equipment in libraries.54 As technologies evolved in the 
following decades, particularly with the growth of high-speed photocopying, the 
51 The few cases that offer some insight for education or library applications do not 
involve such nonprofit entities that are generally favored under fair use. See. e.g., Basic Books, 
Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (photocopying by a 
for-profit copyshop). 
52 For a list ofthe guidelines examined in this article, see supra note 4. 
53 The Gentlemen s Agreement and the Problem of Copyright, 2 1. DocuMENTARY 
REPROD. 29, 31-33 (1939). See also Alan Latman, Fair Use ofCopyrighted Works. reprintedin 
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON 1lIE JUDICIARY, 86m CONG., STUDY No. 14, § 11-12, 
COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION (Comm. Print 1960) (suggesting that the Gentlemen's Agreement 
revealed an intention by the publishing industry to regulate private activity and not to concede 
common uses). 
54 Previously, the controversy over fair use had focused on the lawfulness of making 
manual transcriptions of articles and other research materials found in a library. See generally 
RR Bowker, The National Library as the Central Factor of Library Development in the 
Nation, 37 LtBR. J. 3, 3-6 (1912). As recently as 1973, counsel to Williams & Wilkins Co., a 
journal publishing company, suggested that a student who transcribes content ofthe journal for 
research or study would be making a "technical infringement." Copyright Law Revision: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents. Trademarks, and Copyrights ofthe Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 152-53 (1973) (remarks ofArthur Greenbaum). 
615 2001] ILLUSION OF FAIR-USE GUIDEliNES 
debate over fair use shifted from isolated copies to multiple copies that more 
likely held the risk ofreplacing purchases ofcopyrighted works.55 
2. Classroom Guidelines (1976) 
The best known ofall fair-use guidelines emerged in 1976, not coincidentally 
in conjunction with the passage of the newly revised Copyright Act,56 For the 
fIrst time, the law embodied fair use in statutory terms, and not merely as a 
judicial doctrine.57 To many copyright proprietors-particularly publishers--the 
newly codifIed fair use was a challenge or even a threat,58 Although the new 
statute was fimdarnentally unspecifIc and susceptible to broad intetpretations, it 
nevertheless made unequivocal that fair use would exist and could be raised in a 
wide range of cases.59 The new statute also stated explicitly that fair use would 
generally apply to educational uses, including multiple copies of protected works 
for teaching purposes.60 The new law, as enacted in 1976, was astonishingly 
simple in its reliance on four factors: the purpose of the use; the nature of the 
work; the amount of the work used; and the effect of the use on the value of, or 
the market for, the original work,61 
For many educators, however, the new statute was uncomfortably vague, 
demanding analyses of four factors on which even the most seasoned copyright 
lawyers could not reach agreernent,62 The legal interpretations and the possible 
legal liabilities were daunting to the teachers, librarians, and administrators who 
55 Other proposals for fair-use standards emerged in the intervening years, but with little 
acceptance. For example, the American Library Association issued a "Reproduction of 
Materials Code" in 1941. See Borge Varmer, Photoduplication of Copyrighted Material by 
Libraries, reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON TIlE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., STUDY No. 
15, COPYRIGHT LAwREVISION 52-53 (Corom. Print 1960). 
56 For the Copyright Act of 1976 as originally passed by Congress on October 19, see 
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
57 Fair use in American copyright law originated in judicial rulings. Scholars generally 
regard the doctrine as having originated in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
{No. 4,901). 
58 See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Congo 974-76 (l967) (remarks of 
William M. Passano, president ofthe Williams & Wilkins Co.). 
59 See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 65-f>7 (l976). 
60 17 U.S.C. § to7 (l976). 
61Id. 
62 Early in the process leading to passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, educators urged 
Congress to enact a fair-use law with specific provisions for permitted copying. Author and 
publisher groups opposed specifics in the law, as did the U.S. Copyright Office. See Copyright 
Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights ofthe 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights, 89th 
Cong. 27-28 (l965). 
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found themselves needing to make responsible decisions that, they hoped, were in 
conformity with the law.63 Even if they were inclined to take on the task, the 
nuances of fair use appeared demanding and time-consuming. Each new 
situation, each new member of the faculty or staff, and each new report about 
copyright developments could engender a raft of new questions, absorbing the 
scarce time of educators. Most educators have little time or propensity for such 
complexities, and copyright responsibilities should not be a burden on, or 
distraction from, educational duties.64 Moreover, difficult decisions about fair use 
are a steady reminder that erroneous decisions might expose instructors to legal 
liabilities. 
Yet, the reality was that copyright law set limits on the use of protected 
works. In particular, the Copyright Act of 1976 granted to copyright owners 
exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution of their works, along with 
various other rights.65 Without a fair-use right, all copying of materials for the 
simple pursuit of classroom handouts would be prohibited.66 The new fair-use 
statute, however, allowed copies for teaching, but only within the limits of the 
four factors. Educators were once again thrust into the unwelcome position of 
needing to understand and apply the uncertain law. 
From this apparent intrusion by copyright, and from the new uncertainty that 
fair use seemed to represent, came a yearning for more specific guidance about 
63 Educators expressed concerns about the challenge of fair-use decisions well before 
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976. In 1967, a representative of educator groups explained: 
"Fair-use gives teachers and scholars no assurance of when copyrighted materials may be 
copied, nor how much, nor under what specific circumstances." Copyright Law Revision: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights ofthe Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 89th Congo 122 (1965) (remarks of Harry N. Rosenfield). See also H.R. REp. 
No. 90.83, at 30 (1967) (Educators "argued further that the doctrine of fair use alone is 
insufficient to provide the certainty that teachers and other nonprofit educational users of 
copyrighted material need for their own protection."). If the educator is incorrect about a fair­
use decision, and the activity is an infiingement, the possible liabilities for copyright 
infiingement include: injunctions, impoundments, actual damages, statutory damages, attorney 
fees and court costs, and even criminal penalties. 17 U.S.c. §§ 502-06 (1994). For further 
discussion ofstatutory damages, see infra text accompanying notes 441-48. 
64 The burdens on individuals are the ''transaction costs" of decisions about fair use, and 
the guidelines have an intended function of reducing those costs. See Kenneth D. Salomon & 
Michael J. Pierce, Commentary, Copyright Law and the Information Superhighway, 96 WEST'S 
EDuc. L. REP. 315, 325 (1995). 
65 Copyright owners in general have the exclusive rights to reproduce the works, to 
distribute copies to the public, to make derivative works, and to make public displays and 
perfonnances. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). With respect to works of visual art, 
the author has certain "moral rights," notably the right of attribution and integrity. 17 U.S.C. § 
I06A (1994). A ''work of visual art" is defined generally as paintings, sculpture, and some 
photographs made in limited copies. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
66 Of course, theoretically, some other right under some other name could allow such 
copying, but this discussion will adhere to the current law and its offerings. 
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the law's meaning.67 Consequently, representatives of educators, authors, and 
publishers met during the years prior to passage of the 1976 Act in order to 
negotiate an understanding of the new law as applied specifically to multiple 
photocopies ofmaterials for classroom use.68 The product ofthose meetings was 
the "Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit 
Educational Institutions," also known as the ''Classroom Guidelines."69 
The Classroom Guidelines are built on the premise that some photocopying 
of materials for distribution to students is within fair use, but with limits. These 
guidelines allow single copies ofshort items, such as an article or book chapter, to 
be made by a teacher for research or class preparation. Multiple copies for 
distribution, however, are subject to the rigorous limits of "brevity," 
"spontaneity," and "cumulative effect" Copies must include "a notice of 
copyright."70 "Brevity" is a precise limit on the number of words that an 
instructor may copy from each work; the user must literally count the words in the 
original article, count the words in the excerpt for copying, and stay within 
specified limits.?1 "Spontaneity" means that the copying is at the instructor's 
"instance and inspiration" and needs to be so close in time to classroom use "that 
67 See Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to 
Photocopy Freely, 60 U. Pm. L. REv. 149, IS9-63 (1998) (tracing origins of the Classroom 
Guidelines); Anderson & Brown, supra note 13, at l44-4S. 
68 Much of the effort to complete the Classroom Guidelines came in the final months 
leading to passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, once Congress had made clear that it would 
not enact a statute that detailed the law applicable to educational needs. Still, the parties did 
meet early in the process to reach agreement, but without success until the brink ofpassage of 
the act by Congress. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subromm. on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Congo 618 (1967) 
(remarks ofErwin C. Surrency). 
69 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4. 
70 The Classroom Guidelines do not explicitly state whether the notice must be the fannal 
copyright notice as appears on the original work, or whether it may be some general statement 
about copyright and its applicability to the work. The debate over the fonn ofnotice was part of 
the struggle over similar language in section 108(a) of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) 
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Congress recently clarified the matter by amending the statute to 
provide that copies made under section 108 must include the fannal notice as it appears on the 
original. If no notice is on the original, the copy must include the general statement about 
copyright. Digital Mittennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. IOS-304, § 404, 112 Stat. 2860, 
2889-90 (1998) (amending section 108(a) of the Copyright Act). Perhaps the logic of that 
construct could be extended to the Classroom Guidelines. 
71 For example, if an article is less than 2,SOO words, the instructor may copy the entire 
article. If it is more than 2,500 words, the instructormay copy only an excerpt of a length equal 
to the lesser ofeither 1,000 words or ten percent ofthe work-although the excerpt may in any 
event be at least SOO words in length, and the instructor may go a little over the limit to reach 
the end of a "prose paragraph." Despite these rigors, one commentator has described the 
Classroom Guidelines as allowing "fairly liberal photocopying for purposes of research and 
scholarship." Diane Leenheer Zimmennan, Capyright in Cyberspace: Don't Thraw out the 
Public Interest with the Bath Water, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 411 n.18. 
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it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for pennission."72 
"Cumulative effect" generally puts a cap on the number of works that may be 
copied from an individual source.?3 For example, during a single instructional 
term, the teacher may copy only one article from a single author, or three articles 
from a single collection or periodical, and no course shall include more than nine 
instances ofmultiple copying during the tenn. 
In addition to these three standards, the Qassroom Guidelines also offer 
''prolubitions.''74 Even if the copying is scrupulously within the three conditions 
of brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect, some activities are still forbidden 
under the guidelines. For example, students may not be charged for the material 
beyond the actual copying cost; the copying cannot substitute for a purchase of 
books and other publications; a teacher may not copy the same material in more 
than one tenn; and the copying "shall not be used to create or to replace or 
substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works."75 The Classroom 
Guidelines not only blatantly diverge from the four factors in the fair-use statute 
and replace them with three different mandates, but also add blanket prohibitions 
that cannot be overcome by any balancing of factors or equities.76 The guidelines 
unquestionably displace the law with a standard that is a departure from the 
statute in many respects. 
The most common attraction of the guidelines is their promise of relative 
certainty about fair use.77 Yet even an objective and generally supportive 
discussion of the guidelines will often yield more questions about not only their 
legal significance but also their factual applicability. Nimmer on Copyright gives 
the QassroomGuidelines tremendous deference in the interpretation offair use,78 
but when attempting to explain their content, the treatise proceeds to question the 
validity and consistency of the word limits and puzzles over the concept of 
"special works,"79 calling it ''very badly defined" and noting the logical flaws of 
72 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69. See also Steven K. Barton, Comment and 
Note, Felony Copyright Infringement in Schools, 1994 B.Y.U. Eoue. & LJ. 143, 154. 
73 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69-70. For an additional summary of criticisms 
ofthe guidelines, see Carol M. Silberberg, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First 
Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 637-39 (2001). 
77 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 68. See also Babiskin, supra note 14, at 223; 
Mary R. Barry, Note, Multiple Photocopying by Educators and the Fair Use Doctrine: The 
Court's Role in Reducing Transactions Costs, 1994 U.ILL. L. REv. 387, 395. 
78 See infra text accompanying notes 383-86. 
79 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69 (defining "special works" as "[c]ertain works 
in poetry, prose or in 'poetic prose' which often combine language with illustrations and which 
are intended sometimes for children and at other times for a more general audience fall short of 
2,500 words in their entirety"). 
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the treatment,80 The guidelines may well offer more certainty, but they still raise 
their own questions and pose their own problems for application. 
3. Music Guidelines (1976) 
The apparent need for guidelines was not limited to simple classroom 
copying, even upon the passage of the 1976 Act. A second set of guidelines, 
addressing the copying of music for instructional purposes,8l was in the same 
House Report that included the Classroom Guidelines.82 These "Music 
Guidelines" focus on a few cornmon situations that arise in the teaching ofmusic. 
They outline when teachers may copy sheet music for classroom performance, or 
record and duplicate student performances ofcopyrightedmusic.83 
The Music Guidelines lack the highly detailed standards of the Classroom 
Guidelines. For example, they allow "emergency copying" of music for an 
"imminent performance," provided that the school or instructor purchases 
replacement copies ''in due course."84 An instructor may copy excerpts of music 
for "academic purposes other than performance.''85 The excerpt is not measured 
strictly by quantity, but must be less than a ''performable unit" and not more than 
ten percent of the entire work,86 Instructors may also record performances by 
students and may make a single copy of an existing sound recordingS7 for 
constructing aural exercises or examinations.88 These guidelines also include 
80 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGI:IT, supra note 7, at § 13.05[E][3][c], n. 534. 
81 Music Guidelines, supra note 4. 
82 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-71 (1976). 
83Id at 70-71. 
84/d. at 71. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
87 Since the drafting of the Music Guidelines, Congress has enacted the Audio Home 
Recording Act. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.c. 
§§ lool-to (1994 & Supp. IV 1998», which generally bars copyright infiingement actions 
against individuals who use certain audio recording equipment to make copies of sound 
recordings of musical works. In return, the music industry receives revenue from a ''tax'' 
imposed on the sale ofrecording devices and materials. Consequently, the making of copies of 
sound recordings may be perfectly lawful, within the narrow conditions of a single copy for 
classroom use. While the Music Guidelines may have been a reasonable interpretation of fair 
use in 1976, theymay not reflect the broader rights ofthis particular use that current law allows. 
See generally, A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the AHRA exemption from liability does not apply to music files downloaded onto 
computer drives). 
88 In a most revealing twist, the Music Guidelines add parenthetically this statement to the 
provision allowing copies ofsound recordings: "This pertains only to the copyright ofthe music 
itself and not to any copyright which may exist in the sound recording." Supra note 4, at 71. 
One can only surmise that negotiations leading to the guidelines included participation from 
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"prohIbitions" similar to the ones found in the Classroom Guidelines.89 Like the 
Classroom Guidelines, these guidelines make no pretence ofrelating the detailed 
standard of fair use to the four factors in the law. While they may not be as 
meticulous as the Classroom Guidelines in their measurement of fair use, they 
still stray far from the law's flexibility. 
4. Off-Air Videotaping Guidelines (1981) 
In addition to the classroom handouts and music copies, one more set of 
guidelines was in preparation in 1976, but the House Report duly noted that it was 
not yet ready for fmal approval and publication.90 Not until 1981 did the parties 
negotiating these guidelines reach a conclusion91 and issue the "Guidelines for 
representatives of the owners of compositions, and not participation by representatives of the 
recording artists. For a study of the creation of these guidelines, with confinnation of the 
perhaps incomplete representation in the drafting, see Barbara L. Bell, The Controversy Over 
Establishing Fair Use Guidelines for Off-Air Videotaping for Educational Uses: A Case Study 
of Attempts to Fonnulate Policy 170-77 (1980) (Wlpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana 
University) (on file with the Indiana University Education Library). 
89 One of the prohibitions in the Music Guidelines provides that all copies must include 
"the copyright notice which appears on the printed copy," Supra note 4, at 71. Unlike the 
Classroom Guidelines, this standard clarifies that the notice must be the formal notice, and not a 
general statement ofcopyright. See supra note 70. 
90 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 71-72 (1976). 
91 After passage ofthe Copyright Act of 1976, negotiators continued to meet, notably in a 
four-day session during July 1977, to draft guidelines. That effort broke down and needed to be 
reinvigorated in congressional hearings nearly two years later. See Ojf-Air Taping for 
Educational Use: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts. Civil Liberties. and the 
Administration oj Justice. 96th Congo 2 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Robert Kastenmeier). 
Apparently causing much of the delay was the reluctance of the motion picture industry, 
notably the Motion Picture Association ofAmerica, to endorse the guidelines that would allow 
some off-air taping of its works. During the protracted negotiations, congressional hearings 
attempted to advance the effort, and an officer of the MPAA made this broad statement: "And 
quite frankly, it is the view ofthe motion picture companies that the taping ofentire copyrighted 
works off the air is an infringement and not a fair use." [d. at 32 (remarks of James Bourns). 
The MPAA never did endorse the Off-Air Guidelines. Not long after issuance ofthe guidelines 
in 1981, prominent members of the MPAA filed a lawsuit against Sony Corporation, asserting 
that its manufacture and sale of home videorecording devices was contributory infringement. 
Universal Studios, Inc. v. SonyCotp. ofAm., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (CD. Cal. 1979). The U.S. 
Supreme Court eventually ruled in that case that home recording of off-air broadcasts was fair 
use. Sony Cotp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984). At the time, 
the MPAA may well have acted in its own appropriate self-interest by not endorsing guidelines 
that could weaken, however slightly, its infringement claim that it was soon to assert. In 
retrospect, the decision to file that lawsuit has been heavily criticized as short-sighted, with 
analysts pointing to the rapid growth ofthe motion picture industry and revenues following the 
widespread consumer acceptance of videocassette recorders. See generally. JAMES LARDNER, 
FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, TIlE JAPANESE, AND TIlE ONSLAUGJIT OF THE VCR 284-85 
(1987). 
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Off-Air Recording of Broadcast Programming for Educational Purposes.''92 
Better known as the "Off-Air Guidelines," this standard would, in general, allow 
a teacher to record, off-the-air, a television broadcast for later use or 
"perfonnance" in classroom teaching. The instructor could use the tape in the 
classroom on only one occasion93 and then only during the first ten school days 
during the forty-five calendar days following the date of the transmission and 
copying.94 Any repeat or later use would require pemrission.95 
The Off-Air Guidelines differ in some important respects from the other 
guidelines, but they also share some common traits. Like the others, these 
guidelines are not built explicitly on the four statutory factors. Elements of the 
guidelines may well be relevant to satisfaction ofthe factors, but the guidelines do 
little if anything to make the connection to the language ofthe law. Unlike many 
other standards, the Off-Air Guidelines are not as unrelentingly precise in their 
measure of fair use. The guidelines are specific about the span of days during 
which the recording may be used, but the guidelines do not place exacting limits 
on the quantity of the broadcast that may be either recorded or used. Indeed, the 
guidelines allow the teacher to record and use the entire televised work In that 
regard, the Off-Air Guidelines may be easier to apply and more palatable than 
some of the other standards, but those differences do not necessarily tell whether 
they are a more accurate statement offair-use law. 
5. Overview ofthe Early Guidelines 
The Classroom Guidelines, the Music Guidelines, and the Off-Air Guidelines 
have much in common with one another. They were developed through voluntary 
negotiations among diverse stakeholders, often representing copyright owners, 
publishers, educators, librarians, and others.96 Each set of guidelines was 
92 Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4, at 8-9 




96 For the Classroom Guidelines, members of the negotiating team included: Ad Hoc 
Committee of Educational Institutions and Organizations on Copyright Law Revision; the 
Authors League of America, Inc.; and the Association of American Publishers, Inc. For the 
Music Guidelines, members included: Music Publishers' Association of the United States, Inc.; 
National Music Publishers' Association, Inc.; Music Teachers National Association; Music 
Educators National Conference; National Association of Schools of Music; and the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Copyright Law Revision. For the Off-Air Guidelines, members included the 
Agency for Instructional Television; Association of Media Producers; Motion Picture 
Association of America; American Library Association; National Education Association; 
Association for Educational Communications and Technology; Authors League of America; 
Screen Actors Guild; Joint Council on Educational Communications; Directors Guild of 
America; Association of American Publishers; National Association of Broadcasters; Public 
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delivered to Congress, and the committee reports included favorable observations 
and lent important credibility to the guidelines as reasonable, if not positive, 
developments consistent with the law that Congress had actually made.97 Those 
comments appear in congressional reports and other official publications, lending 
the appearance of "official" approval to the guidelines.98 The legal community 
will undoubtedly recognize that publication in a report does not make the 
guidelines "law." Yet the larger public is not prepared to grasp or appreciate the 
distinction, often leading to a conclusion that the guidelines are accepted by 
Congress and therefore must be accepted by the American public in its quest to 
understand fair use. Moreover, none of the guidelines exhibits any relationship to 
the statutory definition of fair use; none is built on the four factors that Congress 
and the courts have laid down as the actual measure of,lawful activity.99 
B.	 CONTU.· The National Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works (1979) 
1. Origins ofthe CONTU Guidelines 
A fourth set of early guidelines emerged under considerably different 
conditions. When Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress also 
recognized that the law was flexible to meet new technologies, but had not 
specifically addressed the looming demands of computers and large-scale 
photocopying.loo To begin a close examination of the new law, Congress 
established the National Commission on New Technological Uses ofCopyrighted 
Works (CONTU) and authorized it to make recommendations for revising and 
implementing the new law.101 
Broadcasting Service; American Council on Education; National School Boards Association; 
Writers Guild of America, East; American Federation of Television and Radio Artists; ABC; 
and CBS. 
97 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 72 (1976): 
Teachers will know that copying within the guidelines is fair use. Thus, the guidelines 
serve the purpose of fulfilling the need for greater certainty and protection for teachers. The 
Committee expresses the hope that ifthere are areas where standards other than these guidelines 
may be appropriate, the parties will continue their efforts to provide additional specific 
guidelines in the same spirit ofgood will. 
98 See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 72 (1976) ("The Committee believes the guidelines 
are a reasonable interpretation ofminimum standards offair use.''). 
99 See infra text accompanying notes 367-77. 
100 See 120 CONGo REC. 30, 516 (1974) (remarks of Sen. McClellan, recognizing that 
there would be new "copyright issues ... arising from the development ofnew technology."). 
101 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3-5. See Pub. L. No. 93-573 (1974). 
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One provision of the Copyright Act that CONTU confronted was section 
108(g)(2), which provided for qualified librariesl02 to engage in the making and 
distribution of photocopied materials in furtherance of "interlibrary 
arrangements," or loans. The new law allowed libraries to make copies of some 
works to meet the'research and study needs of individual users. I03 Those copies 
may also be sent to users at other libraries who request the copies.l04 When 
making those copies for distribution as interlibrary loans, however, the law 
establishes further conditions. In general, section 108 prohibits any "systematic" 
copying-which could be multiple copies sent through interlibrary loans-but the 
law nevertheless allows interlibrary arrangements: 
The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section extend to the 
isolated and unrelated reproduction or distribution of a single copy or phonorecord of 
the same material on separate occasions, but do not extend to cases where the library 
or archives, or its employee­
... engages in the systematic reproduction or distribution of single or multiple 
copies or phonorecords of material ... : Provided, That nothing in this clause 
prevents a library or archives from participating in interlibrary arrangements that do 
not have, as their purpose or effect, that the library or archives receiving such copies 
or phonorecords for distnbution does so in such aggregate quantities as to substitute 
for a subscription to or purchase ofsuch work. I05 
In its final report, issued in 1979, CONTU offered guidelines for interpreting 
that statutory standard, at least with respect to copies of recent periodical articles, 
the mainstay ofmany interlibrary-loan operations. Under the CONTU Guidelines, 
libraries are allowed to receive from another library, during a calendar year, up to 
five copies of articles from the most recent five years of issues of a single 
journal.I06 Under that standard, receipt of a sixth article in a year would imply a 
sufficient demand for that periodical such that the receiving library may be 
relying on interlibrary arrangements that substitute for a subscription to the 
work. I07 Many libraries use the guidelines to evaluate the need to purchase a 
subscription, or upon reaching the sixth copy begin to seek permission for making 
102 The statute specifies, in particular, that for a library to have the benefits under section 
108, it must be "open to the public" or at least not limited exclusively to users who are affiliated 
with the library or its parent institution. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(2) (1994). Most public libraries and 
academic.libraries will likely meet this requirement. Private or corporate libraries may not. 
103 For example, the library may make copies of chapters of books and articles under 
some conditions, and may even copy an entire book or other lengthy work under more rigorous 
conditions. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(dHe) (1994). 
104Id. 
105 17 U.S.C. § 108(g)(1994).
 
106 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 55-56.
 
107 Id. at 56.
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additional copies or decide to pay a fee to a service such as the Copyright 
Clearance Center.I08 
2. Distinctive Traits ofthe CONTU Guidelines 
The CONTIJ Guidelines are not truly "fair-use" guidelines; they are not an 
interpretation of section 107 of the Copyright Act. Nevertheless, they are closely 
aligned with the other guidelines, and section 108 is also deployed in libraries and 
educational institutions alongside section 107, often to facilitate similar services 
in fulfillment of education and research needs. Yet these guidelines are in other 
respects fimdamentally different from the three other standards. First, while the 
CONTIJ Guidelines are the outgrowth of a congressional commission, the fair­
use guidelines are the product of negotiations among interested parties. This 
difference is critical in many respects. 
Voluntary negotiations have intrinsic limits. The parties who are most likely 
to attend are the ones perceiving the most immediate concern about the issue­
often the parties with the greatest financial stake. The parties may also be the ones 
with the financial wherewithal to attend negotiating sessions at all. Voluntary 
negotiations also mean that the outcome has the potential ofbeing skewed by an 
imbalance of representation among the diverse perspectives, or even the absence 
of some points of view.I09 By contrast, the appointment of commissioners to a 
limited number ofpositions holds the prospect that the major views on copyright 
matters will be represented and balanced. Appointment to a federal commission 
may also imbue each individual with a greater sense of public service, perhaps 
with an objective of serving the greater good, and not the short-term demands of 
the company or organization that may be paying the travel costs and daily 
wageS-()f hourly billings--ofeachnegotiator. 
108 GASAWAY & WIANT, supra note 7, at 54-55 (outlining several alternatives forlibraries 
upon reaching the limits of the guidelines). A study in 1983 determined that more than forty 
percent of academic libraries that fulfilled interlibrary-loan requests had refused to fulfill user's 
requests for copyright reasons, and more than thirty percent of those libraries refused to fill 
some requests received from other libraries for copyright reasons. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPoRT 
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: LIBRARY REPRODucnoN OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (17 
U.S.C. § 108) (1983), app. I, at 1-6. For more information about the Copyright Clearance 
Center, see: http://www.copyright-corn (last visited April 4, 2(01). 
109 For example, during the CONFU negotiations, see infra text accompanying notes 
116-51, educators complained of being "outgunned." See Robert L. Jacobson, Furor over 
"Fair Use:" Educators Seem Outgunned in Negotiations with Copyright Owners, 42 CHRON. 
HIGHER Eooc., May 10,1996, at A25, and subsequent letters to the editor, 42 CARON. HIGHER 
Eooc., June 14, 1996, at B4. The court in the Kinlw s decision was not inclined to evaluate 
retrospectively the process for formulating the Classroom Guidelines once they had 
congressional support. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 
n.1O (S.D.N.V. 1991). See infra Part II1A.2. 
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A second distinction of the CONTU Guidelines is their substantive measure 
of legal rights ofuse. Whatever the ambiguities of the law, these guidelines set a 
standard that is relatively easy for a library to implement and that allows the 
library to deliver a meaningful quantity of material to the patron who requested 
it. I I0 The Classroom Guidelines would have educators count words before 
copying for some uses; the Music Guidelines refer to copies of ten percent of 
some works. By contrast, the CONTU Guidelines are based on a useful unit of 
intellectual content-a jomnal article-without the need to count words or define 
some other disroptive sub-unit in order to claima rightful exercise offair use. I I I 
The CONTU Guidelines differ from other guidelines in a third respect: their 
foundation in a judicial decision.112 This article will look closely at court cases 
which have referred to the various fair-use guidelines following their 
development and issuance.I13 Those cases, of course, arose after issuance of the 
guidelines. Negotiators of those guidelines did not have the benefit of insight 
from direct court rulings. By contrast, the CONTU Guidelines emerged from 
practices that were in fact devised and implemented at a major research library 
and that were later scrutinized and judged in the course of litigation against that 
library.I14 The effort to create the CONTU Guidelines was directly aided by the 
views of judges who ruled on the critical issues and scrutinized a library's 
practices; the CONTU commissioners had the benefit of knowing what other 
judges would likely allow to pass muster under a fair-use analysis.I15 
110 Several early studies indicated that the CONTU Guidelines were not necessarily a 
serious limit on library services. See, e.g, Dale R. Middleton, Predicting the Impact of 
Copyright Specifications on Interlibrary Borrowing, 65 BUlL. MED. LIBR. Assoc. 449 (1977); 
John Steuben, Interlibrary Loan ofPhotocopies ofArticles under the New Copyright Law, 70 
SPEC. LIBR. 227 (1979); Johanna E. Tallman, One Year's Experience with CONTU Guidelines 
for Interlibrary Loan Photocopies, 5 J. ACAD. LIBR. 71 (1979). 
111 Similarly, the Off-Air Guidelines do allow copies of entire broadcasts. See Off-Air 
Guidelines, supra note 4, at 8 ("'A broadcast program may be recorded off-air.... 'Broadcast 
programs' are television programs transmitted by television stations for reception by the general 
public without charges."). 
112 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973). 
113 See infra Part m. 
114 For a discussion of that litigation that led to the CaNTU Guidelines, see infra Part 
m.c. 
lIS Although the CaNTU Guidelines closely parallel the copying that was sanctioned in 
the Williams & Wilkins decision, the report from caNTU that offered the guidelines 
surprisingly does not analyze that case. See CONTU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 52-75 
(examining the issues surrounding library photocopying). The report does mention the case 
only in a brief footnote with respect to growing concerns about copyright in the late 196Os. 
CaNTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 n.14. 
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C. CONFU: The Conference on Fair Use (1994-1998) 
1. Background and Purposes ofCONFU 
The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) was an infonnal gathering of 
interested parties, convening at the behest and encouragement of government 
officials.116 The genesis of CONFU lies in a draft report, known as the "Green 
Paper," of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights of the Infonnation 
Infrastructure Task Force (IITF).117 That task force was an assembly of federal 
officials, business executives, and representatives of various nongovernmental 
organizations.1t8 Each member presumably brought some combination of 
expertise and representation of diverse interests in the outcome of the IITF. In its 
Green Paper. issued in July 1994, the Working Group outlined and summarized a 
wide range of copyright and related issues affecting the expansion of digital 
commerce and communication.119 One ofthose issues ofmajor concern was fair 
use.l2O 
The Green Paper summarized the law of fair use and addressed problems 
raised with the application of existing law to the needs and circumstances of 
digital technology.l2l New technologies were creating a new environment where 
copyright protected materials may be easily used in the name of fair use but may 
be extensively reproduced and disseminated beyond the limits of the law.122 
Rather than propose legislation, as the report did with respect to other issues,123 
the Green Paper instead made this proposition: "Therefore, the Working Group 
will sponsor a conference to bring together copyright owner and user interests to 
develop guidelines for fair uses of copyrighted works by and in public libraries 
and schools."124 
116 GREEN PAPER, supra note 38, at 134. 
1I7Id. 
118 See Exec. Order No. 12,864, 3 C.F.R. 634 (1993). llTF's chair is the Secretary of 
Connnerce; at the time it was the late Ronald H. Brown. See llTF's website. 
http://www.Htf.nist.gov (last visited April 4, 200I). 
119 Green Paper, supra note 38, at 120-39. 
120/d. at 133. 
121 Id. at 45-53. 
122 Id. at 134. 
123 For example, the GREEN PAPER included proposals for legislation on issues such as 
transmission and the expansion of the distribution right, the meaning of publication, and the 
applicability ofthe first-sale doctrine. See id. at 120-33. 
124Id. at 134. 
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CONFU held its first meeting on September 21, 1994, in Washington, D.C., 
under the direction of an official from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.125 
Meetings occurred on a frequent basis-often monthly-with approximately 
forty individuals regularly participating in most meetings. Most of those 
participants were from the publishing industries, educational organizations, and 
library associations.126 Many other individuals attended less regularly. In 
September, 1995 the Working Group issued its final report, known as the "White 
Paper.nl27 It provided this summary of developments after a year of CONFU 
meetings: 
To date, no formal guidelines have been the subject of agreement, but it appears 
reasonable to anticipate that drafts now in preparation may be fonnalized as 
guidelines before the end of 1995.... 
Should the participants in the Conference on Fair Use fail to agree on appropriate 
guidelines, the Working Group may conclude that the importance of such guidelines 
may necessitate regulatory or legislative action in that area.128 
Not until September 1997 did the work of CONFU progress to the stage of 
having draft guidelines ready for broad, public distribution.129 An interim report 
included "proposals" for guidelines on three topics: multimedia development, the 
use ofdigital images, and the transmission ofworks through distance learning.130 
A year later, in December 1998, the final report from CONFU included the same 
three sets of interpretive guidelines.131 During that year, however, the public was 
invited to review the proposals and to indicate support or opposition to them.132 
That process revealed sharp divisions among the interested parties.133 Many 
of the commercial publishers, for example, generally supported the guidelines. 
Many of the organizations representing educational institutions and libraries 
125 CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 6. The individual who originally led the 
meetings was Christopher A. Meyer. He left the PTO in July 1995 and was replaced by Peter 
Fowler. Id. at 6. Their public duties were generally confined to convening the meetings, 
distributing announcements, and preparing progress reports. Outside public view, these 
individuals mediated sensitive discussions and balanced competing pressures, particularly as the 
final report took shape. As the drafter ofthe final report, Mr. Fowler was especially influential 
in determining the outcome ofCONFU. 
126 See Conference on Fair Use Participants, CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 19. 
127 WHITE PAPER, supra note 38. 
128Id. at 83-84. 
129 CONFU INTERIM REPoRT, supra note 34. 
130Id. at 35-64. 
131 [d. at 33-59. 
132 [d. at 14. 
133 [d. at 18 ("Some participants opposed the process, as well as the results, while others 
strongly supported both. Others strongly supported the process, but determined that they could 
not, or would not, support the results.''). 
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opposed the guidelines.134 None of the guidelines had anything approaching 
unanimous Support.135 In fact, the Digital-Images Guidelines received nearly no 
support. By contrast, the earlier guidelines from the 1970s and 1980s had support 
from nearly all the parties who expressed an interest;136 few parties openly 
opposed them when they were issued.J37 The CONFU guidelines, however, 
stirred sharp opposition from many prominent groups. Still, they gained support 
from many other groups and even from governmental agencies. 
CONFU was an effort to bring diverse groups together to reach a mutual 
resolution of major issues of fair use.138 The outcome of the effort, by contrast, 
revealed deep division in the participants' understanding of fair use.139 
Anticipating that division and the resistance of some parties to adopt the 
guidelines, the CONFU report labeled them as ''proposals'' for guidelines.140 
Apparently they would move beyond a "proposal" status only with some 
unspecified future action-perhaps further action by the government or perhaps 
by the individuals or organizations that might adopt the guidelines as the 
appropriate standard for application. 
CONFU also had substantive limits. The original, self-imposed agenda called 
for discussion and possible guidelines on numerous topics.141 In the end, only 
three proposals for guidelines on fair use emerged from the process.142 The other 
topics fell aside for different reasons.143 Some topics were dropped because 
influential participants insisted. For example, one topic was the fair use of 
printing or downloading a single copy of an item found on the Internet for 
personal use or study. The Association of American Publishers objected sharply 
to any discussion that could lead to identifying fair use of such activity, 
explaining that it was reserving the right to monitor and charge fees for such 
uses,144 The topic fell off the agenda,145 Topics such as "browsing" proved to be 
134 Heather Florence, Copyright Refonn and Licensing Practice, 557 PLIIPAT 123, 266­
67 (1999). 
135 Klingsporn, supra note I, at 114 (referring to the failure ofCONFU to meet its goals). 
136 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 67, 70(1976). 
137 See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 72 (1976) (noting opposition by the American 
Association of University Professors and the Association of American Law Schools to the 
Classroom Guidelines). 
138 GREEN PAPER, supra note 38, at 134.
 
139 CONFU FINALREPoRT,supranote4, at 18.
 
140 Id. at 10.
 
141 Id. at 27 (listing twenty-one topics, ranging from ''what is a classroom" and ''what is a
 
library" to encryption, transient copying, pennissions, and purpose offair use). 
142 Digital-Images Guidelines, Distance-Learning Guidelines, and Multimedia Guidelines, 
see supra note 4, and infra Part n.C.2-4. 
143 CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 27. 
144 The present author attended most ofthe CONFU meetings, and these statements from 
the AAP representative are from the author's notes ofthe meeting. 
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too nebulous for the group to define and comprehend consistently.l46 The use of 
software in libraries was addressed in alternative tenns; the issues were not 
strictly fair use, but rather arose tmder relatively clearly defined statutoI)' 
provisions of sections 108 and 109 ofthe Copyright ACt.147 
The important issues of fair use related to making materials available in 
electronic-reserve systems and through interlibrary loan moved significantly 
toward draft guidelines,148 but the effort did not yield finished documents that 
were brought into the fmal CONFU report by conserlsus of the participants.149 
The failure of CONFU to elaborate on numerous topics or to formally adopt draft 
standards on a few critical issues reveals various limits in the dynamics of 
CONFUpo Some fair-use issues were apparently too unsettled or relatively 
tmimportant; other issues were too conterltious or perhaps simply too important to 
erIgerider meaningful concession and compromise as is necessary in successful 
negotiations.15I 
145 CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 27 ("Topic deemed inappropriate for 
guidelines.'). 
146Id. ("Given concerns over terminology, CONFU agreed not to proceed with a 
statement.''). 
147Id. at 17 ("[I]t was generally agreed by CONFU participants that, since the scenarios 
developed by the working group clearly illustrated the general rules and how particular uses of 
computer program software in libraries either complied with or violated the Copyright Act, 
there was no need to draft separate guidelines.''). See also Statement on Use ofCopyrighted 
Computer Programs (Software) in Libraries-Scenarios, CONFU FINAL REPORT, W., at 61-65. 
148 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 (For electronic reserves, "CONFU could 
not proceed with guidelines;" for interlibrary loan, document delivery, and electronic document 
sharing, the "Working Group agreed that it was premature to draft guidelines for digital 
transmission ofdigital documents."). 
149 CONFU operated without any explicit or dear procedures, but rather by consensus. 
No one can say with any definitiveness whether guidelines are in or out of the report with 
support from a majority or from any set of influential participants. The present author was 
involved in efforts to develop guidelines for electronic resources. For this author's views on the 
failure ofCONFU to formalize those guidelines, see Crews, Electronic Reserves, supra note 39. 
150 One studyputs the reason for the failure ofCONFU more bluntly: 
Nearly three years and thousands ofdollars and human hours later, the parties could not 
come to a consensus on guidelines in any ofthe areas. One explanation for the impasse was that 
academics and other educational users of copyrighted information felt the proposed guidelines 
were too restrictive (preferring the uncertainty ofthe law and the four-prong test to the proposed 
guidelines), while publishers seemed to believe they were being asked to relinquish more 
control over the use oftheir materials in the context offair use than was desirable. 
Stephan I. Colbert & Oren R. Griffin, The Impact of "Fair Use" in the Higher Education 
Community: A Necessary Exception?, 62 ALB. L. REv. 437, 456 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
lSI Several studies have examined the basic factual background of CONFU and 
summarized the features of the proposed guidelines. See, e.g., Kent D. Stuckey, Internet and 
Online Law, 526 PLlJPAT 419, 546 (1998); Needham J. Boddie, II, et al., A Review of 
Copyright and the Internet, 20 CAMPBELL L. REv. 193, 246-259 (1998). 
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2. Multimedia Guidelines 
These guidelines, fonnally entitled "Proposal for Fair Use Guidelines for 
Educational Multimedia,"152 apply to the digital "cutting and pasting" of various 
works to make a unified multimedia project for use in the classroom setting.153 
They evolved through the deliberations of CONFU meetings, but they also took 
shape in a parallel set ofmeetings, with many of the same participants, organized 
and hosted by the Consortium of College and University of Media Centers 
(CCUMC).154 These guidelines were not the exclusive domain of CONFU 
simply because the CCUMC began the process of developing them at an earlier 
date.155 They were soon brought within the purview ofCONFU.156 
The CCUMC openly explored the prospect of such guidelines at a public 
conference held in Washington in June 1994.157 Again, diverse parties with 
diverse interests in the outcome attended to discuss possible fair-use guidelines. 
CCUMC largely represents directors of media centers from educational 
institutions around the country, and they expressed serious concerns about the 
pressures they faced to utilize media technology for educational purposes in ways 
that raise troublesome questions about fair use and copyright infringement. They 
often felt caught between expectations of faculty members who seek greatest 
utility of technology, and the threat of legal liability to third-party copyright 
owners. The guidelines were an effort to mediate that tension. 
Working closely with representatives from industries in the fields of print 
publication, music, video, and motion pictures, the CCUMC led the effort to 
devise the guidelines.l 58 They were also explicitly seeking to follow, in many 
respects, the model of the Classroom Guidelines and other earlier standards.159 
After more than two years, the guidelines took a completed shape that many of 
the participants were prepared to endorse.16o The fmished document is a lengthy 
152 Multimedia Guidelines, supra note 4, at 49. 
153Id. at 50. CONFU offered this definition of a multimedia work: "In general, 
multimedia projects are stand-alone, interactive programs incorporating both original and pre­
existing copyrighted works in various media formats." Id. 
154 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 14. 
ISS ld. 
156Id. at 14-15. 
157 See AGENCY FOR INSTRUcnONAL TEcHNOLOGY & CONSORTIUM OF COllEGE AND 
UNNERSITY MEDIA CENfERS, WHAT'S FAIR? A REPORT ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EDUCATIONAL FAIR ACCESS AND THE NEW MEDIA, (Washington, 
D.C., June 15-17, 1994). 
158 CONFU FlNALREPORT,supranote4, at 14. 
159 It/. at 6 ("Participants were encouraged to follow the example of previous successful 
efforts to develop voluntary fair use guidelines-the Classroom Guidelines in 1976, and the 
National Commission on New Technological Uses ofCopyrighted Works.''). 
160 It/. at 15. 
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and detailed attempt to define with utmost precision the parameters of fair use as 
applied to the wide-ranging activities and materials used in the name of 
multimedia development for educational purposes.161 As with all of the 
guidelines examined in this article, the Multimedia Guidelines are explicitly 
applicable only to non-profit educational useS.162 That limit is rigidly defined in 
this document and confined to curriculum-based uses at institutions that have 
education as a primary mission.I 63 By implication, fair use does not apply, or 
does not apply as broadly, to other uses or to uses in other organizations.l64 
Central to these guidelines are the "portion limitations" for each type of 
work165 A multimedia work may be an assemblage of text, images, sound, and 
other materials "cut and pasted" in digital form onto a single disk or other storage 
unit.166 Each of these types ofworks has its own limit in allowed quantity.167 For 
example, clips oftext are limited to the lesser ofeither one thousand words or ten 
percent of the original work168 Sound clips are limited to the lesser of either 
161 Multimedia Guidelines, supra note 4, at 51. Under the Multimedia Guidelines, 
educational multimedia projects "incorporate students' or educators' original material such as 
course notes or commentary, together with various copyrighted media formats including but not 
limited to, motion media, music, text material, graphics, illustrations, photographs and digital 
software which are combined into an integrated presentation." 
162 CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 32. The Preamble, uniform to all CONFU 
guidelines, establishes that ''these guidelines do not cover non-educational or commercial 
digitization or use at anytime. even by non-profit educational institutions." 
163 Multimedia Guidelines, supra note 4, at 51. "Educational multimedia 
projects ... under these guidelines may be used only for educational purposes in systematic 
learning activities including use in connection with non-rommercial cuniculum-based learning 
and teaching activities." Also, "educational institutions are defined as nonprofit organizations 
whose primary focus is supporting research and instructional activities of educators and 
students for noncommercial purposes." 
164 But see, H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (stating that ''the works and uses to 
which the doctrine offair use is applicable are as broad as the copyright law itself'). 
165 Multimedia Guidelines, supra note 4, at 53 ("Portion limitations mean the amount of a 
copyrighted work that can reasonably be used ... regardless ofthe original medium from which 
the copyrighted works are taken."). 
166Id. at 50. 
167Id. at 53. "In the aggregate means the total amount of copyrighted material from a 
single copyrighted work that is permitted to be used in an educational multimedia project 
without permission under these guidelines. These limitations apply cumulatively ... for the 
same academic semester, cycle or term." [d. 
168Id. at 53. For poems, other limitations apply: 
An entire poem ofless than 250 words may be used, but no more than three poems by one poet, 
or five poems by different poets from any anthology.... For poems of greater length, 250 
words may be used but no more than three excerpts by a poet, or five excerpts by different poets 
from a single anthology. 
Id. at 54. 
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thirty seconds or ten percent169 A multimedia project may utilize only thirty 
seconds of a lengthy symphony or only eighteen seconds of a three-minute 
popular songPO 
Even while staying within these parameters, the instructor or student who 
prepares the work is subject to numerous other conditions. For example, the 
project may be retained and used for only two years,171 although it may be part of 
the individual's portfolio for employment purposes.l 72 Many uses beyond the 
limits in the guidelines explicitly require permissionl73-analogous to the 
''prohibitions'' in the Classroom Guidelinesl74-even though the preamble to the 
guidelines indicates that they are "minimum" standards and that additional uses 
may be allowed under the law.I 75 
3. Distance-Learning Guidelines 
The Distance-Learning Guidelines addressed an especially challenging 
interrelationship between fair use and the distance-learning provisions of section 
110(2) of the Copyright Act.176 The statute allows the transmission of displays 
and performances of copyrighted works, but only within sharp limitations. l77 
First, the law sets "ground rules" for the use ofworks under any circumstances; in 
particular, the content ofthe course may be communicated to classrooms or other 
places "devoted to instruction."178 The transmission may reach students at other 
locations-such as home or work-but only if their "disabilities or other special 
circumstances"179 prevent their coming to the classroom. Once complying with 
these conditions, the law allows displays ofall works, but allows performances of 




171 Itt: at 53.
 




174 Oassroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 69-70.
 
175 Multimedia Guidelines. supra note 4, at 50.
 
176 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (1994). For a critical examination of1he current state of section
 
10(2) and of a proposal from 1he United States Copyright Office to revise it, see Kenne1h D. 
Crews. Distance Education and Copyright Law: The Limits and Meaning 0/Copyright Policy, 
27 J.C. & U.L. 15 (2000). 
177 Section 110(2) allows the transmission of only select types of copyrighted works in 
distance learning. The statute allows "displays" of all types of works. but it allows the 
"performance" ofonly nondramatic literary works and nondramatic musical works. 17 U.S.C. § 
110(2) (1994). By contrast, section 110(1) allows performances and displays in 1he context of 
"face-to-face" teaching, and it sets no limits on 1he types ofallowed works. 17 U.s.C. § 110(1) 
(1994). 
178 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1994). 
179 § 1l0(2)(C)(ii)(1994). 
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only "nondramatic"180 musical or literary works. Audiovisual works are not 
allowed at all in transmissions for distance leaming. lSl 
The guidelines from CONFU were an attempt to use the terms ofsection 107 
on fair use to reach beyond the rigors of section 110(2).1 82 Fundamentally, the 
guidelines are a deliberate move away from the troublesome delineation between 
works that are allowed and not allowed in distance learning.183 The guidelines 
drop the classification of "dramatic" and ''nondramatic'' works and the ban on 
audiovisual works, but the guidelines allow the broadening of works only on 
secured transmissions, and generally only for live or "synchronous" transmissions 
ofthe instructional experience.l84 Only enrolled students at nonprofit educational 
institutions who are receiving the content at permitted locations where fmther 
reproduction may be controlled may receive these transmissions.I85 Moreover, 
the guidelines allow only a single use ofeach work by each instructor; any repeat 
use for future classes requires permission,186 Within these conditions, the 
instructor may display or perform the entire work-which includes showing an 
entire videotape to the clasS.187 
"Asynchronous" transmissions--often where the material resides on a 
computer server or other device and may be accessed by the students at their 
discretion--proved to be highly problematic for the negotiators. Publishers and 
other copyright owners expressed deep concem about the possibility that students 
would be able to download and further reproduce or disseminate the materials, 
thereby circumventing passwords or other restrictions on access and undercutting 
markets for the materials.188 These guidelines from CONFU do not rule out that 
180 § 110(2)(1994).
 
181 § to1(1994) (defining "literarywork" to exclude audiovisual works).
 
182 Section 110(2) of the Copyright Act sets highly problematic and restrictive limits on
 
the use ofcopyrighted works in distance learning. See, e.g., Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright and 
Distance Education: Displays. Performances. and the Limitations of Current Law. in 
GASAWAY, GROWING PAlNS, supra note 7, at 377, 393-94. 
183 Distance-Learning Guidelines, supra note 4, at 44-45. 
184Id at 46. 
185Id. at46-47. 
186 Id. at 46 ("For subsequent performances, displays or access, permission must be 
obtained.''). CJ Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4, at 8 (allowing single performance of a 
videotape recorded "by individual teachers in the course of relevant teaching activities, and 
repeated once only when instructional reinforcement is necessary''). 
187 Distance-Learning Guidelines, supra note 4, at 46. "Works performed must be 
integrated into the course, must be part of systematic instruction and must be directly related 
and ofmaterial assistance to the teaching content ofthe transmission. The performance may not 
be for entertainment purposes." In addition, "(P]erformance of an entire copyrighted work or a 
large portion thereofmay be transmitted only once for a distance learning course." ld 
188 This concern as a practical matter is likely to grow in the future as technology evolves. 
It may well be addressed, however, in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which creates a 
new federal offense for the circumvention of technological measures that protect copyrighted 
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fair use may apply to asynchronous transmissions, but they openly acknowledge 
that the parties were simply unprepared to reach agreement at that time.189 
4. Digital-Images Guidelines 
The Digital-hnages Guidelines are perhaps the most awkward of all the 
guidelines to emerge from CONFU.190 They are set forth in a lengthy document 
that seeks at its core to articulate when a library or educational institution may 
make a digital version of a photograph or other image and make it available for 
teaching and research.191 While this subject may appear to be relatively focused 
in its scope, the legal issues actually became extraordinarily intertangled. The 
result is a complex and convoluted set ofguidelines. 
The use of visual images poses distinct challenges for applying fair use.192 
The use will most likely require the entire work, a fact that most often weighs 
against fair use.193 A photograph may also be a highly creative work, which also 
works. Thus, the college or university may transmit content, but impose passwords as a 
condition of access. Defeating or circumventing such measures may be a new form of federal 
offense that gives rise to civil and criminal penalties. Copyright owners strongly supported that 
legislation in order to give added assurance that their materials would be better protected in a 
digital environment. Thus, this new legal protection should allow greater assurance of 
protection when applied in the distance-learning context to control use and prevent misuses of 
content. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). For an 
examination of events leading to development of the Distance-Learning Guidelines and the 
critical attacks on them, see Laura N. Gasaway, Guidelines for Distance Learning and 
Interlibrary Loan: Doomed and More Doomed, 50 J. AM. SOC'V FOR INFo. SCI. 1337 (1999). 
189 Distance-Learning Guidelines, supra note 4, at 45. "Although the participants believe 
fair use of copyrighted works applies in some aspects of [asynchronous delivery of distance 
learning], they did not develop fair use guidelines to cover these situations because the area is so 
unsettled." Id. True, these developments in distance learning are "unsettled," but they are not 
likely to become any more settled in the near future. This stated reason for not addressing 
asynchronous distance learning likely conceals more realistic reasons: it poses too large a risk to 
copyright owners to win their acceptance of guidelines that acknowledge or concede fair use. 
For further discussion ofthe background ofthese guidelines seeGasaway, supra note 188. 
190 Phan, supra note 1, at 198-201 (highly critical ofthe Digital-Images Guidelines). 
191 Digital-Images Guidelines, supra note 4, at 36-37, 40. 
192 CONFU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 10. "It was recognized at the outset of 
CONFU that digital images collections raise issues different from text issues; that these 
considerations and concerns were not addressed by text norms and understandings (e.g., 
quality/distortion/accuracy issues, commercial exploitation potential, and the critical mass 
necessary for educational uses)." Id. Since issuance of the Digital-Images Guidelines, a district 
court has ruled that the use of "thumb-nail" versions ofphotographs in search engines to locate 
thern on the Internet is permitted under fair use. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 
1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1999). See also Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F. 3d 18 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (holding that the reproduction ofphotographs as a news item is fair use). 
193 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,449-50 
(1984); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925-26 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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generally weighs against fair use.l94 Moreover, a single photograph may involve 
layers of legal claims. The photographer may hold the copyright, but the 
photograph may capture the image of a painting or other copyrighted work, or of 
a sign that has trademark protection, or of a person who has rights of privacy or 
publicity.195 The image may be from a book or slide collection, to which a 
publisher other party holds a compilation copyright. These circumstances give 
rights to multiple claimants with respect to one visual image. 
The Digital-Images Guidelines met this challenge in a most complex manner. 
These guidelines allow faculty and others to make digital versions of analog 
images, but subject to numerous conditions that are not clearly articulated. Images 
may be made and presented in forums such as the face-to-face classroom and in 
peer conferences, but generally the images may be accessed only on a "secure 
electronic network" and only for "one academic term." Those restrictions are 
reasonable, if not modest, but the guidelines are, overall, far from such a simple 
and clear approach. The language of this document is convoluted, verbose, and 
obscure. Themeasure offair use is repeatedly hedged with admonitions about the 
need to secure permission and to keep records of all efforts. If some specific 
activity is outside an elaborately sanctioned provision, the guidelines repeatedly 
refer users back to "the four-factor fair use analysis" under the law. The standards 
outlined in the guidelines are presented as if they are not only a "safe harbor" 
from liability, but a safe harbor from fair use as well. For those parties who might 
accept the Digital-Images Guidelines, they seem to offer explicitly an alternative 
to-or escape from-the need to understand fair use.196 
D. Three Classes ofFair-Use Guidelines 
This lineage of fair-use guidelines underscores that while many of the 
guidelines have some common traits, they also have many critical differences. For 
purposes of analyzing their legal standing, the guidelines may be grouped into 
three categories: (1) privately developed guidelines that have congressional 
recognition in legislative history ofthe copyright law;197 (2) guidelines developed 
194 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (referring to the "nature" 
factor, the court found that "[s]ince 'Puppies' was creative and imaginative and Rogers, who 
makes his living as a photographer, hopes to gain a financial return for his efforts with this 
photograph, this factor militates against a finding offair use'1. 
195 See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(holding that'a photograph ofa public-domain work of art does not have copyright protection). 
196 Sharon Appel, Copyright. Digitization ofImages, and Art Museums: Cyberspace and 
Other New Frontiers, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 149, 232 (1999) (arguing that the CONFU 
Guidelines will not solve the copyright problems of museums, and the potential liability 
"contravenes the essential purpose of copyright law, and threatens the ability of museums to 
carry out their mission in the electronic times in which we live'1. 
197 Classroom Guidelines, Music Guidelines, Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4. 
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by a duly authorized governmental commission;198 and (3) privately developed 
guidelines that have been endorsed or supported by administrative agencies.199 
Invariably, these classifications are not entirely discrete. Some overlap of 
characteristics among the guidelines does occur. Yet these classifications are 
intended to isolate and identify the salient attribute of each set of guidelines that 
purports to give them "official" or "legal" status. By making this classification, 
the analysis can begin to test the significance of that status for attributing legal 
validity to each ofthe fair-use interpretations. 
1. Guidelines andLegislativeHistory 
The Classroom Guidelines, the Music Guidelines, and the Off-Air Guidelines 
are in this category. Each of these standards was the product of private 
negotiations, but the finished work was submitted to Congress for review.2oo At 
no time did any of these guidelines advance in Congress toward legislation. In 
fact, the earliest of the guidelines grew out ofexactly the opposite situation. They 
were a direct response to a known unwillingness of Congress to legislate the 
details of fair use. Yet with respect to each of these guidelines, members of 
Congress expressed approval. 
2. Guidelines and Congressional Commissions 
The CONTU Guidelines are the only fair-use guidelines forthcoming from a 
congressional commission.201 While the CONTU commission had no authority to 
make law, it was a commission charged by an Act of Congress and acting 
consistently with that charge in developing guidelines under the auspices of the 
source of copyright law-COngress.202 In that regard, these guidelines may be 
understood as emerging from a more authoritative source than, for example, 
guidelines that result from negotiations among private parties. Not only is such a 
commission closely connected to a law-making authority and charged by that 
authority to act, but such a commission will be accountable to that authority in the 
end. 
When the CONTU Commission completed its work and submitted its final 
report in 1979, it delivered its findings and recommendations to Congress.203 The 
significance of accountability was vivid from the outset. One recommendation, 
198 CONTU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4. 
199 CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4. 
200 H.R REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67, 70 (1976). 
201 See CONTU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 3. 
202 See supra text accompanying note 101. 
203 See generally, CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4. 
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for example, was a revision of section 117 ofthe Copyright Act,204 governing the 
use of computer software.20S Congress enacted that recommendation in 1980.206 
The commission members must certainly have recognized that its 
recommendations must be balanced and reasonable to win congressional 
approval. Similarly, when CONlU recommended the guidelines for interlibrary 
loans, its members surely must have perceived the need to be fair and balanced 
simply to gain acceptance and to avoid rejection. The public might accept or 
reject the guidelines as they seek to follow them. Congress could also have 
accepted or rejected the CONlU recommendations. 
The work of CONlU was also accountable to legal precedent. In particular, 
the interlibrary-loan guidelines were built on the foundation of a statute-section 
108207-and a case-Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States.20S Those existing 
developments provided a relatively specific standard against which to evaluate 
any recommended guidelines. For the guidelines to be accepted in the legal 
community and by librarians, they must bear strong fidelity to the statute and the 
case. Critics would be able to undermine the credibility ofthe commission's work 
ifit strayed far from existing law. Thus, not only was the commission accountable 
to Congress, an authoritative source of law, but it was also more clearly 
accountable to the law itself. The relevant law in this instance was also reasonably 
specific. 
3. Guidelines and Administrative Agencies 
The CONFU guidelines are the work of an infonnal gathering of interested 
parties acting under the auspices of federal agencies, principally the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office. CONFU arose from a suggestion in a report from 
the National Information Inftas1ructure Task Force, and the U.S. Copyright Office 
joined in supporting the effort.209 While the Patent and Trademark Office and the 
Copyright Office have some lawmaking authority, notably the issuance of 
regulations on limited matters,210 neither organization has the authority to provide 
any rulings or elaborations on the meaning of fair use under copyright law. In 
fact, the Copyright Office distributes widely a form letter explaining that it does 
204 17 U.S.C. §117 (Supp. IV 1998). 
205 CONTU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at I. 
206 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980). 
207 17 U.S.C. §108 (1994 &'Supp. IV 1998). 
20S 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). This case is examined in detail at infra Part m.c. 
209 GREEN PAPER, supra note 38, at 134. ("[T]he Working Group will sponsor a 
conference to bring together copyright owner and user interests to develop guidelines for fair 
uses ofcopyrighted works by and in public libraries and schools.'') 
210 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 701-710 (1994 &. Supp. IV 1998) (providing the general authority of 
the Copyright Office to act on specified matters). 
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not answer inquiries from the public about the meaning of fair use.2ll The 
Copyright Office, however, long has issued a "circular" that provides general 
information about the law offair use and reprints the earlier fair-use guidelines.212 
CONFU was therefore acting under the guidance of federal agencies that 
obviously have no authority to make law relevant to fair use. They have no 
specific authority to convene and empower a group to adopt binding standards. 
Moreover, these administrative agencies had no authority to respond in any 
binding way to any recommendations that emerge from CONFU. When the 
CON1lJ Commission delivered its final report in 1979, it delivered it to Congress 
and to the President, and Congress had the power to act on many of the 
recommendations.213 Congress could have rejected the interlibrary-loan 
guidelines as inconsistent with the law of section 108. In contrast, when CONFU 
delivered its final report in 1998, it delivered it to the Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks, the head of an agency with no authority to give any 
recommendations with a binding stature.214 Acceptance or rejection by that 
agency might reveal a point ofview or bolster a particular objective, but it would 
have no legal authority. 
In a gesture that tacitly acknowledged those limits of the CONFU process, 
supporters of the Multimedia Guidelines seemed to perceive that congressional 
imprimatur could lend the guidelines greater significance or possible authority. In 
September 1996 those supporters took the draft guidelines to members of the 
Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the U.s. House of Representatives and 
obtained a signed, ''nonlegislative report" that offered a general endorsement of 
the guidelines.215 Recognizing the authority of Congress to make copyright law, 
approval from a subcommittee-albeit vaguely stated-was a significant step 
toward bestowing the appearance of law on the guidelines.216 Even viewing that 
211 U.S. COPYRlGHT OFFICE, FAIR USE, F.L. 102 (1993) ("'The Copyright Office can 
neither determine if a certain use may be considered 'fair' nor advise on possible copyright 
violations. If there is any doubt, it is advisable to consult an attorney.'). That fonn letter is 
available at http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/tlslfl102.pdf(lastvisitedApriI4,2001). 
212 See U.S. Copyright Office, CIRCULAR 21: REPRODUcnoN OF COPYRIGIITED WORKS 
BY EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS, at http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/circslcirc21.pdf (last visited 
April 4, 2001). 
213 CONllJ FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 1. 
214 fd. 
215 MULTIMEDIA COMMITIEE PRINT, supra note 4. 
216 The nonlegislative report from the subcommittee stated in part: "the Subcommittee 
congratulates" the developers of the Multimedia Guidelines "for their hard work and effort, 
which clearly advances the strength of the U.S. copyright system." fd. More substantively, the 
report makes this statement: 
While only the courts can decide whether a particular use ofa copyrighted work fits within the 
fair use exemption, these guidelines represent the participants' consensus view of what 
constitutes the fair use of a portion of a work which is included in a multimedia educational 
project. The specific portion and time limitations will help educators, scholars and students 
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development most generously, support from a subcommittee hardly makes the 
guidelines law. In the final analysis, the CONFU guidelines are partly the work of 
one or more federal agencies, perhaps seeking to serve important goals, but 
ultimately acting without authority to create results that are binding on any party. 
ill. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND FAIR-USE GUIDELINES 
While the fair-use guidelines have had a central function of assisting 
educators, librarians, and other individuals as they apply fair use in common 
situations, the guidelines also have shaped several judicial decisions. Some of 
those decisions provide detailed applications of the guidelines to the given facts, 
often with insightful discussion of the legal standing of the fair-use 
interpretations. Other decisions have offered only passing mentions of the 
guidelines. Each of these court opinions is important in its own way. The detailed 
examinations provide essential scrutiny of the guidelines, allowing readers to 
examine the court's comprehension of fair use and the negotiated guidelines. The 
briefreferences in several other cases are also vital. A few words from a court can 
be rife with meaning. A court may summarily articulate a conclusion, or a few 
words may reveal the court's understanding of the role and importance of the 
guidelines. This Part ill of the article will survey those cases and analytically 
discern from them the legal significance of the guidelines in the eyes of the 
federal judiciary. 
A Courts and the Classroom Guidelines 
1. Association ofAmerican Publishers v. New York. University 
The first infringement litigation against photocopying for educational uses 
arose not long after the fair-use statute took effect on January 1, 1978. In 1980 
and 1981 publishers brought copyright actions against two for-profit shops that 
were photocopying materials for student use. The parties settled both cases, and 
the settlement included an agreement that the shops would adhere to the 
more easily identify whether using a portion ofa certain copyrighted work in their multimedia 
program constitutes a fair use of that work. They grant a relative degree of certainty that a use 
within the guidelines will not be perceived as an infringement of the Copyright Act by the 
endorsing copyright owners, and that permission for such use will not be required. The more 
one exceeds these guidelines, the greater the risk that the use ofa work is not a fair use, and that 
permission must be sought. 
Id. at 2. A lawyer may not confuse such ambiguous statements with the law, but an educator 
who may be inclined to find an "answer" to fair use or who may be seeking protection from 
liability could easily find comfort in such words from a congressional source. 
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Classroom Guidelines as a limit on fair use.217 Faculty at colleges and 
universities, however, have an enormous range of places and possibilities for 
securing photocopies of class materials, and the publishing industry faced the 
daunting prospect oflitigation against numerous shops and other outlets. To make 
the point of copyright infringement directly against educators, publishers filed a 
lawsuit against New York University (NYU) and several named faculty members 
in December, 1982.218 Only four months later, the parties settled that suit as 
well.219 Again, the settlement incorporated the Oassroom Guidelines.22o This 
time the guidelines were adopted as the formal standard of fair use at NYU-a 
major research university.221 
The incorporation of the guidelines in the NYU settlement had several 
consequences of tremendous importance.222 First, the measure of fair use in the 
guidelines became the formally adopted standard at a major university and 
established a precedent or model that other institutions could follow. Second, 
other institutions did follow it. They followed it out ofconcern that they also may 
face unwanted litigation. They followed it because the publishing industry sent 
hundreds of letters to colleges and universities throughout the country urging 
them to adopt the guidelines or face a risk of litigation.223 Third, the NYU 
settlement restructured the Classroom Guidelines into an even more rigid 
standard than was embodied in the original version. That rigid version became the 
model or precedent that other institutions often adopted. Of particular note, the 
217 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Tyco Copy Servs., Inc., COPYRIGHT L. DEC. 
(CCH),1I 25,230 (D. Conn. 1981); Basic Books, Inc. v. The Gnomon Corp., COPYRIGHT L. 
DEC. (CCH), , 25,145 (D.C. 1980). 
218 Addison-Wesley Publ'g. Co. v. N. Y. Univ., No. 82-8333 (SD.N.Y.filed Dec. 14, 
1982). See, e.g., Edwin McDoweII, Nine Publishers Sue NYU, Charging Copyright Violation. 
N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 15, 1982, at C34. 
219 Copyright Infringement and Photocopying for the Classroom: The Association of 
American Publishers v. New York University Settlement. in 1983 ENTERTAINMENT, 
PuBUSHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 313 (Michael Meyer & John David Viera, cds., 1983). 
See also Addison-Wesley Publ'g. Co. v. New York Univ., No. 82 ClY 8333, 1983 WL 1134, 
1983 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 11 25,544 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983). 
220 Addison-Wesley Publ'g. Co. v. New York Univ., 1983 WL 1134 (S.D.N.Y.), at 4-6. 
221 Id. at 6 ("The Guidelines ... are to be used to determine whether or not the prior 
permission ofthe copyright owner is to be sought for photocopying for research and classroom 
use. If the proposed photocopying is not permitted under the Guidelines ... permission to copy 
is to be sought."). 
222 The Classroom Guidelines are an integral part of the Policy Statement on 
Photocopying of Copynghted Materials for Classroom and Research Use. This policy 
statementwas approved by the Board ofTrustees ofNew YorkUniversity on May 9, 1983, and 
is available at http://www.nyu.edu/pageslosllpublicationslphotocopying.htrnl (last visited April 
5,2001). 
223 Form letter from Townsend Hoopes, President of the Association of American 
Publishers, Inc., to college and university administrators. (June 10, 1983). 
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NYU settlement adopted the guidelines without the opening preamble about 
"minimum" standards.224 Faculty making copies under the settlement were 
expected to follow the strict limits, not as a minimalistic safe harbor, but rather as 
a ceiling on fair use. Any uses beyond those limits required advance approval 
from university counsel. For all practical purposes, the minimum standards ofthe 
original guidelines became maximum standards at NYU. 
2. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp. 
One court decision questioned critically at least one major portion of the 
Classroom Guidelines and ultimately ruled that those guidelines, in that one 
respect, were not consistent with fair-use law. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's 
Graphics Corp.,225 several prominent commercial publishers of textbooks and 
other books alleged that Kinko's had infringed their copyrights by making 
multiple copies of lengthy excerpts from the books and compiling them into 
"coursepacks" or "anthologies" sold to students at nearby colleges and 
universities.226 Faculty members at those institutions selected the materials, and 
the students acquired the copies for reading in connection with specified 
courses.227 Kinko's at that time operated a "Professor Publishing" program to 
solicit from professors the business ofmaking and selling copies.228 
Based on an analysis of the four factors from section 107, the district court 
had little trouble concluding that the copying was not fair use.229 Only after 
224 The settlement agreement with NYU provides that the university will adopt the 
Classroom Guidelines. It specifies that faculty will adhere to the guidelines as set forth in the 
appendix to the settlement. That appendix includes only the substantive standards, without the 
introductory language about minimum standards. That language, however, does appear in a 
footnote to the settlement and NYU policy in connection with a discussion of the origin of the 
guidelines. Still, the settlement is explicit in calling on faculty to adhere to the guidelines 
without inclusion of the "minimum" language. See COpyright Infringement and Photocopying 
for the Classroom: The Association of American Publishers v. New York University 
Settlement, in 1983 ENTERTAlNMENT, PuBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 321 (Michael 
Meyer & John David Viera, eds., 1983). See also Addison-Wesley Publ'g. Co. v. N. Y. Univ., 
No. 82 CIV 8333, 1983 WL 1134, 1983 COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)' 25,544 (S.D.N.Y. May 
31, 1983). 
225 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
226 Id. at 1528. 
227 [d. at 1528-29, 1531. 
228Id. at 1528-29, 1534. 
229 In summary, the court found that the copying was for "commercial" putposes when 
pursued by Kinko's and not by the individual instructor or university.Id. at 1531-32 (''The 
amount of that profit is unclear; however, we need only find that Kinko's had the intention of 
making profits.''). The amount, ranging from approximately five percent to twenty-five percent 
of the original books, was excessive.Id. at 1533-34. In addition, the court found in copying 
entire chapters the amount taken was "substantial because [the copies] are obviously meant to 
stand alone ... as a complete representation of the concept explored in the chapter." Id. The 
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reaching its conclusion did the court turn its attention to the Classroom 
Guidelines. That sequence is revealing. It affirms that the statute, and not the 
guidelines, is the source of the law, and by first having reached a decision based 
on the law, the court was :free to explore the merits of the guidelines as dictum 
and not as a rule oflaw. The court even seemed reluctant to look at the guidelines 
at all, acknowledging that they should apply to copying by an instructor or an 
educational institution, and not by a for-profit copyshop.23o Yet the court found 
''the circumstance ofcopying for college students to be particularly compelling in 
this case."231 The court proceeded to evaluate the ''brevity,'' "spontaneity," and 
"cumulative effect" of the copying,232 concluding with little surprise that the 
actions ofK.inko's were outside the bounds ofthose rigorous confines.233 
Not content with winning the court's rejection offair use based on analysis of 
section 107 and of the Classroom Guidelines, the plaintiffs argued further that 
Kinko's should be held in violation of a specific "prohibition" contained in the 
guidelines, a provision that would bar any copying ''used to create or to replace or 
substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works."234 The plaintiff­
publishers argued that this language was a sweeping gesture to place all 
coursepacks outside the ambit of fair use.235 The court refused the bait, accepting 
copying also interfered with the market for the original books. Id. at 1534. Only the third 
factor-the "nature" ofthe works-weighed in favor offinding fair use. The court resolved that 
the materials were factual in nature and that factual works with infonnation of public interest 
are more amenable to a finding offair use. Id. at 1532-33. 
230 [d. at 1535-36 ("For a proper analysis, there must be initial consideration given to the 
issue of what comprises educational copying and whether Kinko's status as a for-profit 
corporation, and its profitrnaking intent, renders outside ofa Guidelines review. We believe that 
it does."). Other commentators have been highly critical of the court's use of the Classroom 
Guidelines. According to one study: 
Once again the Kinko's court missed the point. Reliance on the Agreement on Classroom 
Guidelines for guidance about fair use is questionable at best. The Agreement was not included 
in the legislative history to change the law "in any way." It does not even limit copying but 
instead sets forth bright line rules that indicate when teachers are within a safe harbor. Even as a 
safe harbor, though, the Agreement is not especially illuminating. It is so restrictive that most 
classroom uses are outside this safe harbor anyway. By design, the Agreement on Classroom 
Guidelines simply does not provide a meaningful standard for determining when classroom uses 
infringe. 
Anderson & Brown, supra note 13, at 156. 
231 Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1536 n.ll. 
232 See Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 68, and supra text accompanying notes 
71-73. 
233 Kinko 3,758 F. Supp. at 1536-37. 
234 [d. at 1537. The reference is to Part ill of the Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 
69. 
235Id. (According to the plaintiffs, "Part ill of the Guidelines 'flatly and unequivocally' 
prohibit[sJthe copying ofthe sort in suit''). 
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instead Kinko's urging for "a less rigid view of the meaning of the 
Guidelines.''236 Although the court could see that the construction of anthologies 
may be a factor weighing against fair use, largely because the "cumulative effect 
[on the income to copyright owners] would be disastrous,''237 it nevertheless 
concluded: "We ... refuse to hold that all unconsented anthologies are prohibited 
without a fair use analysis.''238 The court added: "While we agree that Congress 
did manifest a specific apprehension of the use of anthologies, it is not clear that 
Congress intended strict application of this prohibition without fair use 
balancing.''239 
In the final analysis, the Kinko's court gave the Classroom Guidelines some 
important credibility.240 They captured the court's attention, and they received a 
systematic application to a given situation. But a close reading of the case 
confirms that the guidelines were never given the weight of law. Moreover, the 
ruling undercut the guidelines in one crucial respect-the prohibition against 
anthologies was rejected categorically. The court also demonstrated that the 
guidelines are subject to close scrutiny in light of the four factors of section I07. 
Despite the congressional attention and the importance of having guidelines to 
address common fair-use dilemmas, the court was not prepared to take them at 
face value. 
236Id.; see also Bartow, supra note 67, at 153; Scott M. Martin & Jonathan Zavin, 
Photocopying and the Doctrine of Fair Use Under the Copyright Act, in EXAMINING TIIE 
lMPUCATIONSOFTIIEFElSTANDKlNKO'sDECISIONS 661 (1991); EileenN. Wagner, Beware the 
Custom-Made Anthology: Academic Photocopying and Basic Books v. Kinko's Graphics 68 
WEST'S EDUC. L. REp. 2 (1991) (agreeing that the decision did not enforce the prohibition). 
237 Kinko's, 758 F. Supp. at 1537 & n.14. In the analysis of the four factors from section 
107, the court also looked to "other factors" and noted with no further explanation: 
"Additionally, the Classroom Guidelines express a specific prohibition of anthologies. The fact 
that these excerpts were compiled and sold in anthologies weighs against defendant." ld at 
1535. 
2381d. at 1537. 
2391d. 
240 One study concluded that the Kinko 's court gave much more weight to the Classroom 
Guidelines than the present analysis finds: 
The court engaged in a balancing analysis of Kinko's conduct under the Agreement on 
Classroom Guidelines as if it were actually a controlling part of the law within the Copyright 
Act. Though the court initially equivocated on whether the Agreement stated the minimum or 
maximum allowable copying under the fair use doctrine, it ultimately determined that a 
''violation'' of the Agreement was yet another factor to be weighed against the defendant in a 
fair use analysis. 
Anderson & Brown, supra note 13, at 155. 
644 OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 62:599 
3. Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc. 
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc. 241 
demonstrates the lack ofresolution on some of the most common fair-use issues, 
and the case reveals the struggle even among federal judges over the meaning of 
fair use in general, and the applicability of the Classroom Guidelines in 
particu1ar.242 On November 8, 1996, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals handed 
down an en banc decision concerning the MDS case (the defendant is commonly 
called ''MDS''), holding that large-scale photocopying by a commercial copyshop 
for the creation of "coursepacks" was not fair use. The decision in many respects 
is an affinnation ofthe earlier Kinko's ruling,243 and it held that similar copying, 
also by an off-campus for-profit shop, was not fair use.244 Not only do reasonable 
experts disagree about fair use, but so do reasonable jurists, as eight judges agreed 
that the copying was infringement and five judges dissented and believed the 
activities to be within the scope of fair use.245 
241 99 FJd 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
242 The various amicus briefs filed in the case on appeal also evidence the strong interest 
in this case. For example, the brief filed on behalf of eleven copyright law professors is 
published at L. Ray Patterson, et al., BriefAmicus Curiae ofEleven Copyright Law Professors 
in Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 2 J.INTELL. PRoP. L. 183 (1994). 
243 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
244 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1383. The en banc ruling and the earlier three-judge panel from the 
Sixth Circuit showed that federal judges were far from a like mind on this case. In a February 
1996 ruling, two of the three appellate judges held that the copying was fair use. The Sixth 
Circuit, on accepting the decision for rehearing en banc, vacated this decision. With the 
November 1996 decision, the court affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, which had entered summary judgment for the publishers. See Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 913 (E.D. Mich. 1994). See 
generally Denise K. Magner, Federal Appeals Court Eases Copyright Rules for "Course 
Packs," CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 23, 1996, at A20. (reporting the appellate ruling in 
favor offair use). 
245 The decision from the Sixth Circuit is seriously problematic in many respects. Notably 
lacking is a detailed and insightful analysis of the four factors of fair use. Indeed, the court 
acknowledged that it provided only sparse comment on two of those factors. MDS, 99 F.3d at 
1389-90 (examining only briefly the "nature" and "amount" factors). The court reversed the 
order of the factors, examining the "effect" factor first, and attributing greater weight to it: "We 
take it that this factor, 'the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work,' is at least primus inter pares, figuratively speaking, and we shall tum to it 
first." Id. at 1385-88. Further complicating the legal analysis, the court also resolved that when 
the challenged activity is "commercial," as in this case, the burden of proving adverse market 
effect is on the defendant, and the use is presumed unfair until the defendant proves otherwise. 
Id. at 1385-86. The concept of presumptions shaping the fair-use analysis is rooted in recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions, but the validity of that approach remains open to debate. 
Moreover, this decision, as others, does not carefully distinguish whether the presumption is 
against a conclusion offair use or applies with respect to one factor only. For decisions from the 
Supreme Court that struggle with the creation and application ofpresumptions, see Campbell v. 
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The majority based most of its decision on a finding of potential adverse 
market effects that could result from photocopying, which, if "widespread," 
would threaten the stream of revenue from pennissions that the plaintiffs had in 
fact been able to cultivate.246 According to the majority, the other factors were 
"considerably less important," and the court dealt with them "relatively 
briefly."247 The court's examination of the "amount" factor is also cursory, but 
focuses on the measure of copying that ranged from five to thirty percent of the 
original works, noting among other conclusions that MDS greatly exceeded the 
I,OOO-word limit in the Classroom Guidelines.248 Additionally, it found with little 
surprise that the copying undertaken by MDS greatly exceeded the rigid, minimal 
standards of fair use set forth in the guidelines.249 The court justified its reliance 
on the guidelines by noting their appearance in congressional reports 
accompanying passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.250 Yet the court also 
pointedly noted that the Qassroom Guidelines "state the minimum and not the 
maximum standards ofeducational fair use.''251 
One paragraph, especially its closing sentence, discloses the court's 
ambiguous response to the Classroom Guidelines and its view of them as 
minimalistic interpretations: 
In its systematic and premeditated character, its anthological content, and its 
commercial motivation, the copying done by MDS goes well beyond anything 
envisioned by the Congress that chose to incorporate the guidelines in the legislative 
history. Although the guidelines do not purport to be a complete and definitive 
statement of fair use law for educational copying, and although they do not have the 
force of law, they do provide us general guidance. The fact that the MDS copying is 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters.,471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
246 Indeed, the court made a passing critique of an earlier case that had held more limited 
copying of an individual journal article for library patrons to be fair use. "A licensing market 
already exists here, as it did not in a case on which plaintiffs rely." MDS. 99 F.3d at 1388, citing 
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973), aJfd by an equally 
divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)." 
247 Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1388. The court found the "purpose" to be entirely 
"commercial." Id. at 1386, 1388-89. The majority opinion gave no meaningful attention to the 
"nature" factor, noting only that the defendant acknowledged that the materials copied 
contained creativity or expression. Id. at 1389. 
248 Id. at 1389-90. 
249Id. at 1390-91. 
250Id. at 1391. For a discussion of the origins of the Classroom Guidelines and their 
original appearance in the congressional report, see supra Part ll.A.2. 
251 Id. at 1390. 
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light years away from the safe harbor ofthe guidelines weighs against a finding offair 
use.252 
This single paragraph l;l1capsulates several essential principles about fair use 
that are often obscured by confusion and misleading statements.253 First, the MDS 
court confirms that the Classroom Guidelines are not the law. They have not been 
read into law in this case or any other case, and Congress has not made them 
law.254 Their appearance in congressional reports does not make them law. 
Second, the guidelines may be helpful "general guidance.''255 They may articulate 
useful concepts for understanding the meaning of fair use in particular 
circumstances, but they do not necessarily offer a definition for ultimately 
establishing fair use. Third, activities may be outside the ambit of the Classroom 
Guidelines, but they are not necessarily infringements. Indeed, the MDS court 
found that when activities are "light years" away from the guidelines, that fact 
may only ''weigh against" a finding of fair use.256 Fourth, in the court's view, the 
guidelines are at best a safe harbor.257 They may even be a safe harbor for a 
commercial copyshop, in addition to the nonprofit organizations for which the 
guidelines were intended.258 
252 [d. at 1390-91. 
253 See Michael G. Frey, Note, Unfairly Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: Princeton 
University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d J381 (6th Gir. 1996), 66 U. ON. L. 
REv. 959,1014-15 (1998). Frey offers a similar critique of the court's use ofthe guidelines and 
takes the matter further: 
What the text does not clearly indicate, however, but what the majority extracts from it, is the 
fact that copying which falls outside the Guidelines' safe harbor should weigh against a finding 
offilir use. The court's reasoning is wrong because the Guidelines were not meant to serve as an 
additional barrier to a finding offair use in educational settings. 
[d.; see also Gilbert Busby, Note, Fair Use and Educational Copying: A Reexamination of 
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 86 Ky. LJ. 675, 706-fJ7 
(1997-1998) (highly critical ofthe use oflegislative history and the guidelines in MDS). 
254 In an examination ofthe relevant cases, Part III ofthis article demonstrates that no case 
has adopted the guidelines as a legal standard. Part n.A.2 traces the origins of the Classroom 
Guidelines, also revealing that Congress never adopted them as a mandatory standard. See H.R. 
REP. No. 94-1476, at 72 (1976). 




257 Although some interested parties strongly object to labeling the guidelines as a "safe 
harbor," the MDS court explicitly pronounced them as such. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
258 Of considerable significance, the court called the guidelines a "safe harbor" even as 
applied to a for-profit defendant, taking the concept far beyond the nonprofit setting where the 
guidelines are intended to apply. [d. at 1391. The label "safe harbor" defies the role of 
guidelines regularly espoused by many commercial publishers which may be seeking to 
preserve rights to bring legal action against even a nonprofit institution that has acted within the 
constraints ofthese guidelines. See infra text accompanying notes 400-02. See generally, Frey, 
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Five judges dissented in three separate dissenting opinions.259 Judge Ryan 
wrote a detailed dissent that exceeded the majority opinion in both length and 
depth.26o He took the majority to task on several aspects of fair use, but also 
devoted considerable attention to the Classroom Guidelines, arguing that they 
were oflittle significance in comprehending the law. Judge Ryan correctly noted 
that the guidelines are not enacted into the law, and then scrutinized the majority's 
reliance on the guidelines as an element of "legislative history" for interpreting 
the fair-use statute.261 Ryan condemned the use of legislative history and 
underscored strong propositions from recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions: 
Despite the well-settled rule that legislative history is irrelevant and inappropriate 
to consider except to clarify ambiguity in the text ofa statute, the majority relies upon 
the legislative history without identifying any ambiguity in the statute, but only 
because "[t]he statutory factors are not models of clarity, ... the fair use issue has 
long been a particularly troublesome one ... , [and other] courts have often turned to 
the legislative history when considering fair use questions." I wish to emphasize in 
the strongest terms that it is entirely inappropriate to rely on the Copyright Act's 
legislative history at all.262 
Judge Ryan acknowledged that section 107 begs the need for some clarity, 
but he was quick to accept the duty of bringing meaning to fair use by deciding 
the case based on the factors in the statute. He declined to rely on guidelines: 
supra note 253, at 1010 (calling application of the Classroom Guidelines to for-profit activity 
"strange"). 
259 A short dissent by Chief Judge Martin focuses on the constraining effect of copyright 
on the free flow of information and the needs of educators and students. MDS, 99 F.3d 1381 at 
1393-94. A dissent by Judge Merritt adopts the argument that multiple copies for classroom use 
are within fair use under section 107 and ought not be further limited by the four factors. Id. at 
1394-97. Judge Merritt reinforced his views by asserting the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution in support ofbroader fair-use rights. Id. at 1397. The interrelationship between fair 
use and rights of free speech often leads courts to read the scope of fair use more broadly in 
order to protect the speech rights of the defendant who is using copyrighted works to advance 
the activities that ordinarily enjoy First-Amendment protections. See, e.g., Time Inc. v. Bemard 
Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (allowing the use of sketches from the 
famous Zapruder film in a book about the Kennedy assassination). 
260 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1397-1412. Ryan's dissent is also structured with the style and 
formality of a lead opinion, suggesting that the judge may have hoped to persuade his 
colleagues on the bench to join him, or perhaps persuade the U.S. Supreme Court, should it 
have reviewed this decision on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari. 
Mich. Document Servs., Inc. v. Princeton Univ. Press, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997). The parties then 
settled the case. See Footnotes: Michigan Copy Shop and Publishers Settle Copyright Lawsuit, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 20, 1997, at A12 (reporting settlement tenns that allowed 
MDS to copy no more than a single page of a protected work and required payment of $50,000 
damages). 
261 MDS, 99 F.3d at 1412. 
262 Id. at 1411 (alterations in original) (quoting majority opinion at 1390). 
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"The Classroom Guidelines do not become more authoritative by their adoption 
into a Committee Report."263 He added: 
That the Classroom Guidelines are not law should be reason enough for this court to 
refrain from using them to find infringement, but this is not the only reason to reject 
out ofhand arguments based on legislative history. Committee Reports are unreliable 
"as a genuine indicator of congressional intent" and "as a safe predictor of judicial 
construction."264 
Judge Ryan also may have overstated the majority's dependence on the 
Classroom Guidelines, though his general statements about the importance of 
legislative history and the lack of significance of the guidelines do bear 
considerable credibility. Judge Ryan may have also overstated concerns about the 
majority's reasoning. Had the majority relied primarily or even prominently on 
the Classroom Guidelines, concern about the merits of legislative history would 
be crucial. Instead, the majority used the guidelines in a manner similar to 
previous cases that have gone before: as a source ofsupport for a decision already 
reached on an evaluation of the four factors. The guidelines are, quite simply, a 
crutch. They give some modicum of assurance to educators and librarians when 
the four factors leave lingering doubts. They also give assurance to federal judges 
who may be looking for external validation of a decision already reached, 
knowing that fair use is open to diverse interpretation and that eminently 
reasonable people can easily criticize any conclusion that anyone may reach.265 
4. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco me. 
In a controversial decision from 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit ruled that single copies ofjournal articles made by a research scientist for 
his own research program at a for-profit company may in some instances not be 
fair use.266 Again, the guidelines become a source of solace for a court rendering 
a troublesome decision.267 In its general analysis of the law, the court noted that 
2631d.
 
264 [d. (citation omitted).
 
265 See Elliott Epstein & Andrew J. Zulieve, The Fair Use Doctrine: Commercial
 
Misappropriation and Market Diversion, 13 ME. BJ. 142, 1467 (1998) (noting that the MDS 
court had little trouble ruling that the copying was not fair use, suggesting that the court did not 
need additional support from the guidelines). 
266 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 FJd 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. 
dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995). 
267 Perhaps evidencing protracted debate among the judges who decided this case, the 
court went so far as to amend its opinion seven months after its initial decision. The Second 
Circuit handed down its original decision in October 1994, but issued a significantly amended 
opinion in July 1995. Most remarkably, the amended opinion also came after the parties settled 
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"Congress has thus far provided scant guidance for resolving fair use issues 
involving photocopying, legislating specifically only as to library copying, and 
providing indirect advice concerning classroom copying."268 With the Classroom 
Guidelines as virtually the only clue of congressional insight on fair use for 
photocopying, traces of the guidelines crept into the court's analysis of the 
copying involved in this case, despite the case's for-profit enterprise context. In 
particular, the court's analysis of the "purpose" factor examined the scientist's 
reason for making the copies.269 The court sympathized with the argument that 
copying for immediate laboratory use may well be fair use: ''This is the sort of 
'spontaneous' copying that is part of the test for pemrissible nonprofit classroom 
copying.''270 "Spontaneity" is a concept from the Classroom Guidelines, and it 
appears nowhere in the law. Bringing it into the Texaco case can only be seen as 
an encroachment ofthe guidelines into law.271 
The Texaco decision alluded to the Classroom Guidelines again when the 
opinion struggled with language affirming that the ruling encompasses 
"institutional, systematic copying" and not copying ''by an individual, for 
personal use in research or otherwise.''272 In a footnote the court provides this 
summary of the legal weight of the guidelines: ''Though these guidelines are not 
considered necessarily binding on courts ... , they exist as a persuasive authority 
marking out certain minimum standards for educational fair use ... ."273 In the 
final analysis, the Texaco decision confirms in a small way the trend apparent in 
all other cases addressing the Classroom Guidelines: they are not law; they are a 
minimal standard of fair use; they are a compelling source of congressional 
insight on fair use; they are a useful crutch for the courts that are struggling with 
fair-use ambiguities as much as are the stakeholders in the fair use debates; and 
they add some authority for a judicial decision that is first and foremost based on 
the law and not the guidelines. 
their lawsuit and successfully petitioned the u.s. Supreme Court to dismiss the petition for 
certiorari. See id. at 913. 
268Id. at 917 (footnote and internal citation omitted). 
269 Among other purposes, Texaco claimed that the copies allowed the scientist to bring 
less bulky copies into the laboratory, and the copies would not have to be safeguarded from 
damage.Id. at 919. 
270Id 
271 See Zimmerman, supra note 71, at 411 n.18 (claiming that the ruling "calls into 
question the legitimacy of such copying for personal use outside the narrow parameters of the 
guidelines'} 
272 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 916. The opinion also states: "In other words, our opinion does not 
decide the case that would arise if Chickering were a professor or an independent scientist 
engaged in copying and creating files for independent research, as opposed to being employed 
by an institution in the pursuit ofhis research on the institution's beha1f." Id. The court added 
much ofthis language when it amended the opinion. See supra note 267. 
273 Texaco, 60 F. 3d at 919 n.S (citations omitted). 
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5. Marcus v. Rowley 
The earliest court ruling to make any examination of the Classroom 
Guidelines was the 1983 decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Marcus v. Rowley.274 Eloise Marcus, the plaintiff, wrote a thirty-five page booklet 
on cake decorating and used it to teach adult-education classes. She sold copies to 
her students for two dollars each, and she properly included a copyright notice on 
all copies and registered the work with the Copyright Office.275 Shirley Rowley, 
the defendant, enrolled in one of Marcus's classes and purchased a copy of the 
booklet. Rowley later developed her own booklet for her own classes, and eleven 
of the twenty-four pages in her work were copied directly from Marcus's original 
work. Rowley neither gave the plaintiffcredit for her work nor acknowledged her 
copyright.276 
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the use was not fair, in a decision based on the 
four factors of the statute.277 As in the Kinko's case, the court turned to the 
Classroom Guidelines, but only after already reaching a conclusion based on the 
law, and only to affirm the decision already rendered. The Marcus opinion 
confused the fundamental nature of the guidelines in a series of contradictory 
statements. In one paragraph, the court noted that classroom copying ''was of 
such major concern to Congress," that Congress "approved a set of guidelines 
with respect to it."278 The opinion then added that the guidelines represent ''the 
Congressional Committees' view" offair use.279 
In the same paragraph from Marcus, however, the Ninth Circuit first appears 
to have ratified the Classroom Guidelines as defmitive: ''The guidelines were 
designed to give teachers direction as to the extent of permissible 
copying ...."280 After giving the guidelines that conceptual boost, the court then 
promptly marginalized them: "The guidelines were intended to represent 
minimum standards of fair use."281 Once again, the Ninth Circuit seems more 
accurate with its second statement-the guidelines are at best a minimum 
measure of fair use in the educational setting. The one weighty paragraph from 
274 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983). 
275 Id. at 1173. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 1177. The court acknowledged that the then new Copyright Act of 1976 did not 
apply to the activities in this case, because the events occurred before the Act took effect in 
1978. Yet the court noted that the fair-use doctrine was not intended to change under the new 
law, so the court could reliably look to the text ofsection 107./d at 1174. 
278 Id. at 1178. 
279 /d. The decision is referring to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives, which issued the report in which the Classroom Guidelines first appeared. See 
supra note 4. 
280Id. 
281Id. 
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the Marcus opinion recovers from its ambiguity and ends on perhaps its most 
accurate statement: ''Thus, while they are not controlling on the court, they are 
instructive on the issue offair use in the context ofthis case.''282 
The Marcus court proceeded to apply the Oassroom Guidelines, concluding 
that the defendant's use ofthe plaintiff's booklet did not meet the standards ofthe 
guidelines.283 The court looked to the tests of ''brevity'' and "spontaneity," 
concluding, among other findings, that the copying was excessive, and that the 
use of the materials during three academic years was not "spontaneous.''284 1be 
court found that the defendant met the "cumulative effect" test of the guidelines, 
but did not include a copyright notice on the copied portions as required by the 
guidelines.285 For all the court's rhetoric about the guidelines as ''not controlling" 
and as ''minimum standards,''286 the court's actual analysis of the guidelines has 
all the appearance of treating the Classroom Guidelines as a mandatory standard 
of inflexible application, yet the court still was not basing its decision on them. 
The best indication of the meaning of the guidelines is their position in the 
overall analysis of fair use within the opinion. As in the Kinko's and MDS 
decisions, the court turned to the Classroom Guidelines only after reaching a 
conclusion based on the four factors. The guidelines largely served the purpose of 
affrrming the decision that the court had already reached. Given their relatively 
strict-or at least literal-application in the Kinko's, MDS, and the Marcus 
decisions, perhaps the real value of the guidelines is to serve as a tool for judges 
to fmd some degree of assurance about a decision that is in reality based on the 
factors from section 107. 
6. Bridge Publications, Inc. v. Vien 
A 1993 ruling from the District Court for the Southem District of California 
was one decision in a series related to the aggressive defense of copyrights held 
by L. Ron Hubbard and the Church of Scientology.287 In Bridge Publications, 
Inc. v. Vien,288 the defendant was accused of reproducing or instructing students 











287 Perhaps the most significant copyright infringement case involving materials owned 
by the Church of Scientology is Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 907 
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). Also notable is the ruling against the fair use of Hubbard's 
writings in a biography. See New Era Publ'n Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 
576 (2d Cir. 1989). 
288 827 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1993). 
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taught by the defendant.2E9 The opinion glides through the four factors of section 
107 with little explanation or analysis, and with little hope of finding fair use; the 
court swiftly concluded that all four factors weighed against the defendant.290 The 
court added this brieflook at the Classroom Guidelines: 
Finally, the court finds defendant's use does not fit within the special guidelines 
approved by Congress as to fair use in the educational context Defendant's copying 
and use of the works was not restricted to one copy for her own use in teaching. 
Additionally, the undisputed evidence shows defendant's copying was not limited and 
spontaneous, but was extensive and methodical, and consisted of copying from the 
same author, time after time. This is clearly not within the letter or spirit of the 
Congressional guidelines.291 
Aside from questioning whether the court really understood the standard 
prescribed in the guidelines, or whether they should apply at all to for-profit uses, 
the application of the Classroom Guidelines in Bridge Publications was 
superfluous in light of the drubbing that the court gave the defendant under 
section 107. Most importantly, the reference to the Classroom Guidelines was, as 
in Kinko '8 and Marcus, a mechanism available to the judge for reinforcing a 
determination already rendered under the statute. 
B.	 Audiovisual Works: Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. 
Crooks 
In Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks,292 three plaintiff 
companies produced and distributed, for profit, educational audiovisual materials, 
mostly on videotape or sixteen-millimeter film.293 The defendants were a 
cooperative of public schools in upstate New York and its officers and 
directors.294 The cooperative, known by the acronym "BOCES,"295 was a 
289 ld. at 632. The cursory opinion offers few details about the events in this case. It is a 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, and the opinion at its most elaborate states: "Nor is 
there a genuine issue of fact regarding defendant's copying of, or directing the copying of, the 
copyrighted works. The undisputed evidence shows that defendant copied or directed her 
students to copy plaintiffs' copyrighted materials as part of a 'Dynamism' course which she 
offered for sale." ld. The opinion later refers obliquely to "sound recordings," "wholesale 
copying," and sales of materials to students at $3,000 "for the same purpose intended by 
plaintiffs." ld. at 632, 634, 636. 
290 [d. at 635-36. 
291ld. at 636 (citation omitted). 
292 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
293 ld. at 1158. 
294 [d. at 1159. 
295 The formal name of "BOCES" was Board of Educational Services, First Supervisory 
District, Erie County, New York.ld. at 1159. 
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nonprofit organization funded by nineteen school districts and servicing more 
than one hundred schools.296 BOCES maintained an elaborate and expensive 
array of equipment in order to facilitate large-volume recording off-air of 
programs transmitted by broadcast or by cable and reproducing those tapes in 
quantities for the needs of members.297 Member schools could request a tape, 
which BOCES would make and deliver, and the instructor could play the tape, 
generally five or six times, for showing to different sections of a particular 
class.298 
The court focused on the four factors of section 107299 and found little 
support for the claim of fair use,3oo despite some sympathy for the nonprofit 
296 Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1159. 
297 Id. at 1162. 
298 !d. at 1163. 
299 The case involved activities that occurred before and after January I, 1978, the 
effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, so the text of section 107 was technically not 
applicable to all claims of fair use by the defendants. Id at 1160. The court acknowledged that 
discrepancy, but was little troubled by it: "Section 107 ... which, although not controlling in all 
instances here, is intended to be a codification of preexisting law." Id. at 1168. The defendants 
unsuccessfully argued that the taping was merely ''time--shifting.'' building upon another case 
that found "time-shifting" for private home recording to be fair use. Id at 1163. In the early 
19808, the precedent for tim~shifting as fair use was Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. 
of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), a case that was destined for the United States 
Supreme Court, which would also hold that private off-air recording of non-subscription 
television broadcasts is fair use. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984). By the time ofdeciding Crooks, however, the Sony case had been appealed to 
and decided by the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals, which ruled that the taping was not fair use. 
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981). Despite 
the potential applicability of the Sony decisions, and their mixed results, the court in Crooks 
found them to be little help: 
Both this case and the conflicting Sony decisions evolve from the relationship of the 
copyright laws to the use ofnew and similar technologies. Beyond this threshold, however, the 
similarity ends. The analyses of fair use and the copyright laws in the Sony opinions are at times 
helpful and instructive to the legal issues presented here, but the Sony cases are, in comparison 
to the instant case, "no more like than an apple to an oyster." Offoremost concern here are the 
copyright laws and their application to off-th~air videotape recordings used for classroom 
educational use. 
Crooks, 542 F. Supp at 1169 (footnote omitted). 
300 The court found an improper purpose in light of the "highly sophisticated" system for 
copying. the lack of"spontaneity," and the multiple copying. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175. The 
court also found that the films were educational in "nature" which tipped against fair use in 
order to protect the educational market and the revenues from it Id. at 11 n-78. The court 
found that the work was also "out-of-print," which could have helped tip the "nature" factor 
toward a finding of fair use. Id. at 1177. The relevance of a work being out-of-print has had 
mixed consequences for fair use. Most authority is consistent with the Crooks decision, holding 
that if a work is out-of-print, fair use can apply more liberally. See Maxtone-Graham v. 
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1264 n.8 (2d Cir. 1986); S. REP. No. 94473, at 64 (1965); H.R. 
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I 
educational purpose.301 Although this case involved off-air videotaping of 
'broadcasts, and the Off-Air Guidelines had been published in the Federal Register 
'the year before, the court never mentioned them.302 The Classroom Guidelines, 
:however, did influence the reasoning. The court noted the defendant's lack of 
l"spontaneity,"303 a concept derived from the guidelines.304 The Classroom 
IGuidelines were especially salient when the court detennined that the "effect" 
Ifactor weighed heavily against fair use.305 In a peculiar twist on a concept from 
Ithe guidelines, the court noted: "lhe cumulative effect of BOCES' massive 
:videotape copying indicates that there would be no market whatsoever for 
Iplaintiffs' videotape sales or licensing agreements if off-the-air videotaping of 
iplaintiffs' works is permitted to continue in an unregulated fashion. ''306 Under 
:the guidelines, "cumulative effect" was defined with precise limits on the extent 
:of copying; by the court's reasoning, cumulative effect gave rise to infringement 
,when it occurred without "regulation" by BOCES, apparently well beyond strict 
:numericallirnits.307 Such an analysis leaves open the prospect that "cumulative 
I effect," if within reasonable policy limits established by the defendant, could in 
: fact be adverse to the plaintiff, but not so adverse as to tip the fourth factor against 
: a finding offair use.308 
I 
i REp. No. 94-1476, at 67 (1976). By contrast, the Kinko:Y decision determined that ifthe work is 
! out-of-print, fair use applies more narrowly, because royalty payments for rights to make copies 
: are the only remaining market for the work Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 
, F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The court also ruled that the "amount" factor weighed 
against fair use because of the copying and storing of full copies of films for many years. 
Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1179. The court was adamant, however, in holding that reproductions 
of fuIJ copies could still be within fair use. ld. The court quoted from Williams & Wilkins Co. 
I v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973): "the idea that copying an entire copyrighted 
work can never be fair use is an overbroad generalization, unsupported by the decisions, and 
, rejected by years ofaccepted practice." Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1179. 
301 Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1174. 
302 For discussion of the origins ofthe Off-Air Guidelines, see supra Part ILA.4; see also 
Bell, supra note 88 at 170-77. 
303 Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1175. 
304 See supra text accompanying note 72. 
305 The court emphasized that the off-air taping interfered with the plaintiffs' ability to 
market the works for educational users and "tend to diminish and prejudice the potential sale of 
, plaintiffs' works in videotape format." [d. at 1169. 
306 [d. at 1169-70 (emphasis added). 
3071d. 
308 A crocial word here is "reasonable." BOCES had a "rough rule of thumb" that it 
,	 purchased an additional copy of a film after the first copy received thirty "teacher requests." ld. 
at 1173. The court seemed unimpressed with the looseness of the standard and with the high 
ceiling on demands for copies before purchasing another original. 
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When Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, its reports acknowledged 
that some off-air taping for educational use could be fair use.309 The court, 
however, took a much narrower view of this possibility, noting that the House 
report "briefly mentions the possibility that the fair use doctrine may have some 
limited application to off-the-air videotaping for nonprofit classroom educational 
use."3JO The court also looked to the Senate report, which would have allowed 
only ''temporary use" to fit within fair use}11 In conclusion, the court resolved: 
"BOCES' massive and systematic videotape copying and the retention of some 
master videotapes for up to ten years cannot be considered 'limited' or fair 
use ...."312 
Reliance on the Classroom Guidelines in Crooks is deeply flawed. For 
example, concepts of "cumulative effect" are vestiges of the Classroom 
Guidelines meant for photocopying; the Off-Air Guidelines for videotaping do 
not delimit fair use according to "cumulative effect." Turning to any of the 
guidelines in this case is suspect. The photocopy guidelines are not germane; the 
off-air guidelines were available to the court, but were not in existence at the time 
the infringing event occurred. But the use of the guidelines in this case is no less 
extraordinary than the use of the Classroom Guidelines in Kinko's or Texaco, 
which involved copying by a for-profit entity.313 Applying guidelines to activities 
occurring before the guidelines were negotiated may be inappropriate or unfair; 
similarly, applying the Classroom Guidelines to a for-profit defendant breaks 
significantly from the letter and spirit of the guidelines. Nevertheless, these 
decisions reveal that courts have little hesitation referring to the guidelines when 
they can bolster a case built on uncertain law. 
In none of the relevant cases is the application ofa set of guidelines a perfect 
fit, or even a close fit. Instead, the urge to apply the guidelines is "compelling," in 
the words ofthe Kinko's decision.314 The courts are driven to apply the guidelines 
in their quest for support; in turn, readers of the decisions are often drawn to the 
brief references to guidelines in their search for specific resolution of the fair-use 
issues. The circumstances seem no less compelling in the Crooks case. Perhaps 
309 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 71 (1976) ("The Connnittee believes that the fair use 
doctrine has some limited application in this area ... .''); S. REp. No. 94-473, at 66 (1975). 
3J0 Crooks, 542 F. Supp. at 1181. 
311 Id. 
312 Id. BOCES also argued that making copies of audiovisual works was within its rights 
under section 114 of the 1976 Cop)Tight Act, but the court noted that the argument was a 
stretch, given that the provision applies specifically to sound recordings. The court also used the 
opportunity to emphasize once again the language from H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), 
affinning that off-air taping is a fair·use problem. Id. at 1183. 
313 For discussion of the Kinko's and Texaco decisions, see supra Parts III.A.2 and 
III.A.4. 
314 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics CorP., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
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they are sufficiently compelling that even though the court really did not apply the 
guidelines, many readers ofthis case have seen the silhouette of the guidelines in 
the court's reasoning and have called upon this case for its feeble vindication of 
the negotiated stance. 
C. Interlibrary Loans: Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States 
In the late 1960s the Williams & Wilkins Company, publisher of various 
medical journals, brought suit against the National Library of Medicine (NLM) 
for making and distributing photocopies of its journal articles in the name of 
"interlibrary loans.''315 As a legal action against the United States government, 
the case began in the U.S. Court of Claims, and the commissioner held that the 
copying was beyond the scope of fair use.316 On appeal, the full panel of the 
Court ofClaims reversed, and held for the library.317 The publisher sought review 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, and in 1974 it split four-to-four, with one justice not 
participating.318 Consequently, the decision from the appellate panel was upheld, 
with its fmding that the copying in question was fair use. 
This case is of considerable importance for several reasons. It revealed the 
flexibility of interpreting fair use in the years leading to final passage of the 1976 
Act. Stakeholders in the debate over fair use had fresh ammunition for arguing 
that fair use was ambiguous not only for them to apply in daily activities, but even 
for judges trained in the law. The case further underscored the importance of fair 
use for the survival of interlibrary-loan activities, and it gave judicial credence to 
the appropriateness of allowing fair-use copying at all for interlibrary sharing of 
resources. That fundamental proposition ultimately became part of the 1976 Act 
in section 108(gX2),319 and it may not have become part of statutory law had the 
Williams & Wilkins case not reached a conclusion at such a propitious time. 
More significant, the case is the clearest judicial signal that reasonable 
standards or limitations on photocopying for research purposes can pass a fair-use 
test, and those reasonable standards in tum became influential on the formulation 
of the CONTU Guidelines.320 The NLM based its copying practices on a 
"General Interlibrary Loan Code" that had been adopted voluntarily by libraries 
cooperating in lending programs.321 As instituted at the NLM, the "Code" meant 
315 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1346-47 (CI. Ct. 1973), 
affd by an equally divided Court, 420 US. 376 (1975). For a most enjoyable look at the 
strategy and events surrounding this case, see PAUL GolDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: 
FROM GUTENBERG TO TIlE CELEsTlALJUKEBQX 78-128 (1994). 
316 Williams & Wilkins. 487 F.2d at 1346-47. 
317 [d. at 1363. 
318 Williams & Wilkins Co., 420 U.S. 376. 
319 17 U.S.C. § 108(g)(2)(1994); see alfo supra text accompanying notes 102-05. 
320 See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 4. 
321 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1348. 
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that the library provided only a single copy of an article from a jomnal issue for 
each request, and each copy included a statement that it is for "study or 
research."322 The library also identified 104 "widely-available" journals and 
generally refused to fulfill copying requests until the requestor had sought the 
journal from nearby libraries that held those more common publications.323 The 
NLM, nevertheless, would fulfill the request if it came from another government 
library, or if the article requested was more than five years old, or if the requestor 
had been unsuccessful in securing the article elsewhere,324 The library adhered to 
other limits on the number of copies it would provide to each requestor and the 
number ofpages it would copy from anyone journaI.325 
These limits greatly influenced the court's ruling; "Both libraries have 
declared and enforced reasonably strict limitations which, to our mind, keep the 
duplication within appropriate confines."326 In the end, however, the court looked 
to the equitable doctrine of fair use, and turned for guidance to language of 
committee reports surrOlmding the copyright revision bills then in Congress. 
Those reports noted the need for interested parties to convene and negotiate a 
resolution of a "mutual understanding" and ''workable clearance and licensing 
conditions.''327 Lacking those resolutions, fair use depends on "all the applicable 
322 Id. The full statement placed on the copies was: "This is a single photostatic copy 
made by the National Library of Medicine for purposes of study or research in lieu of lending 
the original." [d. 
3231d. at 1349. 
324/d. 
325 Seeid. 
326 Id. at 1354. The court went further and drew analogy to the practice of the Library of 
Congress, which permitted individual library users to make their own copies on unsupervised 
machines which bore notices that allowed single copies "for the purpose of study, scholarship, 
or research." Id. at 1356 n.l6. The more complete text of the notice on the machines, as 
included in the court's opinion, provides "a single photocopy of copyrighted material may be 
made only for the purpose ofstudy, scholarship, or research, and for no other purpose" and "the 
sale and/or further reproduction of any photocopied copyrighted materials is iIlega!." Id. The 
court viewed the requestor in the interlibrary.loan arrangement to be little different from the 
user who comes to the library in person. ''The reader who himselfmakes a copy does so for his 
own personal work needs, and individual work needs are likewise dominant in the reproduction 
programs ofthe two medicallibraries-programs which are reasonably policed and enforced." 
[d. at 1355. Current law of library copying also makes no fundamental distinction between 
making copies for a user at the library and for a user who requests the copy from another 
library. In either case, the library that is actually making the copy for the user is subject to the 
same conditions. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(d}-(e) (1994) (allowing a library to make copies of 
articles and other short works, and even entire works, under specific conditions). Only when the 
material is sent to another library for delivery to the user is the library that requests the copy 
then subject to the added conditions that are the object of interpretation in the CONTU 
Guidelines. See 17 U.s.C. § 108(g)(2) (1994). 
327 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1361 (citing H.R. REP. No. 90·83, at 36 (1967». 
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criteria and the facts of the particular case."328 The court concluded that the 
libraries had acted consistently with that approach and held that copying an entire 
article is not necessarily an infringement.329 The photocopying by the libraries 
was fair use.330 In the summary of its reasons for reaching that conclusion, the 
court Wlderscored its desire·for Congress to take the lead in "contriving pragmatic 
or compromise solutions which would reflect the legislature's choices of policy 
and its mediation among the competing interests."331 
The court's conclusion may have been more prescient than it could have 
expected. Just a few years later Congress enacted section 108, which explicitly 
permitted photocopies of articles and other short works for library users, whether 
on location or through a request from another library.332 Congress also imposed 
general limitations on interlibrary arrangements, and the further elaboration of 
those limitations fell upon CONTU.333 The CONTU Guidelines for interlibrary 
loans embody many of the limitations that the Williams & Wilkins court found to 
be persuasive when considering the lawfulness of the NLM photocopying 
program.334 Consequently, libraries that rely on the CONTU Guidelines are not 
only implementing guidelines that have the support of a congressionally 
established commission, but guidelines that have in large substance been the 
subject of-or at least have emerged from-judicial analysis. Those circumstance 
alone give the CONTU Guidelines greater authority and greater legal credibility 
than any ofthe other guidelines examined in this article. 
Although the Williams & Wilkins case may give the CONTU guidelines 
important support, the case has been frequently criticized. Nimmer joins a list of 
copyright experts who have been highly critical of the Williams & Wilkins ruling: 
"This landmark decision by the Court of Claims appears to this writer to be 
seriously in error, with implications that might well justifY its description by one 
of the dissenting judges as 'the Dred Scott decision of copyright law."'335 A 
comparison offair use to slaverymay be hyperbole, but the depth ofthe criticism 
is clear. Nimmer disassembles the intemallogic of the ruling, and he argues that 
the case is inconsistent with fundamental precepts of fair use.336 The questionable 
survival of Williams & Wilkins in future court decisions elevates the importance 
328/d 
329 Cj Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.s. 417, 449-50 (1984) 
(finding fair use despite reproduction ofthe entire work). See also supra note 300. 
330 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1356-57. 
331/d at 1363. 
332 Pub. L. No. 94-553 (l976), 90 Stat. 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 108 
(1994 &Supp. N 1998)}. 
333 See 17 U.S.C. § 108(gX2) (1994). 
334 487 F.2d at 1354. 
335 4 NlMMERONCOPYRIGHT,supranote 7, § 13.05[E][4][c] (footnote omitted). 
336 Jd. 
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of the passage of section 108(gX2) to secure limited rights of copying for 
interlibrary loans, notwithstanding variable interpretations offair use. 
The CONfU Guidelines further reinforce that lawful opportunity. This 
transition from the uncertainty and controversy of fair use to reliance on section 
108 is a manifestation of the importance that Congress places on the survival of 
interlibrary services and the copying that makes the service and the preservation 
of collections possible. Even if Nimmer is correct about traditional fair-use 
principles when, for example, he criticizes the decision for placing too much 
emphasis on the interest of "medicine and medical research" in general,337 
Congress may well have overridden that concern by passing section 108 of the 
Copyright Act. Section 108 and the CONfU Guidelines may not be wholly 
consistent with fair use, but that conclusion may not be relevant to the merits of 
current law for interlibrary services; that law is now rooted in broader principles 
of the need for expanding access to materials at remote locations, on urgent 
request, and under other circumstances that advance interests of learning and 
expanding knowledge in general. 
D. Glim~~frommeU~~premeCoon 
Two decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court provide some brief indications 
of the Justices' thinking on this matter. In the well-known 1984 decision, Sony 
Corporation ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court ruled narrowly 
that taping a broadcast television program offthe air for later private viewing was 
fair use.338 Four Justices dissented, arguing that fair use does not necessarily 
allow the making of complete copies of works, even for private use.339 The 
dissenters noted, for example, that section 107 of the Copyright Act allows full 
copies under certain circumstances340 : 
In other respects, the making of single copies is pennissible only within the limited 
confines of the fair use doctrine. The Senate report [accompanying passage of the 
1976 Act], in a section headed "Single and multiple copying," notes that the fair use 
337 See id § 13[E][4][c]. 
338 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984). 
339Id. at 457-500 (Blackmun, 1., dissenting). 
340Id. at 464-65. The dissenters noted further that full copies may be allowed under 
section 112 (broadcasters may make one copy of transmissions) or copies for blind persons or 
copies made by student calligraphers for learning purposes (then solely a matter offair use, but 
today some such copies are allowed under section 121). The list is a peculiar hallmark of the 
issues ofthat time. Id at 464-65 nn. 11 & 12. 
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doctrine would permit a teacher to make a single copy of a work for use in the 
classroom, but only ifthe work was not a"sizable" one such as anovel or treatise.341 
The dissenters made a detailed survey of fair use, with numerous references 
to hearings, reports, and other pieces of the legislative history of the Copyright 
Act, but the opinion, cmiously, never alludes to the Classroom Guidelines.342 The 
Court did not need to make those references, but the opinion seems to touch every 
other relevant issue surrounding the guidelines, including the quotation above 
about copies for teaching. Evidently, the Court was avoiding the repercussions of 
making any statement about the guidelines in a case where such statements would 
be unnecessary and likely inflammatory in the aftermath of a closely divided 
decision ofimportance to the millions ofAmericans who watch television. 
The Sony dissent also examines off-air videotaping in the legislative history 
of the fair-use statute.343 In a brief examination of off-air videotaping for 
educational uses, the Court did not look to the guidelines,344 but it instead referred 
to the committee reports from the passage ofthe 1976 Act to conclude: "Even in 
the context of highly productive educational uses, Congress has avoided this 
temptation [to 'stretch' fair use for new technologies]; in passing the 1976 Act, 
Congress made it clear that off-the-air videotaping was to be permitted only in 
very limited situations.''345 This heavy emphasis on the legislative history, with 
scrupulous avoidance of the guidelines themselves, is consistent with the 
dissenters' discussion of photocopies for education: considerable detail from the 
reports and hearings, but no mention of the guidelines.346 Inferences from 
omissions are hazardous, at best. Yet, amidst detailed examination of the 
legislative history, the omission of any mention of the guidelines begs questions 
about their significance as a gauge ofthe law or even ofcongressional intent. 
The following year, in 1985, the Court ruled in Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises347 that a magazine exceeded the limits offair use when 
it made brief quotations. from President Gerald Ford's then unpublished 
3411d. at 465. The dissenters proceeded to cite S. REP. No. 94-473, at 63-64 (1975) and 
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-69, 71 (1976). 
342 Sony, 464 U.S. at 475-86. 
343 [d. at 480-8 1. 
344 See Off-Air Guidelines, supra note 4. 
345 Sony, 464 U.S. at 481. The opinion cites H. R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 71 (1976), and S. 
REP. No. 94-473, at 64 (1975). 
346 The Off-Air Guidelines may be distinguished in this context from the Classroom 
Guidelines, because the fonner did not exist until 1981 and thus were not truly evidence of 
congressional intent supporting passage of the 1976 Act. Yet the dissenting opinion in Sony 
mentions neither set ofguidelines, even the Classroom Guidelines as they appeared in the H.R. 
REp. No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976). See Sonyv. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417,476 
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
347 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
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memoirs.348 The Court drew some of its fair-use analysis from the legislative 
history of the 1976 Act, noting that the Senate Report "selected photocopying of 
classroom materials to illustrate fair use."349 In the process, the Court lent some 
credibility to the Classroom Guidelines. The Senate Report includes some 
analysis of classroom photocopying, but that language was omitted from the 
subsequent House Report. The Court did not view the omission as a retraction of 
principles in the Senate Report, but instead the Court made this explanation: 
It appears instead that the fair use discussion ofphotocopying ofclassroom materials 
was omitted from the final [House} Report because educators and publishers in the 
interim had negotiated a set of guidelines that rendered the discussion obsolete. The 
House Report nevertheless incotpOrates the discussion by reference, citing to the 
Senate Report and stating: "the Committee has reviewed this discussion, and 
considers it still has value as an analysis of various aspects of the [fair use] 
problem."350 
This approach is little more than a recognition that the Qassroom Guidelines 
exist, without offering them any support or criticism The Court did not need to 
give them any substantive look. The issue ofclassroom copying was not at issue 
in this case, and the discussion of classroom copying was only a model for 
understanding fair use in general. If anything, the Court's passing mention of 
classroom copying and the guidelines is a reminder that the Court will look 
primarily to general principles of fair use in its quest to resolve an issue before it, 
but guidelines continue to surface in the quest for fair use.351 




350ld. at 554 (citations omitted).
 
351 The U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed directly the issues surrounding
 
photocopying for teaching or research purposes. The Sony and Harper & Row cases are the 
Court's only mentions of the Classroom Guidelines. In 1994 one more passing mention of 
classroom photocopying was buried in Campbell v. Acuj}Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
(I994), the well-known decision involving the rap-parody version of Roy Orbison's song "Oh, 
Pretty Woman." The "purpose" factor under section 107 may weigh in favor offair use under 
various circumstances, including ifthe use is "transfonnative." ld. at 579 n.ll. Transfonnative 
use was a critical part of the analysis in a case involving a significant variation on an existing 
song. Transformative use usually does not occur in a case ofsimple photocopying. At least two 
cases have found straight photocopying to be non-transfonnative and therefore the purpose 
factor weighed against fair use. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 
F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
Yet in a passing mention in the Campbell decision the U.S. Supreme Court made this strong 
statement about fair use and classroom copying: "the obvious statutory exception to this focus 
on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom 
distribution." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 n.1l. The source ofthis conclusion is the language of 
section 107 itself, which, in listing the types of activities to which fair use may apply, mentions 
"teaching," followed by this parenthetical statement: "including multiple copies for classroom 
-_._-----_._---­
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E. Synthesis ofthe Cases 
In almost twenty-five years of fair-use guidelines, only a few court rulings 
have been relevant to the intended applications of the guidelines. None of the 
principal cases is actually within the scope of the guidelines; none involves copies 
made for nonprofit educational purposes. The courts have stretched application of 
the guidelines not to find a foundation for a ruling, but instead to reinforce a 
ruling already reached. However, outside the scope of these few cases where the 
courts were willing to stretch guidelines to copying for profit, whether conducted 
by a researcher or by Kinko's, most courts have not been willing to make similar 
leaps.352 
Applying the guidelines in any case beyond the literal situations they 
encompass is a risky proposition for all interested parties. Imagine either of two 
situations. First, suppose the court in Texaco had applied the four factors and 
concluded, as it did, that the copying was not fair use.353 Then the court looked to 
the Classroom Guidelines, and by analogy to single copies ofarticles for teaching 
and research, concluded that the copying taking place inside Texaco Inc. was 
within the "spirit" of the guidelines and hence perhaps within fair use after all. 
Under this proposition, the conflict between law and guidelines would be overt, 
and the publishers in the Texaco case would ultimately be arguing for a reading of 
fair use that conflicts with the court's understanding of guidelines that the 
publishers has supported for many years. 
The second situation is the reverse. Imagine that the Texaco court ruled that 
the copying was within fair use, after applying the statutory factors. Then it 
looked to the guidelines and resolved that the for-profit activity was clearly not 
within the guidelines, and that application ofthe guidelines was "compelling."354 
use." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The Court's recognition of the importance of this provision is 
well deserved. The clause was a late addition to the language of section 107 shortly before 
passage of the Copyright Act in 1976, and its addition to the pending bill was a careful and 
deliberate step to articulate the intent of Congress that straight copying was within the 
congressional understanding of fair use. This conclusion is hardly an open door for all 
classroom copying to be fair use, but it is an indication that classroom copying is generally 
favored under the law and need not be subject to a test of "transfonnative" use. This broad 
acknowledgement of allowing direct copies suggests that rigorous conditions on portion limits 
and restrictions in the guidelines may be in disregard of the special deference Congress gave to 
education when exercising fair usc. 
352 For example, in Texaco, 60 FJd at 915, the Second Circuit ruled that single copies of 
articles for research are not fair usc. Although these basic facts are similar to some conditions 
outlined in the Classroom Guidelines, the facts were also critically different. The research was 
in the context of a for-profit entity, and the copies were not made for private research or for 
teaching preparation. See also supra Part III.A.4. 
353 See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 932. 
354 The Kinko s decision found application of the Classroom Guidelines was 
"compelling." See supra text accompanying notes 231. 
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Again, the court would have found a conflict between its reading of the law and 
its application ofthe guidelines. 
Either ofthese situations creates a direct conflict between law and guidelines. 
How might the court respond to that conflict? Clearly the court should respond by 
giving the law precedence over the guidelines. But perhaps the prospect of such 
an awkward conflict reveals the limited significance of the courts' utilization of 
the guidelines in actual cases; the guidelines were raised only to affinn a decision 
already rendered. The guidelines were not even part of a fresh perspective on the 
legalities of fair use. They were not even truly given a separate analysis. They 
were reinforcement to give the ruling a slightly stronger foundation and to give 
the judges a slightly stronger sense of having reached a correct conclusion. The 
guidelines simply would not have been deployed by the court had they stirred a 
contradictory result and posed yet a further challenge for a judge needing to make 
practical sense of fair use. These succinct hypothetical situations, reinforced by 
the way guidelines are used in actual court cases, demonstrate that the guidelines 
ultimately have not been adopted as a legal foundation for fair use, but rather are a 
tool ofconvenience to achieve a desired result. 
What then is the real meaning of the Classroom Guidelines as revealed in 
these cases? On the one hand, if the guidelines are useful tools for judges and 
other arbiters offair-use controversies, then they are still only a tool for bolstering 
a decision already made after applying the four factors of section 107 to the facts 
of the case. For educators and others who need to live by some measure of fair 
use for routine classroom copying, the cases manifest some defmite lessons about 
the weaknesses ofthe guidelines. They are not the law. They may even contradict 
the law in past and future cases. For all practical purposes, courts may view them 
as a "safe harbor," but even many of the most vigorous supporters will not give 
them that level of credibility.355 On the other hand, if the courts look to them as 
crutches, in roughly analogous cases, one can be certain that a court will look to 
the guidelines in a case against an educator or educational institution-the 
situations where the guidelines are intended to apply. Yet the cases from the past 
also suggest that the court will most certainly look to the guidelines only after 
applying the four factors. Thus, even when guidelines are available for a specific 
application, educators would be remiss to rely on them without applying the four 
factors that actually form the foundation offair-use law. 
IV. CONFLICTING PERCEPTIONS OF FAIR-USE GUIDELINES 
Building upon the preceding foundation of legal analysis, this Part IV of the 
article will test the validity of various perceptions and characterizations attributed 
to the guidelines. Those characterizations will be grouped in classifications that 
reflect the broader impressions that guidelines have made on the community 
355 See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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working with fair use. Some examinations lead to the conclusion that guidelines 
are a measure of fair-use law. Other reviews have given them weight as 
legislative history, perhaps revealing congressional intent about the meaning of 
fair use. Still other characterizations see the guidelines as private tools for 
applying fair-use principles only to the parties that assent, or as evidence of 
acceptable or tolerable behavior. 
This scrutiny of the guidelines will reject the validity of most common 
perceptions of the guidelines. Part V of this article will offer to replace those 
faulty characterizations with a fresh comprehension that reflects more accurately 
the legal status ofthe guidelines. 
A Guidelines and the Law 
1. Guidelines as a Measure ofFair Use 
All of the guidelines fail any valid claim that they might have binding, legal 
authority.356 Congress never enacted them.357 No court ever has read them into 
law in a legal decision.358 From a source-based analysis, one can unequivocally 
conclude that the guidelines are not themselves binding on the public as a rule of 
law.359 That conclusion, however, begs the remaining question: could the 
guidelines still be an accurate statement of fair-use law, even though they have 
not been specifically adopted by a lawmaking authority? Just because the courts 
have not adopted the guidelines does not necessarily mean that they do not 
embody an accurate measure of fair use for the limited situations they describe. 
No court has had such a case for actually testing the guidelines. 
Indeed, the circumstances in the cases examined in this article have departed 
greatly from the limits of the guidelines. According to the MDS decision, for 
example, the use was ''light years beyond" the limits of fair use articulated in the 
Classroom Guidelines.360 Without a court ruling on facts resembling the 
guidelines, the outcome of such a decision is somewhat, although not entirely, 
speculative. Some suggestions of such a ruling appear in a few of the existing 
cases. The Kinko s case, for example, made a fairly meticulous review of the 
356 See, e.g.• Jonathan 2avin, Copyright Infringement Litigation, 567 PLIIPAT 327, 331 
(July-Aug. 1999) (arguing that Classroom Guidelines lack the force oflaw). 
357 The guidelines that have been presented to Congress have received only positive 
comments in reports, but never have they been carried any further toward legislation. For 
discussion ofsuch treatment ofthe guidelines, see infra Part N.AA. 
358 For discussion ofthe treatment ofthe guidelines in court rulings, see supra Part m. 
359 Part Vof this article will examine the ''pedigree'' of the guidelines with respect to the 
authority oftheir sources and their relationship to positive law. 
360 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390-91 (6th 
Cir.1996). 
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guidelines,361 and the court ultimately rejected urgings by the publishers to 
endorse one important prohibition in the Classroom Guidelines,362 Thus, the court 
found that the Classroom Guidelines were, at least in that one important respect, 
not consistent with fair use and were instead more restrictive than the law actually 
allowed.363 Even a for-profit copyshop, where fair use is relatively narrow, was 
not held to the full sweep of restrictions in the guidelines. If the guidelines were 
an attempt to express the actual law of fair use, they failed in at least one critical 
respect that was oftremendous importance to the plaintiffs. 
Language directly from other court opinions further affmns that the 
guidelines are not likely to be accepted as a statement oflaw. Typical of a court's 
view of the Classroom Guidelines is this statement from Marcus v. Rowley: 
"Thus, while they are not controlling on the court, they are instructive on the issue 
offair use in the context ofthis case,"364 
Guidelines are far from law in many other respects, both substantively and 
structurally. The Classroom Guidelines are again the most salient case on point. 
They seek to quantify a law that Congress took pains to keep flexible.365 They 
also introduce variables in the fair-use equation that appear nowhere in the 
statute.366 Specifically, fair use under the statute depends on the four factors of 
purpose, nature, amount, and effect.367 The guidelines, however, make fair use 
dependent on brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative effect.368 By focusing on those 
variables, rather than the statutory four factors, guidelines depart abruptly from 
the law itself and may in fact make decisions based upon standards that are 
legally less sound. To the extent that the variables from the Classroom Guidelines 
have recast conceptualizations and articulations of fair use, the guidelines may be 
a subversive force on the law, as they purport to displace the congressionally 
sanctioned factors with a privately negotiated alternative.369 
361 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535-37 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
362 See supra text accompanying notes 234-39. 
363 See supra text accompanying note 238. 
364 695 F.2d 1171,1178 (9th Cir. 1983). 
365 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976). 
3661d. at 68-69, 71 (1976). 
367 See supra text accompanying notes 21-24. 
368 See supra text accompanying notes 70-73. 
369 Not only do the Classroom Guidelines replace legal factors with negotiated factors, but 
the guidelines also replace the balancing test of fair use with a requirement that users satisfY all 
of the factors in the guidelines. See Wagner, supra note 236, at 11 ("All four tests [brevity, 
spontaneity, cumulative effect, and inclusion ofnotice] must be satisfied to provide Fair Use 
protection for multiple copying."). 
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One of the most salient examples of such variation from the law is 
"spontaneity."37o The Classroom Guidelines introduced this concept, explaining 
that copying must be "at the instance and inspiration of the individual teacher," 
and that the decision to use the work must be "so close in time" to the "moment 
of its use" that pennission is not likely to be obtainable.371 This type of 
"spontaneity" may be evidence that the copying is for educational purposes, 
consistent with the "purpose" factor of the statute.372 Spontaneity may also be 
evidence that the ability to seek and secure permission is not practical, so a charge 
for fees is also unlikely. Such circumstance may evidence that the copying has 
little adverse market effect, consistent with the last factor under the fair-use 
statute. To that extent, the guidelines may offer one possible means toward 
satisfYing the law. But in this context, the guidelines are vastly overreaching. 
First, they tend to freeze the means for satisfying the fair-use statute, when 
multitudes of possibilities for defining fair use ought to have the same credibility 
as any other possibility.373 Second, they give the impression that "spontaneity" 
and other concepts really are part of fair use. That misperception has been 
prevalent in many of the CONFU meetings, where participants often demanded 
that statements of fair use include a "spontaneity" requirement. Spontaneity may 
well be evidence relevant to some ofthe fair-use factors, but it is hardly required. 
The guidelines have been construed as if to require it. 
Another prominent conflict between the guidelines and the law is with 
respect to the "amount" factor. The amount allowed under many ofthe guidelines 
is both rigid and minuscule.374 Perhaps the narrowest quantum of copying in any 
case that identified an infringement was in the Harper & Row v. Nation Enters. 
decision from the United States Supreme Court in 1985, holding that a quotation 
of only about three hundred words in a publication was an infringement.375 
370 Scott M. Martin, Photocopying and the Doctrine of Fair Use: The Duplication of 
Error, 391. COPYRIGHT SOC'YU.S.A. 345, 386 (1992). 
371 According to the Classroom Guidelines: "The copying is at the instance and 
inspiration ofthe individual teacher," and "(t]he inspiration and decision to use thework and the 
moment of its use for maximum teaching effectiveness are so close in time that it would be 
unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for pennission." See Classroom Guidelines, 
supra note 4, at 69. 
372 At least one case has used "spontaneity" in this context. See Am. Geophysical Union 
v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919 (2dCir. 1994). 
373 The Classroom Guidelines first appeared in the House Report from 1976, and they 
directly contradicted statements in that report against "freezing" fair use. H.R. REP. No. 94­
1476, at 66 (1976) ('"There is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially 
during a period ofrapid technological change."). 
374 L. Ray Patterson, Regents Guide to Understanding Copyright and Educational Fair 
Use, 5 J. lNTELL. PRoP. L. 243, 283 (1997) ("Quantifying fair use is contrary to the statutory 
right of fair use, which authorizes the user to exercise his or her judgment in accordance with 
the provisions ofsection 107."). 
375 471 U.S. 539, 565 n.8, 569 (1985). 
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Although that case dealt with reproduction and publication of the materials. the 
exceedingly briefexcerpt was within the tight parameters of "brevity" laid out in 
the Classroom Guidelines.376 On the other hand. Harper & Row also involved the 
surreptitious taking and use of an W'lpublished manuscript and lmowingly 
jeopardizing sales of the work once published-facts that also militated against a 
fmding of fair use.377 
By contrast, when the facts involve earnest and good-faith uses of published 
works, in ways that do not likely harm significant sales-as would often be the 
situation with common copies for classroom distribution-the outcome in a court 
case is likely to be completely different. Such was the case of Maxtone-Graham 
v. Burtchaell,378 in which the Second Circuit Court ofAppeals upheld the use of 
extensive excerpts from one book into a later publication. There the court ruled 
that copying as much as seven thousand words was fair use}79 The cap of one 
thousand words W'lder the ''brevity'' element of the Classroom Guidelines seems 
paltry by comparison. 
Despite the many problems with the Qassroom Guidelines in particular, they 
have had an irresistible appeal for many people who perhaps ought to lmow 
better. The judge in the Kinko '8 case. for example. called application of the 
guidelines in that case "compelling,"380 despite their inapplicability to for-profit 
copying381 and despite finding that the guidelines are not entirely a good 
summary of the law.382 Even a prominent copyright treatise. Nimmer on 
Copyright, makes what might be best called an overreaching conclusion about the 
Classroom Guidelines. Nimmer correctly emphasizes that the guidelines "purport 
to state merely the minimum extent of fair use in connection with teacher 
photocopying."383 Nimmer also adds that the guidelines are not controlling on a 
court, citing language from Marcus v. Rowley.384 Yet in an odd twist, Nimmer 
W'lderscores that the House Report containing the original guidelines38S does not 
control the defmition of fair use. but he concludes that the guidelines are 
practically the embodiment oflaw: 
376 Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 68 (allowing, for example, an instructor to 
photocopy for distribution up to one thousand words from an article). 
377 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562-63. 
378 803 F.2d 1253, 1265 (2d Cir. 1986). 
379 [d. at 1257, 1263. 
380 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1536 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
381 Id. at 1535-36. 
382 See supra text accompanying notes 234-39. 
383 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHf,supra note 1, § 13.05[E][3][a]. 
384 Id.; Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983). 
385 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 3166-71 (1976). 
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Strictly speaking, the guidelines represent merely the Congressional 
Committees' "understanding" ofwhat the courts would regard as fair use in applying 
the traditional judicial doctrine of fair use. Congress does not pwport to substitute its 
judgment for that ofthe courts in any particular case. Nevertheless, it seems clear that 
the courts will be greatly infll,lenced by this "understanding," so that for practical 
purposes the guidelines may usually be regarded as the equivalent ofstatutory text.386 
Nimmer builds his case on matters of no precedential value, and which 
involve no judicial decision: the 1983 settlement ofthe lawsuit against New York 
University387 and an opinion of the Attorney General ofKansas.388 Nimmer also 
depends heavily on Marcus v. Rowley,389 but that court carefully avoided reading 
the guidelines into the law.39o The Kinko '3 court may have reflected common 
sentiment when it called the Classroom Guidelines "compelling,"391 but Nimmer 
is without justification when he equates them with statutory status. 
2. Guidelines as a Minimum Scope afFair Use-the "Safe Harbor" 
The original language from the Classroom Guidelines and the Music 
Guidelines began the notion that guidelines are an expression of ''minimum'' 
concepts of fair use.392 By their own terms those guidelines "state the minimum 
and not the maximum standards ofeducational fair use under section 107.393 The 
Court of Appeals in Marcus v. Rowley accordingly declared: ''The guidelines 
were intended to represent minimum standards of fair use."394 The Uniform 
Preamble of the CONFU guidelines carries a similar message in considerably 
different terms: "Uses that exceed these guidelines may or may not be fair use. 
The endorsers also agree that the more one exceedS these guidelines, the greater 
386 4 NIMMER ON CoPYRIGHf, supra note 7, § 13.05[E][3J[a] (footnotes omitted). Another 
major treatise on copyright law takes a comparatively subdued and o~ective approach to the 
Classroom Guidelines: "The guidelines, which do not have the controlling force oflaw, aim to 
create a safe hamor for classroom photocopying." 2 PAUL GolDSTEIN, COPYRlGHf § 10.2.2.1 
(2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1998). 
387 For discussion ofthe NYU case, see supra Part mA.l. 
388 Op. Att'yGen. Kan., 1981 COPYRIGHTL. DEC. (CCH)'25,331 (1981). 
389 695 F.2d at 1118-19. 
390 For discussion of the Marcus case and its use of the guidelines, see supra Part mASs 
274-86. 
391 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1536 n.ll (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
392 David J. Bianchi et aI., Comment, Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp.: 
Potential Liabilityfor Classroom Anthologies, 18 J.C. & V.L. 595, 606 (1992). 
393 Music Guidelines, supra note 4, at 71 ;see, e.g., Classroom Guidelines, supra note 4, at 
68. 
394 695 F.2d at 1178. 
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the risk that fair use does not apply."395 While this language does not explicitly 
describe the guidelines as "minimum" standards, the implication that they 
represent some version of a minimalist interpretation is clear. The CONFU 
preamble does make explicit that something beyond the limits of the guidelines 
may still be fair use.396 
Another articulation of a "minimal" concept of the guidelines is the 
appellation "safe harbor." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals called the 
Classroom Guidelines a "safe harbor" in the MDS case.397 The district court in 
Kinko's also referred to them as a "safe harbor,"398 but equivocated. That court 
seemed to reserve the possibility that copying beyond the guidelines may be fair 
use, but copying within them may also be infringement: "courts must balance the 
interests involved."399 
The label "safe harbor" was an object of steady attention and diligent 
rejection in the CONFU negotiations.4OO Many participants were accustomed to 
calling the earlier guidelines a "safe harbor," and they saw in the language of the 
CONFU preamble and in the nature ofthe discussions that the next generation of 
guidelines would also take the same construct. The guidelines would be a 
minimal measure of fair use, where one would most assuredly be free from 
infringement risks. Additional fair use would be possible, but with no assurance 
of protection from liability. Many representatives of the commercial publishing 
jndustry eschewed that vision. They sought instead to preserve the right to bring 
an infringement action against uses that are within the guidelines, however remote 
the desirability ofsuch an action may be. 
The purported "final" meeting of CONFU, on May 19, 1997, brought the 
beginning ofchange and some etucial reinforcement ofthe "safe harbor" concept 
for guidelines.401 Representatives of the Association of American Publishers 
(AAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc., announced in the open meeting that they would 
regard the Multimedia Guidelines to be a safe harbor, and that they would not 
bring a lawsuit against nonprofit educational institutions that remain within the 
395 CONFU FINAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 31. 
396 This particular clause in the preamble has been a point of serious contention among 
CONFU participants. Some negotiators have understood it as a generous expression of 
openness to possible fair use beyond the defined limits ofthe guidelines. Other negotiators have 
seen the language as an anchor on the flexibility of fair use, constantly pulling one back to the 
gravitational center ofthe stated limits ofthe guidelines. 
397 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
398 Basic Books. Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1537 (SD.N.Y. 
1991). 
, 399 Id. at 1536 (citing 4 NIMMER ON COPYRlGHf, supra note 7, at § 13.05[E], at 13-96). 
400 These observations from CONFU meetings are from the author's personal 
participation in the discussions. 
401Id. 
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guidelines. Their change ofposition was an important development, but it did not 
achieve full assurance. The Authors League of America responded that it was not 
prepared to give up the right to bring an action against even "minimal" activities. 
The League's representative pointedly called the guidelines, at best, a "safer 
harbor."402 
The guidelines may ultimately fail to pass complete scrutiny as "minimal" 
standards or as a safe harbor.403 Until the prospective plaintiffs-particularly the 
commercial publishers and authors-unequivocally give the guidelines an 
identity as a zone of safety, the guidelines may never attain the degree of 
assurance necessary to attract broad-based consensus for the standards. The AAP 
and others undoubtedly changed their position and declared the Multimedia 
Guidelines to be a "safe harbor" in order to attract added support for the 
guidelines, especially from educators who may be looking for sure protection 
from liability. 
Theoretically, a court could read a set of guidelines into the law of fair use 
and declare them to be a zone of safety, or Congress could stake out a similar 
position by statute. But the courts and Congress have avoided exactly those 
possibilities. The notion of a safe haIbor may have some intuitive appeal, but it 
could have important detrimental consequences. A "safe haIbor" would be a 
major step toward freezing fair use and undermining its flexibility.404 In the end, 
the concept of safe harbor may be established only by the private parties who give 
the guidelines their shape and existence in the first place. Without near unanimity 
among the publishers, authors, and other copyright owners, the concept of a truly 
safe harbor for any set of guidelines is fatally flawed. As long as the right to sue 
or even threaten to sue a party remains, the harbor has rough water and mines. 
3. Guidelines as a Maximum Scope ofFair Use 
To call the guidelines a "maximum" measure of fair use may defy logic and 
contradict the language of "minimum" standards.40S Indeed, rational arguments 
and plain statements from the text ofthe guidelines and some relevant cases point 
to conceptualizing the guidelines as minimum standards,406 or even perhaps a 
402 Id. 
403 Nevertheless, the perception of a "safe harbor" persists with some inference of its 
benefits. See Salomon & Pierce, supra note 64, at 325 ("These understandings between 
educators and copyright owners have served as 'safe harbor' standafds for fair use and have, to 
some degree, reduced uncertainty and transaction costs for educators."). 
404 Contra H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976)(stating, "there is no disposition to freeze 
the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period ofrapid technological change"). 
405 Klingsporn, supra note I, at 108 (noting that universities adopt the guidelines as 
maximum standards). 
406 See supra Part lV.A.2. 
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definition of fair use itself.407 Yet some suggestion of "maximum" limits 
surround the guidelines.408 
The most prominent example of a maximum standard is the use of the 
Classroom Guidelines in the settlement of the New York University case.409 
There the settlement required faculty members and others at NYU to seek advice 
of university counsel before exceeding the guidelines.410 As a practical matter, 
that advice is not readily forthcoming, and the guidelines consequently become 
the limit of fair use for classroom photocopying. Moreover, the wording of the 
settlement agreement and the consequent policy statement for the NYU 
community was built on the Classroom Guidelines, but omitting the prefatory 
paragraph assuring that the guidelines are ''the minimum and not the maximum 
standards" of fair use.411 By their plain language and their practical effect, the 
NYU settlement made maximums ofminimums.412 
Further, the guidelines themselves may include language of "minimum" 
standards, but they also include some overt maximum standards. The inclusion of 
"prohibitions" in the Classroom Guidelines, and similar outer boundaries in the 
Multimedia Guidelines, is an attempt to establish caps on fair use. One such 
prohibition-regarding the making of anthologies-was asserted against the 
defendant in the Kinko's decision.413 The plaintiffs urged the court to adopt a 
sweeping prohibition against all coursepacks, in accord with the prohibition from 
407 See supra Part N.A.1.
 
408 See Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'y
 
U.s.A. 137,142 n.26 (1993) (expressing concern over mischaracterizations of the guidelines as 
maximum standards). 
409 See supra Part m.A.l. 
410 Jane C. Ginsburg, Reproduction of Protected Works for University Research or 
Teaching, 39 1. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 181, 202 (1992). 
411 The Unifonn Preamble to the CONFU Guidelines, CONFU FINAl. REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 31-32, includes this statement: ''This Preamble is an integral part of these guidelines 
and should be included whenever the guidelines are reprinted or adopted by organizations and 
educational institutions." Inclusion of that statement is a direct result of the experience of the 
NYU case and the stripping off of the prefatory paragraph that put the guidelines in an 
important context The author ofthis article is hardly a supporter of the CONFU Guidelines, but 
he is the author ofthat one sentence and pressed the CONFU negotiators to include it in order to 
prevent a repeat of the NYU experience with parties under pressure accepting bowdlerized 
versions of the guidelines, if they choose to accept them at all. For a discussion of the NYU 
case and the use ofguidelines in the settlement, see supra Part lILA.I. 
412'Sorne educators and librarians fear that one particular statement in the Uniform 
Preamble of the CONFUGuidelines will have an effect ofdrawing any innovations in fair use 
back to the Iirriits of the guidelines, thus making effective maximums of the CONFU 
Guidelines by putting an onerous burden on users to justify their activities in light of the four 
factors offair use and from a frame ofreference ofthe guidelines. 
413 See supra text accompanying notes 234-39. 
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the Classroom Guidelines. The court refused to accept it.414 The court, in fact, 
rejected that prohibition, signaling an unwillingness to view even a narrow aspect 
of the guidelines as a mandate. In sum, the Classroom Guidelines may have been 
adopted as a maximum in the NYU settlement, and some of the guidelines may 
include attempts to limit fair use, but no court has accepted those boundaries.415 
4. Guidelines as Legislative History 
The appearance of some guidelines in congressional reports, and even in a 
"nonlegislative" report,416 has been cited as a source of authority for the 
standards. Positive congressional action may well have considerable influence on 
the decisionmaker seeking to identify and apply a standard when faced with a 
fair-use problem. But appearance in legislative history obviously does not give 
the guidelines the force of law, and may not even give them much credibility in 
the interpretation of fair use under current doctrine. Legislative history, quite 
simply, is no longer given the strong weight it may once have held in statutory 
interpretation.417 
Not only might legislative history play a diminishing role in current legal 
doctrine, but a closer look at the legislative history regarding fair use suggests that 
Congress may have been applauding the process of guideline development as 
much as the content of the finished work.418 To the extent that Congress offered 
compliments, it seemed as pleased with a resolution and a cooperative process as 
much as with the substantive outcome. At no time did Congress scrutinize or 
414 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1543 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) ("The fact that Congress has set forth a statement in its Oassroom Guidelines that 
anthologizing is prohibited does not require this court to paint with the broad brush plaintiffs 
suggest.''). 
415 Yet the perception of the guidelines as the limits offair use continues. See Robert 
Kasunic, Fair Use and the Educator ~ Right to Photocopy Copyrighted Materialfor Classroom 
Use, 19 J.C. & U.L. 271, 289 (1993) (finding that the Classroom Guidelines "have the potential 
for obstructing the fair-use analysis by creating a perception that anything outside the 
Guidelines is unfair"). 
416 The Multimedla Guidelines were the subject of a "nonlegislative report" from a 
congressional committee. See supra text accompanying note 215-16. 
417 See generally Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on 
Legislative History: The Impact ofJustice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999); 
Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Origina/ism in Recent Supreme Court 
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. 
L. REv. 1 (1998); Robert C. Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis ofthe Influence ofLegislative 
History on Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation. 7lND.OO'L & CoMP. L. REv. 1 (1996). 
The dissent in the MDS decision used this argument against the Oassroom Guidelines. See 
supra text accompanying notes 259-65. 
418 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 72 (1976) ("The Committee appreciates and commends 
the efforts and the cooperative and reasonable spirit of the parties who achieved the agreed 
guidelines on books and periodicals and on music."). 
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question the content of the guidelines. If the guidelines are to serve the needs of 
parties who agree to them, then Congress need not look closely at the terms. Ifthe 
guidelines are to become a surrogate for law, then congressional examination 
would be helpful, ifnot essential. The lack ofclose examination ofthe guidelines' 
content suggests that Congress was endorsing the effort, not the substance.419 
Nevertheless, some lingering references to the guidelines as legislative 
history appear in some cases. The Kinko 's decision placed considerable weight on 
the fact that the Qassroom Guidelines were a part of the legislative record. ill 
dismissing general criticism of the guidelines as a "concession forced on 
educators," the court refused to dissect the processes leading to the guidelines and 
concluded that "[t]he congressional record must speak for itself."420 Elevating the 
guidelines to the level of congressional recognition had the effect ofundermining 
any effort to investigate the circumstances of their origins and the relative 
representation of the interests in the copyright debate, because: "TItis court is in 
no position to retrospectively evaluate the quality of debate and parsing of 
privileges and responsibilities during Congress' or these groups' 
deliberations.''421 
Dissenters in the MDS case, by contrast, attacked reliance on the guidelines 
as legislative history in support of fair-use interpretation.422 That opinion made 
ample use of recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court undercutting the 
value of legislative history for statutory interpretation and narrowing the 
circumstances under which courts ought to look to legislative history at al1.423 
Moreover, the majority opinion in MDS acknowledged that Congress may well 
have intended to accept a changing scope of allowable copying in light of 
changing circumstances and technologies. Thus, the legislative history that 
captures the sentiment of Congress in 1976 may be inconsistent with the larger 
concept ofa fluid and flexible fair use. With reliance on legislative history falling 
out of favor, and with the guidelines revealing little of Congress's substantive 
understanding of fair use, the persuasive authority ofthe various guidelines as an 
indication ofcongressional intent seems to be oflittle significance. 
419 The most recent example is the "Nonlegislative Report" about the Multimedia 
Guidelines. The language ofthat short document borrows heavily from the text of the Uniform 
Preamble to the CONFU Guidelines. See CONFU FiNAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 14 nA8, 31­
32. It ultimately provides only broad, general statements about fair use and the role of 
guidelines, then applauds the efforts ofthe negotiators to reach agreement. 
420 Basic Books, btc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp, 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 n.lO (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
421 [d. 
422 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1410-12 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (Ryan, 1., dissenting). 
423 [d. at 1411. 
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5. Guidelines as an Instrnmentfor Judicial Decisionmaking 
Anyone who bas struggled with Wlderstanding the meaning of fair use in any 
situation can certainly sympathize with judges who face the same problem and 
must justify a conclusion in a published opinion. In retrospect, the Classroom 
Guidelines are relatively easy to apply post-hoc to facts that have already 
transpired, especially in a mechanical manner that overlooks their "minimal" 
character. Such is the way the guidelines are used in judicial rulings. Yet to apply 
them after the fact, especially ifthe court already has applied the statutory factors, 
the court avoids the struggle of faculty and others who must determine through 
foresight whether some planned activity will be fair use.424 
B. Guidelines and Their Parties 
1. Guidelines as Agreements Not to Sue 
Most ofthe discussion ofpossible characterizations ofthe fair-use guidelines 
portrays them in their relationship to society at large, or at least to the members of 
society who are affected by the relevant decisions SUITOWlding fair use. But the 
guidelines may also be considered as instruments that define relationships among 
the parties themselves. In this regard, the guidelines may be viewed as private 
compacts that have some binding quality on the named supporters, and not on all 
educators or other vast groups. 
The defendant in the MDS case, for example, argued to the Sixth Circuit that 
the Classroom Guidelines are an agreement by the AAP on behalfofits members 
not to sue a nonprofit educational institution that remains within the stated 
standards.42s It may have been a self-serving description by a litigant seeking to 
424 This article earlier makes the assertion that judges have used the guidelines as a crotch 
to support a decision that is based on the four factors ofthe law itself. See supra Part m.E. 
425 Kenneth D. Crews, Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc.: Notes 
from rehearing en bane before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (1996), at http://www. 
iupui.edu/-eopyinfolmdshrg.html. This description also begs questions about the ability of the 
AAP to act on behalfof its members. In all of the discussion ofguidelines as "agreements," one 
must look critically at the scope ofsubject matter to which any party has the authority to reach 
agreement. In the case of the AAP, for example, it may or may not have authority to reach 
agreement binding on its members; agreements in the name ofthe organization maybe binding 
only on the organization itself. On the other hand, an agreement by the AAP not to bring an 
infungement action is a significant step with considerable consequence for its members. 
Infringement litigation is expensive, but if well organized and strategically executed, the parties 
can gain the greatest influence from successful litigation. Moreover, strategic planning should 
help avoid initiating a lawsuit that has significant chance of not sucoeeding. To that end, the 
AAP has organized and supported the major recent litigation of relevance to this study, such as 
Pn'nceton University Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995); Basic Books, Inc v. 
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avoid application of the guidelines and advance the chance ofwinning a case, but 
the description is rational and perhaps even apt. An agreement that a set of 
guidelines is a "minimum" standard of fair use is tantamount to an 
acknowledgement that an infringement lawsuit against activities within the 
standard will fail. That concession, however, is not the same as an agreement not 
to sue. One may still bring an infringement case, regardless of how feeble the 
chances ofwinning. To agree that the guidelines are minimal fair use is more akin 
to calling them a "safe harbor," which already has been shown as a problematic 
appellation.426 To call them agreements not to sue is to take the notion one step 
further and to say that the parties have given up their right to test whether activity 
within the guidelines may nevertheless be infringing. Nothing in the guidelines 
themselves suggests that the parties really have forgone their right to go to court. 
Given the strident avoidance ofthe "safe harbor" concept by some parties,427 they 
would most certainly reject any suggestion that they have further given up their 
right to bring a case to court. 
2. Guidelines as Agreement among the Parties Regarding Fair Use 
An essential quality ofthe fair-use guidelines is that they have been offered as 
a standard that may be adopted and employed by limitless persons and 
organizations seeking to understand and apply fair use. They are not limited in 
their application only to the parties who state their acceptance or endorsement at 
the end of negotiations.428 The use of guidelines in litigation demonstrates that 
they are advocated as standards of general or universal applicability. Yet options 
for understanding and applying fair use do exist. One can turn to the factors in the 
statute and case analysis; less prominent interpretations of fair use are also 
available.429 Consequently, the guidelines may not have the universal 
applicability that they would appear to have. Thus, they may instead reflect a 
private understanding of fair use that is applicable only to the guidelines' 
endorsers. 
Kinlw's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), and the New York University 
case. For further background about the earliest of these cases and events leading to them, see 
CREWS, supra note 50, at 43-55. Thus, an agreement by the AAP not to sue may, for all 
practical purposes, be an agreement by most ofits members also not to file the action. 
426 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
427 See supra text accompanying notes 400-402. 
428 Patterson, supra note 374, at 282 (commenting on the Classroom Guidelines: "Private 
agreements do not eviscerate constitutionallybased rights granted by congressional statutes-et 
least for those who are not parties to the agreement"). 
429 See, e.g., ALA MODEL POLICY, supra note 4. 
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Of course, the parties would object strongly to this characterization.430 First, 
it would confine the effectiveness ofthe guidelines to the specific parties. That the 
guidelines would have some purported consequences for others who were not 
parties to the negotiations or agreement is the essence of their perceived value. 
The negotiators, quite simply, sought to define fair use for the broader public.431 
Second, this characterization might make the guidelines actually binding on the 
parties. The endorsing parties would probably want to avoid this result as well. 
Few copyright owners have been prepared to call the guidelines a "safe 
harbor.''432 Fewer still would likely concede the right to bring an action against a 
use within the guidelines. Similarly, few educators and librarians have been 
willing to accept the guidelines as the limit of fair use; fewer still would likely 
enter into a binding commitment to follow the guidelines. 
This conception of guidelines also does not reflect the reality of the meeting 
of the minds among the parties. The parties agreed on their interpretation of fair 
use, and not on a licensing of rights. The distinction is critical. First, the parties 
who negotiate and sign their names to any of the guidelines are often not 
430 At least one court apparently rejected such a characterization. In reacting to testimony 
from a copyright law professor, the Kinko's court made this observation: 
There was testimony introduced at trial by Professor Peter Jaszi that the Guidelines was no 
compromise but in fact a concession forced on educators. This testimony was admitted but, for 
the reasons stated here, this court places limited reliance on it. This is a likely claim by any party 
to a compromise. A compromise is just that, one side gives up some of its demands in exchange 
for concessions of the other party. This court is in no position to retrospectively evaluate the 
quality of debate and parsing of privileges and responsibilities during Congress' or these 
groups' deliberations. The congressional record must speak for itself. 
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 n.lO (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
431 The assertion that private negotiators could establish a standard of fair use for the 
broader public is perhaps pretentious, but essential if the guidelines are to have the influence 
that the negotiators intended. In retrospect, one may question the wisdom of that objective. 
Regardless ofthe intended or actual influence ofthe guidelines, the parties to them are the only 
ones who actually manifested their assent to the terms. Developers of the CONFU Guidelines 
even sought to extend that circle of parties in ways that forced a standoff during negotiations. 
An early draft of the Multimedia Guidelines, for example, stated that the "participants" in the 
negotiation agreed to various of its terms. The list of participants encompassed nearly any 
organization whose representatives appeared at any meeting. To state that all such parties had 
agreed to anything in the guidelines was simply an objective error. For the text of the 
Multimedia Guidelines with language indicating agreement by the "participants," see 
MULTIMEDIA COMMITfEE PRINT, supra note 4, at 1-2. The present author raised this concem at 
the CONFU meeting of May 17, 1997, and urged that the word "endorser" replace the word 
"participants" in such statements. Over strenuous objections from the lead supporters of the 
Multimedia Guidelines, the assembled group accepted the changes. See CONFU FlNAL 
REPoRT, supra note 4, at 50. This accomplishment at the CONFU meeting is hardly 
braggadocio. After two and a half years of meetings, that word change may be this writer's 
most meaningful influence on the CONFU Guidelines. See supra note 4. 
432 See supra text accompanying notes 400-02. 
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themselves either the users or the rightsholders of copyrighted materials that are 
the subject ofthe guidelines. Therefore, the parties certainly do not have authority 
to enter into license agreements. Second, the conduct of negotiations would 
undoubtedly be considerably different if emphasis were on licensing and not fair 
use. Most important, negotiated guidelines for fair use acknowledge some 
potential variation from the defined standard. For example, the Classroom 
Guidelines are explicitly minimum and not maximum standards,433 so the 
guidelines themselves anticipate fair use beyond their own rigors. Such is the 
nature of fair use. But it would be a strange license indeed that allowed a variable 
and unspecified right ofuse. 
C. Guidelines as a Substitution for Fair Use 
Fair-use guidelines also have potential for offering a standard when the 
individual seeking guidance abandons the four factors in the law-often in a state 
of bewilderment or frustration. Many instructors and librarians, individuals who 
are expected to follow fair use, find the statutory standard distinctly unsettling. 
That lack of comfort with variability in the law was the essential motivation for 
developing the guidelines in the first place. If the guidelines are not the law, they 
may instead be a substitute for the law. They may be a reflection of activity 
similar to fair use that is deemed to be workable and tolerable to the supporting 
parties.434 The guidelines have become surrogates for a law that many individuals 
simply fmd unwieldy or disconcerting. 
1. The Proprietors View: Tolerable Behavior 
To the extent that the guidelines are endorsed by publishers, authors, and 
other proprietor groups-especially if those groups seek to profit from their 
copyrights-then the guidelines may be little more than a designation ofactivities 
that the commercial interests are prepared to tolerate, regardless of whatever the 
law allows. Such an approach to guidelines may bear some resemblance to fair 
use and the four factors, but more likely the guidelines will circumscribe a zone of 
activity that copyright proprietors are either unwilling or unable to enforce, or that 
are not likely to generate reasonable revenue from future licensing.435 1bey may 
433 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
434 Bernard Zidar, Fair Use and the Code ofthe Schoolyard: Can Copyshops Compile 
Coursepacks Consistent with Copyright?, 46 EMORY LJ. 1363, 1406 (1997) f'The Classroom 
Guidelines represent a balance, strock by the House and Senate conferees and approved by 
Congress, between the benefit to society derived from allowing students to use certain materials 
fairly and the benefit which would flow from protecting the copyright holder's monopoly.''). 
435 The notion of acceptable behavior and the safe harbor are closely related. See Zidar, 
supra note 434, at 1406. Zidar states: 
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also embody some quantum ofactivity that might be politically expedient to grant 
in order to gain some support for the guidelines.436 
Strong support for guidelines within the publishing industry suggests that 
they have passed at least a test of tolerance.437 The publishing industry has the 
extraordinary privilege ofbeing a plaintiff in most copyright litigation that might 
involve the guidelines.438 As the copyright owners, publishers are ordinarily able 
to decide whether or not a case is proper or beneficial for its own interests. The 
commercial publishers are also best positioned to relate the guidelines to effects 
on their markets. They are understandably resistant to any fair-use guidelines that 
interfere with current or prospective markets. While the fourth factor of the fair-
use statute emphasizes market effects,439 a commercial proprietor acting in its 
own self-interest would not have any inclination to accept a fair-use standard that 
would require abandonment ofreasonable markets. Thus, the guidelines that have 
strong approval from the publishing industry may be viewed as measures of fair 
use that are acceptable to the industry simply because they do not interfere with 
The fact that the Guidelines purport to represent a "safe harbor" indicates that use of 
copyrighted materials in a manner which complies with the Guidelines does not inflict market 
harm upon the copyright holder. Similarly, the ALA and Wisconsin policies were also drafted to 
illustrate instances in which copying for classroom use was harmless to the copyright owner. 
Id. For a discussion ofthe ALA and Wisconsin policies mentioned in the preceding citation, see 
CREws, supra note 50, at 47-53. 
436 Copyright owners often concede certain activity as fair use for many different reasons. 
For example, in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 
1986), West sought to claim copyright protection for its compilation of court rulings as 
published in bound volumes of court reporters. To effect that claim of compilation copyright, 
West needed to assert protection ofits pagination in the reporters. See id. at 1219. Nevertheless, 
West conceded without challenge that citing to the first page of any case would be fair use. Id. 
at 1222. West no doubt had many reasons for making that concession. Among those reasons 
might have been political expediency: to claim that right would be to assert that all references to 
West cases are themselves infringements-making every judge who hands down a written 
opinion a likely infringer. Such a claim is clearly not an effective way to win the judge's 
support. Another reason is self-interest. West's economic strength lies in the fact that its reports 
are the standard tool for citing cases; to discourage citation to West publications would be to 
undercut the company's economic viability. 
437 An anecdotal example ofthe tolerance test was the unwillingness ofa representative of 
a motion picture studio to endorse the Multimedia Guidelines. During a public meeting of 
CONFU, attended by this article's author, the representative explicitly declined to endorse any 
guidelines that allowed any copying ofany ofits works. 
438 A review of the cases examined in this article confirms that publishers are often the 
plaintiffs. Textbook publishers sued Michigan Document Services, Inc., and Kinko's Graphics 
Corporation. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th CiT. 
1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
Journal publishers sued Texaco Inc. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. 60 F.3d 913 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
439 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)(1994). 
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activities that the industry could realistically control or enforce, or from which it 
may derive appreciable profits. 
One could also argue the opposite: an agreement with assent from educators 
or librarians is suspect, because they are unlikely to accept an agreement that does 
not meet either their expectations of fair use or their practical needs. This 
perspective, however, is somewhat less persuasive, primarily because the 
community ofusers is not positioned to bring litigation.44o Educators are the ones 
who will endure the litigation as defendants. Educators also have few resources to 
withstand litigation, and therefore are not as well situated to resist undesirable 
guidelines through legal action. 
2. The User's View: Acting in Good Faith 
Good faith is a crucial concept for educators and librarians, not only because 
of its ethical overtones for proper and lawful behavior, but also because good-
faith decisions about the exercise of fair use are sanctioned under the law in one 
most important respect: the remittance of statutory damages. Statutory damages 
are available to copyright owners who successfully prove infringement,441 but 
generally only if the work had been registered before the infringement 
occurred.442 The copyright owner may always seek recovery of damages or lost 
profits, but may opt for statutory damages,443 and may want to opt for them, if the 
actual damages are modest or nominal. Statutory damages allow the court to 
award up to $30,000 per work infringed.444 Statutory damages may reach as high 
as $150,000 if the infringement was ''willful.''445 On the other hand, statutory 
damages may be remitted, if the court finds that the infringer was "innocent" or 
acted in good faith.446 
440 An educator could conceivably bring an action seeking declaratory judgement that 
activities are within fair use, but no such action by educators has been reported. Declaratory 
judgment actions have been brought by some commercial parties, but only rarely. See, e.g., On 
Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 
(seeking declaratory judgment that a system for viewing videotapes of motion pictures in hotel 
rooms is not a public petformance). 
441 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). 
442§411. 
443 § 504(a). 
444 § 504(c)(1). 
445 § 504(c)(2). 
446 Id. The statute directs: 
In a case where the inftinger sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such 
infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
inftingement ofcopyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award ofstatutory damages 
to a sum ofnot less than $200. 
[d. 
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The general remittance provision applies to both nonprofit and for-profit 
defendants who can prove that they were "not aware and had no reason to 
believe" that the activities constituted copyright infringement.447 In that event, the 
statutory damages may drop to as low as $200, in the court's discretion. In the 
case of an infringer who is an "employee or agent" of a nonprofit educational 
institution, library, or archives, statutory damages may be eliminated altogether, if 
the infringer can demonstrate that he or she ''believed and had reasonable grounds 
for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under 
section 107."448 Congress was tacitly acknowledging that fair use is open to 
interpretation, and that one could reasonably conclude that an activity was within 
fair use, only to have the court rule otherwise. To relieve the tension of that 
uncertainty, Congress eliminated one of the largest financial consequences of 
infringement for educators and librarians who apply fair use in a reasonable 
manner.449 That reasonable, balanced application is the essence ofgood faith.45o 
The Kinko's decision indirectly explored the interrelationship between 
guidelines and good faith. The defendant, Kinko's Graphics Corporation, 
prepared a "Handbook" for its employees, in which the company acknowledged 
that the Classroom Guidelines would be of little assistance for application of fair 
use, because "almost every case ofcollege or university level copying will reach 
beyond the scope of the limits."451 Although Kinko's apparently "exempted 
itself' from the guidelines, the court was highly critical when it found that 
Kinko's offered nothing in its place.452 The absence of guidance about fair use 
undermined its search for "good faith": 
Kinko's instructions to its workers possessed little ofthe nuance ofthe copyright 
law. They provided no hypothetical sitoations nor any factoaI summary of the state of 
the law presently. There was no mention of the facts of the Sony case, the Salinger 
case, the Harper & Row case or others which may illustrate some of the complexities 
ofthis doctrine. This can hardly be considered a "good faith" effort on Kinko's part to 
447Id. 
448Id. 
449 One connnentator calls this provision "probably the single greatest source of 
educators' mistaken belief that they are immune to lawsuit for infringement." Wagner, supra 
note 236, at 18. Wagner is correct in emphasizing that the provision does not exonerate 
educators; it only holds the possibility oflimiting liability for statutory damages. Yet she argues 
that Congress should repeal this protection for educators, asserting that educational institutions 
are "giants" akin to "Fortune-5OO" corporations, and educators should be presumed to 
understand copyright law and be denied any defense as "innocent infringer[s)." Id. at 1&-19. 
450 One writer called this protection from statutory damages a "part of the Magna Carta 
for educators" in the Copyright Act. Roger D. Billings, Jr., Ojf-the-Air Videorecording, Face-
to-Face Teaching. and the 1976 Copyright Act, 4 NO. Ky. L. REv. 225,242 (1977). 
451 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
4521d. 
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educate their employees. To the contrary, it appears more to be a way to "cover" 
themselves while Kinko's remained willfully blind to the consequences of their 
activity.453 
To the Kinlw's court, good faith may be fOWld in guidance that does not 
necessarily embody standard guidelines. Good faith may be fOWld in general 
explanations of the law and its general directions for how to respond to common 
situations. Good faith may appear in summaries of major cases delivered in a 
manner that can serve to educate the staff and move them toward compliance 
with the law. Good faith does not mean that the employees of Kinko's-or the 
faculty, librarians, or staff of a college or Wliversity-must ultimately behave 
within the scope of fair use, but they must have reason to believe that they are 
doing so. General explanations ofthe law can serve that objective.454 
Are guidelines therefore an ins1rument for establishing good faith? They 
Wlquestionably can be. A good set of guidelines delivered to employees, faculty, 
or anyone else in a position to make fair-use decisions may demonstrate the good 
faith of the organization, and the application of the guidelines by the individual 
can manifest that person's good faith as well. But the Kinko's decision tells us that 
a relevant set of guidelines is not the sole method for establishing good faith; 
general discussion offair use or alternative interpretations may serve the objective 
.ofgood faith every bit as well. 
Although a set of guidelines may be a valuable tool for establishing good 
faith, the objective of fmding good faith may reveal that many of the existing 
guidelines are not well suited to serving that desired end. First, few courts would 
likely conclude that any of the guidelines is not at least a good-faith attempt to 
interpret fair use, even though reasonable analyses could differ widely on the 
extent to which one may deviate from the guidelines and still remain within the 
parameters of section 107.455 Yet many of the guidelines, notably the Classroom 
Guidelines, reach far beyond the quest for good faith. They instead demarcate a 
strict line, measured by COWlting words and instances of copying, in an effort to 
define fair use.456 They are, at their core, a rigid confine on the flexibility that 
Congress intended to give the law. They also apply only to narrow situations and 
offer little guidance for the diverse circumstances where fair use may apply. Good 
faith, by contrast, may instead be better served by a more general Wlderstanding 
ofthe law, as was sought by the court in the Kinko 's case. 
453/d. 
454 For an example of a publication widely circulated at large universities, in part to serve 
this objective, see CONSORTIUM FOR EDUCATIONAL TECHNOLOGY FOR UNNERSlTY SYSTEMS, 
FAIR USE OF COPYRlGIffED WORKS: A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN EDUCATING AMERICA (1995). 
455 The guidelines may also help establish good faith even though they may not ultimately 
pass scrotiny under fair-use law. See supra Part IV.A.I. 
456 See supra text accompanying note 70-76. 
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A second problem with existing guidelines and the quest for good faith is that 
the concept of good faith embodied in the Copyright Act's remission of statutory 
damages is vastly different from a meticulous definition of fair use. The Act's 
notion of good faith is one meant to protect the well-meaning member of the 
education or library commUQity who made a reasonable determination of fair use, 
but instead was found by a court to be an infringer. This concept of good faith 
assumes and anticipates that the behavior in question is ultimately not fair use.457 
This statutory construct is not merely protection for socially beneficial pursuits of 
education and libraries; it is protection for parties who seek innovative 
applications of fair use for worthy purposes. It is protection for experimentation 
and extension of the law to new needs. Detailed guidelines that attempt to define 
fair use and that offer a sanctioned, minimalist view of fair use miss the point of 
the "good faith" that Congress sought to protect and encourage. The use of rigid 
guidelines to define "good faith" ultimately subverts congressional intent. 
3. The User's View: An Appearance ojPropriety 
Colleges, universities, and libraries often have need for adopting a policy on 
the fair use of copyrighted works by employees, library patrons, and others. 
Guidelines provide a useful tool in response to that need. First, the creation of 
guidelines that have some external validation and provide a vague promise of 
protection from liability greatly ease the process of developing a policy. An 
organization can simply adopt the guidelines and avoid grappling with the law 
itself. Second, regardless of the deficiencies in the guidelines as a measure of fair 
use, adhering to standard guidelines can avoid questions about the 
appropriateness of an alternative policy statement that one may develop. 
Endorsement ofthe guidelines by various publishing groups-the likely plaintiffs 
in a copyright infringement action-can also demonstrate that the adopting 
organization at least intended to comply with standards acceptable to the party 
claiming the infringement. 
Well-established guidelines may have multiple uses in institutional 
policymaking. First and foremost, the expectation may be that the guidelines will 
be a force on behavior, discouraging unlawful activity and helping to find the path 
of proper conduct. To that end, perhaps, guidelines have found their way into 
policy manuals and other official documentation for educational institutions, 
libraries, and other organizations.458 As a formal policy standard for an 
organization, a set of fair-use guidelines may appear to have the authority of 
mandates on individual behavior. Yet a gulf too often exists between institutional 
ideals and individual realities. The Classroom Guidelines are an important case in 
457 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. N 1998) (referring to the user in question as an 
"infiinger"). 
458 See CREWS, supra note 50, at 73-74. 
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point. Since their publication in 1976, the Classroom Guidelines have been a 
common foundation for formal policy at major universities throughout the United 
States.459 But their meticulous, quantitative measures of fair use are difficult and 
impractical to apply, and in fact few faculty members actually adhere to them. 
The result is an inherent tension between institutional expectations and faculty 
response. 
Does the tension really exist? The simple existence of a widely ignored 
campus policy should manifest inherent tension, but ignorance of the policy may 
be an accepted and expected result. Organizations often do not promote new 
policies thoroughly among constituents, and they certainly do not rigorously 
enforce policies applicable to routine behaviors or to activities that are within the 
domain of academic freedom, such as a teacher's plans for handouts and other 
photocopies. The daily decision to follow or not follow the policy is typically 
within the individual professor's discretion and good judgement. Disparity 
between policy and individual decisionmaking is even more certain when the 
policy makes intrusive and impractical demands. If a differential between policy 
and actual practice is common and unsurprising, why should policymakers within 
the institution bother to make a policy at all? Ifa consciously made reason exists, 
it may be deceptively simple: to protect the institution from any unlawful 
activities ofits employees. 
The policy that fails to serve the individual instructor may still serve the 
institution. Imagine this simple scenario: A professor is accused of making 
photocopies for classroom handouts in excess of the Classroom Guidelines. Her 
university will also be implicated and will undoubtedly face possible exposure on 
an agency theory or on other grounds for vicarious liability. Although the 
university may ultimately be unable to escape sharing legal liability for the deeds 
of its employees, the university will be able to demonstrate its good-faith and its 
official expectation of rigorous copyright compliance by pointing to the 
Classroom Guidelines available to all faculty members in the official policy 
manual.460 
If such posturing by the university does not, in fact, exculpate the institution 
from some or all liability, the existence of the policy can become the public 
display of the university's intention to follow the law strictly and not to sanction 
violations. The existence of the formal policy also becomes the safe fall-back 
position in the event that the professor is held to have infringed copyright. The 
university will not need to change its policy to a more demanding standard or 
explain its previous position; it can instead emphasize the policy it had in place all 
along a1'!d underscore the need for other faculty members to follow the policy it 
had promulgated in the first place. Suggesting that the policy protects the 
459 See supra note 50. 
460 The settlement in New York University effectively had this result, by requiring faculty 
members to comply with the Classroom Guidelines. The university is accordingly able to 
distance itselffrom non-eomplying employees. See supra text accompanying notes 222-24. 
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institution from its own employees has a ring of simple duplicity. Faculty 
members, librarians, and staffwould have plenty ofreason to feel alienated. 
All of these shortcomings are avoidable. A policy that the institution expects 
to be violated should never become policy at all; all members of the academic 
community would lose the opportlmity for reasonable and honest guidance and a 
chance to learn a workable copyright standard for common pursuits. Also, if the 
institution adopts a policy that it expects to be ignored, it is hardly serving its own 
interest in fostering a relationship of trust and respect with its faculty and staff. 
Yet the institution that adopts, for example, the Classroom Guidelines, is most 
likely not consciously intending either to put a stranglehold on the faculty or to set 
them up for conflict within the organization. Instead, the decision to adopt the 
Classroom Guidelines is usually the product of limited information about 
alternative fair-use interpretations, combined with a misperception about the 
relationship between guidelines and the law. Too often policymakers conclude 
that the well-known guidelines are the only available choice and may even be 
necessary to meet legal obligations. Such policymakers undoubtedly have sincere 
intentions, but they may still have only limited awareness of their options and the 
implications ofthe policymaking decisions. 
This view of guidelines and policies invariably reeks of cynicism Although 
universities and other organizations may in fact be using standard guidelines for 
purposes of seeking cover, the cynicism does not stem primarily from the 
institutional propensity to be cautious or to adopt externally validated structures, 
or simply to find the easily available solution to a policymaking challenge. 
Instead, the real fault lies with the drafters of the Classroom Guidelines 
themselves, for accepting a view offair use that cannot be reasonably applied, and 
certainly will not be applied by busy instructors who are seeking to fulfill the 
demands ofteaching, who function with tremendous autonomy, and who have the 
discretion not to make use ofa work ifthe barriers to its adoption in the classroom 
are burdensome or are more interference than support. If the guidelines were 
more pragmatic in their application and more accurate in the articulation of fair 
use, the adoption of the guidelines by institutions would not generate needless 
tension and cynicism. 
D. Guidelines within the Academic Community 
Most characterizations of the guidelines relate them to dynamics or interests 
outside the educational institution. Either the guidelines are some reflection of 
fair-use law, or an external force shaping the institution's activities, or they 
manifest a relationship between the institution and the external copyright owners. 
The guidelines may also serve a constructive purpose inside the institution. They 
may be used by educational institutions as a standard for educating the academic 
community about copyright and fair use, or they may be a standard for taking 
disciplinary action against a faculty member, a student, or other member of that 
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community whose activities may be copyright infringements and could give rise 
to liabilities. 
Again, the standard fair-use guidelines fail in this attempt. As a tool for 
educating the community, they overlook the actual law of fair use, and they often 
set a standard that faculty cannot reasonably apply.461 As a result, a policy built 
on most of the guidelines will not necessarily convey accurate infonnation about 
fair use462 and will not be well received by earnest faculty who may be looking 
for meaningful infonnation.463 As a disciplinary standard, they are similarly 
flawed. An institution that may base internal reviews and discipline on the 
confined standards of most guidelines would be engaged in policy action 
stretching far beyond anything that the law might anticipate.464 To build the 
guidelines into fonnal university policy, to which faculty may be held 
accountable, is to suggest that the institution could-at least theoretically-be in 
turn held accountable to enforce its own policy through disciplinary procedures. 
V. A LEGAL THEoRY OF FAIR-USE GuIDELINES 
A Relationship ofGuidelines to Legal Theory 
If existing fair-use guidelines bear little relationship to fair-use law, but 
continue to persist and prevail in many communities, they must serve purposes 
that the law has been unable to achieve. In many instances, individuals 
unprepared to work with the flexibility of fair-use law often turn to standard 
guidelines in quest of relative certainty or to expedite the decisions surrounding 
461 See supra text accompanying notes 356-79. 
462 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.105-304, § 202(a), 112 Stat. 2860, 
2881-82 (1998) (codified as 17 U.S.c. § 512(e)(lXc) (Supp. IV 1998», calls in part for 
educational institutions to provide copyright infonnation to "all users" of its computer network 
systems as one condition of the university's potential ability to avoid copyright infringement 
liability as a "service provider." In unusually assertive and specific language, the statute 
specifies that the infonnation must "accurately describe" the law and must "promote 
compliance with" copyright laws. Id Given the shortcomings ofthe guidelines examined in this 
article, one might reasonably consider whether distributing them to the university community 
might be insufficient to satisfy this requirement ofdistributing accurate information. 
463 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
464 Generally speaking, the law has not required policing of employees to find and address 
infringements. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (Supp. IV 1998). Nevertheless, an organization 
seeking scrupulously to avoid liabilities may well choose to monitor activities in order to 
identify and eradicate posslble infringements, although such efforts have stirred serious 
concerns about academic freedom and free speech. For example, Carnegie Mellon University 
recently reviewed websites on its servers and removed allegedly infringing music files. Kelly 
McCollum, How Forcefully Should Universities Enforce Copyright Law on Audio Files?, 
CHRON. HiGHER ED., Nov. 19,1999, at A59. 
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policymaking and implementation.465 The guidelines also offer some perceived 
promise of preventing liability.466 Lawmaking and governmental bodies also 
cling in various degrees to the concept of guidelines for fair use. Courts 
occasionally reference the guidelines, and the CONFU report received support 
from various federal agencies.467 However weak the tie may be between the 
guidelines and the law, some tie exists. That connection between guidelines and 
law may be described and critiqued in various terms. 
Various theories from legal analysis may be applied to the circwnstances 
surrounding the origin and application of the guidelines in order to discern a 
model for better understanding them. This part of the article will suggest that 
concepts of normative and positive law may provide a framework for 
understanding the legal significance of the guidelines.468 Application of these 
theories, however, will also demonstrate that while they may offer a meaningful 
legal cons1nlct for understanding fair-use guidelines, these theories also reveal 
further weaknesses in the guidelines. 
B. New Legal Theoryfor Fair-Use Guidelines 
1. Positivist Concept ofGuidelines 
A theory of positive law is rooted in the concept of law having authority to 
impose a standard or a particular behavior on individuals.469 The law can set an 
expectation, and violations will be penalized Professor Ronald Dworkin has been 
a leading analyst oflegal positivism,470 and one ofhis ftmdamental principles is 
that the law, with its authoritative effects, can be identified by its pedigree.471 The 
465 Some commentators continue to demand more certainty in the law. See, e.g., Trevor 
Cox, Information and the Internet: Understanding the Emerging Legal Framework for 
Contract and CQpyright Law and Problems with International Enforcement, II TRANSNAT'L 
LAw. 23, 48 (1998) ("A better approach would be to amend the United States Copyright Act to 
establish guidelines for fair use over the Internet and to provide basic examples for actions 
which would not be a copyright infringement.''). 
466 See Tomas A. Lipinski, Designing and Using Web-Based Materials in Education: A 
Web Page Legal Audit--Part /, Intellectual Property Issues, 137 WEST'S Eouc. L. REp. 9, II 
(1999) (recommends adopting the Multimedia Guidelines "to minimize potential liability"). 
467 See supra text accompanying notes 209-12. 
468 According to one study, "legal positivism refuses to go away" despite steady criticism 
of it. See Frederick Schauer & Virginia 1. Wise. Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 
CoRNaLL. REv. 1080, 1080 (1997). 
469 Legal positivism also has been descnbed as contending that "the nature of law is 
contingent on human decision" and not necessarily on higher or moral principles. See id at 
1087. 
470 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A MAlTEROF PRINCIPLE (1985). 
471 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Law as Order, 91 HARv. L. REv. 909, 912 (1978). See also 
Schauer & Wise, supra note 468, at 1093 (asserting that under positivist theories the rule oflaw 
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pedigree of positive copyright law is found in Congress, which has the power to 
grant rights to authors.472 Implicit in that power is the right to curtail the extent of 
those rights by reserving rights-such as fair use-to the public. Assuming, 
however, that Congress has enacted constitutionally the fair-use statute, the 
legislative history also demonstrates beyond peradventure that Congress was not 
willing to enact more specific terms.473 Thus, the more detailed provisions of the 
guidelines, developed outside of Congress, deviate from the source and policy of 
copyright law. The guidelines fail the fimdamental test ofpositive law. 
Supporters of the guidelines, however, are well aware that the guidelines are 
hardly positive law with binding authority.474 Taking the guidelines to the courts, 
therefore, has been an attempt to secure what Congress could not grant: a 
pedigree for the guidelines.475 The text of the guidelines may well be rooted in 
private negotiations, but their adoption by a court as a standard in a fair-use 
decision would elevate the guidelines to a status with a new pedigree; they would 
emerge from such a court ruling with the quality of being law.476 To date, 
however, this effort has failed.477 The MDS decision referred to guidelines as a 
"safe harbor" and not a legal standard.478 The court also belabored the effort to 
rule against activity that was, by the court's reckoning, "light years" beyond the 
guidelines.479 If the guidelines were law, any breach of their limits would be an 
is "source-based"). Roger A. Shiner argues that under a positivist theory, "authority" is not the 
same as ''validity'' of the law. He attributes validity to the "pedigree" of the law "by the rule of 
recognition ofthe legal system." ROGER A. SHINER, NORM AND NA11JRE: THE MOVEMENfS OF 
LEGAL THOUGHT 24 (1992). He adds this statement about authority: "If the law has authority, 
then the demands that the law makes ofus it has a right to make of us; its requirements are such 
that we ought to conform to them." Id. 
472 Specifically, the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to grant to "Authors" the 
"Exclusive right" to their works. U.S. CoNST" art. I., § 8, d. 8. 
473 HR REP. No. 94-1476 (1976). 
474 On the other hand, the fair*use guidelines could be understood by legal positivists as 
simply filling the gaps and resolving lingering ambiguities in the statutes from Congress: 
"Modem legal positivists believe that problems of legal indeterminacy (the failure of rules to 
guide decision-makers to correct answers) were minor difficulties in decision making that could 
be resolved by institutional choices based on the competency of the decision maker to resolve 
ambiguity in language." See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAw AND 
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTuRy'S END 49 (1995). 
475 For example, a "source-based conception oflaw is necessarily informational." That is, 
the authority of the law depends on its source and on information to justify the authority of that 
sources. See Schauer & Wise, supra note 468, at 1095. 
476 Similarly, the effort to include guidelines in a congressional report also gives them the 
appearance of a formal pedigree. For a discussion of such developments, see supra text 
accompanying notes 215-16. 
477 See supra Part m. 
478 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
479 Id... see also supra text accompanying note 252. 
688 OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 62:599 
easy case of infringement Even more pointedly, the Kinko's decision rejected 
important provisions of the Classroom Guidelines.480 Not only was that court not 
adhering to the guidelines, but it was also free to reject them. 
2. Normative Concept ofGuidelines 
Ifthe guidelines are not positive law, they instead may be comprehended as a 
"normative" conception offair use.481 General theories ofnormative law relate to 
what the law ought to be, rather than what it really may be or how individuals 
may in fact behave in an environment affected by law.482 TIle Classroom 
Guidelines, for example, articulate an agreed measure offair use. TIle negotiators 
developed the guidelines on a relatively rigorous schedule and at the behest of 
members of Congress, who sought to avoid detailed legislation. This article has 
already demonstrated repeatedly that the guidelines ultimately bear little 
relationship to the law of fair use and the four statutory factors.483 Moreover, one 
need not look far within the academic community to find that few, if any, 
individuals are actually counting words on a page before making photocopies for 
classroom distribution.484 By this standard, the guidelines are not a reflection of 
either the law or actual practice. They may instead be a declaration ofthe law that 
the parties believe ought to apply.485 
Moreover, as a tool for transforming behavior, the guidelines have largely 
failed. Few members of the academic community appear to accept the premise 
that the guidelines, with their meticulous limits on fair use, are a viable statement 
480 Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991); see also supra text accompanying notes 234-39. 
481 One study makes this description of a nonnative perspective of the law: "But the law 
can also be studied to determine what legal principles and rules are justifiable or desirable." 
MlCHAELD. BAYLES, PRlNCIPLESOFLAW: A NORMATlVEANALYSIS I (1987). 
482 A nonnative theory also allows current analysis to examine critically the 
appropriateness of applying outmoded law. See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46 
DRAKE L. REv. 299, 319-20 (1997) (examining the Supreme Court's rejection of a doctrine of 
affinnative action that had become obsolete). 
483 A normative analysis would not necessarily be concerned about the divergence 
between law and guidelines: "One can have a perfectly good explanation of why a court or 
legislature adopted a law, but the law be quite unjustifiable." See BAYLES, supra note 481, at 3. 
484 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 236, at 12 ("Rather, the academic community has 
ignored the Guidelines."). 
485 Note particularly that the guidelines are a statement offair use that the parties to them 
believe other individuals "ought" to apply and follow. Again, the guidelines may have a 
''positivist'' appearance in that regard, but they lack an authoritative source. According to one 
analysis, they therefore do not embody "legitimate authority," but instead have "de facto 
authority," which is further described as "an ill-formed expression." See SHINER, supra note 
471, at 24. 
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of the rule oflaw which they "ought" to follow.4B6 On the other hand, supporters 
of the guidelines have been successful in persuading some members of the 
academic community that the guidelines are the standard that "ought" to be 
adopted in formal policy statements.487 Numerous colleges, universities, and 
libraries have adopted some ofthe guidelines as fonnal policy statements, even if 
they ultimately do not shape the behavior of individuals who are subject to the 
policies. Policyrnakers, therefore, seem to believe that reliance on the guidelines 
serves purposes other than guiding individual behavior.488 Merely having a policy 
premised on the guidelines may provide a defense against institutional liability, or 
it may demonstrate good faith. If the institution is pursuing those goals, rather 
than the goals ofshaping behavior, supporters ofthe guidelines have succeeded in 
imbuing the guidelines with a limited nonnative quality. The guidelines articulate 
the standard that "ought" to be in policies, even if individuals are unconvinced 
that they ought to follow that same standard.489 
3. Combined Theory 
Neither positive nor normative theory seems to describe accurately or 
satisfactorily the legal status ofthe guidelines, yet the guidelines oddly possess a 
peculiar appearance of both nonnative and positive qualities. They are portrayed 
initially as normative standards, and they are advocated later as positive 
standards.490 When the guidelines originate, with support from some members of 
the educational community, the guidelines take on the appearance of fair-use 
limitations that either reflect practices within the academic community or that are 
acceptable to decisionmakers who have the authority to impose guidelines as 
binding standards at educational institutions.491 Either of these perceptions of the 
486 See supra note 484. 
487 See supra note 50. 
48B See supra notes 441-60 . 
489 According to one commentator with respect to the CONFU guidelines, "Ongoing 
legislative or quasi-legislative attempts to deal with fair use issues perpetuate a paradigm, 
however, similar to that implemented by shrink-wrap, that defines 'appropriate' use before the 
normative dimensions of that use have been fully explored." See Michael J. Madison, £ega/-
Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digita/ Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1025, 1099 n271 
(1998). 
490 One analysis ofthe Kinko 's decision seems to make exactly this point, apparently with 
satisfaction of its appropriateness. See Wagner, supra note 236, at 14-15. While that writer is 
critical ofthe Classroom Guidelines for higher education, she notes that educators did sign onto 
the guidelines when they were first drafted, and educators have not taken the initiative in 
decades to seek a renegotiation of them. [d. Thus, the guidelines, by this analysis, have a 
normative quality at their inception and then attain an authoritative quality due to inaction by 
educators. See Wagner, supra note 236, at 14-15. 
491 At least one study has struggled with the difficulty of works that "look legal" even 
though they lack truly "positive" legal qualities. See Schauer & Wise, supra note 468, at 1105. 
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guidelines gives them the appearance of having nonnative qualities. If the 
guidelines reflect actual practices, they are truly nonnative; if they are made 
binding on the institutions and influence practices by imposition, they become 
positive. 
Nevertheless, given the wide adoption ofthe guidelines in fonnal policies, the 
guidelines have the appearance of a nonnative standard with respect to actual 
faculty practices.492 That appearance has been deceiving. It has been used as a 
foundation-however unstable-for advocating that the guidelines should 
therefore be integrated into the law, and accepted by the courts as positive law. 
Although that effort has failed,493 strong supporters of the guidelines continue to 
distribute infonnation designed to lead readers to conclude that the courts have, in 
fact, adopted the guidelines.494 The few references in court rulings are often taken 
out ofcontext and sometimes misinterpreted in order to lead readers to an invalid 
conclusion that the guidelines are positive law. Accepting that the guidelines truly 
have nonnative or positive qualities would be seriously misleading. Yet the 
common perceptions of the guidelines, detailed in Part N, reveal that they are 
often characterized as accurate statements of law or of practice. The result is an 
illusion-an illusion that the guidelines have a basis in fair-use law and enjoy the 
force and respect that the law is due. 
This nonnative and positive analysis further demonstrates that the creation 
and dissemination of the guidelines is carefully managed to achieve the 
appropriate illusion. Participation by educational institutions in the creation ofthe 
guidelines serves the fundamental purpose ofgenerating the illusion ofnonnative 
qualities. The appearance of nonnative qualities also gives them some credibility 
when brought before courts in infringement cases. The appearance that the 
guidelines are widely accepted in the educational community is a nonnative 
quality that a jurist may well accept. Any reference to the guidelines by the court, 
in tum, gives the guidelines the appearance of having positive qualities. Judicial 
The Register of Copyrights also has called fair-use guidelines "a curious U.S. invention" but 
implied that they have normative qualities by suggesting that guidelines "symbolize consensus" 
among interested parties. David Ladd, Private Use, Public Policy: Copyright and Home 
Recording, 56 Wn..soN LIBR. BULL. 266, 269 (1981). 
492 For a study showing the widespread adoption of standard guidelines by research 
universities, see CREws, supra note 50, at 73-74. 
493 For an analysis of the relevant cases, demonstrating that no court has adopted any of 
the guidelines as a legal standard, see supra Part III. 
494 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGE STORES ET AL., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON 
COPYRlGIIT FOR TIlE CAMPUS COMMUNITY 4 (1993). The questions and answers state: 
Although some limited copying which does not full within these [Classroom] guidelines 
(and which is not expressly prohibited under Prohibitions A through F described below) may 
still qualifY as pennissible conduct under the copyright law, copying which does comply with 
these guidelines generally constitutes pennissible conduct under the current copyright law. 
Id 
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notice of the guidelines certainly does not make them positive law, but it has 
facilitated the impression that they are positive law, particularly among the 
educators, librarians, and others who are not prepared to distinguish enforceable 
law from general statements in a court decision. The illusion ofpositive law thus 
further reinforces the academic community's regard for the guidelines. 
The result of this dynamic is a spiral of misperception and sanctioned 
misconstruction of the law. The appearance of normative qualities leads to 
bestowal of positive traits; the appearance of positive qualities makes the 
guidelines more compelling for the academic community and more widely 
adopted. Expanded adoption reinforces the normative aspects. Even if these 
qualities are without merit and even vacuous, their illusory validity gives the 
guidelines important meaning in the academic community that is unlikely to 
invest scarce resources, and unlikely to muster specialized expertise, to analyze 
legal subtleties. At the source of this illusion is the unwillingness of the academic 
community to look critically at the guidelines, the failure of the courts to reject 
them in the application of fair-use law, and the eagerness of proponents to 
encourage development and dissemination of meticulous standards that have the 
insidious effect oferoding and distorting fair use. 
VI. THE FuTuRE OF FAIR-USE GUIDELINES: 
OBSERVATrONS AND RECOMMENDATrONS 
Regardless of the serious disconnect between the guidelines and the law, 
guidelines nevertheless persist. Existing guidelines will continue to arise in court 
rulings and in institutional policies. They will appear in future books and other 
resources about copyright-often with the implications that they are a meaningful 
articulation of fair use law. Undoubtedly, the roster of existing guidelines, from 
the Classroom Guidelines through CONFU, will also be put forth as a foundation 
or model for the crafting of future standards. This article accordingly offers three 
sets of observations drawn from the preceding analysis. The first set of 
observations relates to the legal status of guidelines themselves. The second set of 
observations identifies the functional differences between guidelines and the 
law-observations that suggest how interested parties ought to respond to the 
guidelines. The third set of observations will propose how the inevitable process 
ofcrafting guidelines may be improved in the future in order to avoid the failures 
ofguidelines from the past. 
A Legal Status ofFair-Use Guidelines 
The analyses of the origins of guidelines and the several cases examining 
them, particularly the Qassroom Guidelines, allow the following inferences and 
lessons about the role and meaning ofguidelines. 
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None ofthefair-use guidelines is law. None of the guidelines originates from 
a source with authority to make law. Congress never has adopted any of the 
guidelines into legislation, and no court has accepted them as a standard of fair 
use applicable to any situation. Indeed, Congress and the courts have acted 
carefully and explicitly to assure that they have not elevated any of the guidelines 
to a lawfully binding standard 
The guidelines reflect a minimalistic view offair use. By their own explicit 
statements, many of the guidelines are "minimum" measures of fair use. 
Moreover, the substantive measure of fair use articulated in the guidelines is far 
narrower than any limit of fair use established in any court ruling on facts 
analogous to the guidelines. In the MDS decision, for example, the court found 
infringement in a situation involving copying that was "light years" beyond the 
guidelines.495 On the other hand, the guidelines often contain "prohibitions" that 
users are expected not to exceed, even if otherwise staying within the rest of the 
standards.496 In that regard, the guidelines are maximum standards in the guise of 
minimums. 
The guidelines reflect a view offair use to which proprietor groups are 
prepared to acquiesce as either unequivocally within fair use or beyond the scope 
ofactivity that is worth challenging. By winning the endorsement of publisher 
groups and other proprietors with an interest in challenging some uses as 
unlawful, the guidelines undoubtedly address a practical standard that reflects a 
business strategy, rather than a legal reality. Publishers, in particular, likely have 
little or no interest in supporting guidelines that would seriously threaten business 
objectives, even if they honestly believe that the guidelines accurately describe 
fair use. 
The guidelines do not displace the importance ofapplying the four factors 
from the statute. The law of fair use is ultimately founded on the four factors.497 
Just as the courts have made clear that they do not view the guidelines as a 
substitute for the law, so should individuals working with fair use not abandon the 
law and allow the guidelines to become a substitute. To do so, ironically, places 
the user at risk offollowing a standard with no legal basis. 
The guidelines are too rigorous to be a measure of "good-faith" behavior. 
The u.s. Copyright Act provides important protection for some parties-notably 
educators, librarians, and others who are typically the object of existing fair-use 
guidelines-when those parties make decisions in good faith.498 Not only are the 
guidelines usually far more rigorous and narrow than analogous case law would 
suggest necessary, but they are also more rigorous than necessary to demonstrate 
good faith. Most certainly, behavior strictly within the guidelines would likely be 
495 See supra text accompanying note 252. 
496 See supra text accompanying notes 74-76. 
497 See supra text accompanying notes 21-24. 
498 17 U.S.C. § 504(cX2) (Supp. IV 1998). 
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viewed as good faith, but a good-faith reliance on the four factors would allow 
greater flexibility for meeting unpredicted needs. Moreover, if the guidelines 
evidence a standard that is gauged to meet a tolerance level ofproprietors, it also 
would likely bear little relationship to a good-faith application of fair use to new 
and challenging circumstances. 
The guidelines are nevertheless a compelling tool for educators who seek to 
applyfair use and create policies. The guidelines have the appearance ofhaving 
an official status, and they are widely accepted by the publishing industry and 
other proprietor groups who may be potential plaintiffs in copyright actions 
against the educators. If the objective of an educator making policy is to avoid 
litigation, adopting and following the guidelines certainly offers the prospect of 
discouraging a lawsuit. 
The guidelines are compelling to courts. Courts struggle with the unsettled 
nature of fair-use law. Judges attempting to reach decisions about fair use 
undoubtedly must also perceive that the law is open to widely diverging 
interpretations, and that any decision would therefore be subject to potentially 
sharp criticism. Although the courts in all the cases examined here do reach 
decisions based on the factors in the statute, those same courts are also drawn to 
the guidelines for reasons similar to those of the educational institutions 
developing a fair-use policy: the external validation of the guidelines by interest 
groups gives them some demeanor of credibility. Accordingly, when a judicial 
opinion demonstrates that activity not only violates the law but also the 
guidelines, the court is finding some reinforcement for its ruling. If the guidelines 
have an appearance of validation by interested parties, then the court might 
perceive that the reinforcement has been previously accepted by the persons with 
the greatest interest in the outcome of the ruling. In sum, courts are therefore 
treating the guidelines as a crutch to bolster a ruling and to fend offpost-decision 
criticism. 
Fair-use guidelines have had the effect ofossifying perceptions offair use 
and denying the law its intended flexibility. To the extent that the guidelines 
attract attention in discussions about fair use, they are in tum drawing attention 
away from fair-use law itself. Worse, to the extent that the guidelines are seen as a 
substitute for law or as a standard with legal authority, the guidelines are 
suppressing all opportunity to comprehend and work with the law itself. 
Examples ofthe encroachment ofguidelines on the law abound. Perhaps the most 
salient example is the common expectation that fair use requires classroom 
photocopying to be "spontaneous."499 Spontaneity is a concept that may be 
499 In the midst of writing this article, I gave a presentation on copyright issues at the 
NERCOMP Annual Conference, held in Sturbridge, Massachusetts, on March 23, 1999. 
(NERCOMP is formally known as the New England Regional Computing Program) In the 
context of developing a standard of fair use for an electronic reserve system, one conference 
attendee asked about the need to comply with the "spontaneity requiremenf' of fair use-yet 
one more example of the infiltration of the Qassroom Guidelines into general understanding of 
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relevant to the four factors, but certainly is not required. It is, however, required 
under the Classroom Guidelines. Indeed, it has its origins in the drafting of the 
Classroom Guidelines. Spontaneity is cormnonly asserted as a condition to fair 
use; whenever it is so asserted the guidelines are once again infiltrating our 
understanding ofthe law. 
These observations, taken together, manifest a dubious role for fair-use 
guidelines in current law. The intention ofthe drafters and negotiating parties may 
well have been constructive and positive, and most certainly the ambitions and 
expectations of the parties must have been centered on a hope for a meaningful 
result. Whatever the subjective intent, however, the resulting guidelines have had 
contrary and des1ructive effects. The guidelines have become a convenient 
distraction from the responsibility of copyright owners, users, courts, and even 
Congress to work with the law itself Parties with an interest in supporting the 
guide1ines-especially publishers and others seeking a narrow application of fair 
use-have advocated the guidelines in litigation, in widely distnbuted 
publications, and in tacit demands and threats against educational institutions. 
Whatever the drafters' intent, the guidelines themselves have been distorted and 
imposed on the marketplace in a manner that undercuts the law offair use itself 
B. Responding to the Guidelines 
As new guidelines, with some measure of negotiated or official status, 
emerge from CONFU or other future pursuits, individuals and institutions will 
face the decision about whether to endorse, adopt, follow, or even regard the 
offered guidelines in their analysis offair use. Not only will colleges, universities, 
publishers, and authors face such decisions, but so will congressional committees 
likely be confronted with the decision to support or not support future guidelines, 
just as a House committee did with the earlier guidelines in 1976 and 1981. 
Supporters of new guidelines already have demonstrated their intent to seek that 
imprimatur of law, by taking the Multimedia Guidelines to a House 
subcommittee for its approval.500 
How should this wide array of reviewers of fair-use guidelines make a 
determination of support or non-support? Based on this analysis, reviewers ofany 
guidelines should consider the following traits of copyright law as compared to 
the guidelines, and consider whether the guidelines are a real improvement.50l 
None ofthe fair-use guidelines has the force oflaw; only statutes and court 
rulings have that authority. Ifan educator is looking for the standard to which he 
fair-use law. I frequently receive the same question at numerous academic conferences around 
the country. 
500 See MULTIMEDIA COMMlTIEE PRINT, supra note 4. 
501 These comparisons oflaw and guidelines are based in part on an earlier publication by 
the present author. See Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use and Higher Education: Are Guidelines the 
Answer?, 83 ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 38. 
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or she actually must adhere, only the law can offer that guidance. Guidelines 
cannot. Guidelines are interpretations of the law and are absolutely not the only 
interpretation possible. Guidelines, therefore, cannot give assurance that a user is 
actually operating within the law. 
The law is actually a less complex measure of fair use than are most 
guidelines. The law of fair use depends principally on foW" factors which are 
summarized and described in many different publications.502 The guidelines often 
depend on a multiplicity of variables and include many requirements and 
prohibitions that are not found in the law. For example, the CONFU guidelines on 
production of multimedia works restrict the length of time that a professor may 
keep and use the finished work and require notices that the professor is exercising 
fair use.503 No such obligations exist in the law. The guidelines further itemize a 
long list ofconditions related to quantity, purpose ofuse, and market effects.504 
The law offair use is flexible to meet changing needs and circumstances, 
while the guidelines are rigid. Congress intended for the law to be flexible, and 
court rulings have affirmed that generalizations about fair use are simply not 
valid. For example, the measW"e of the amount of a work that may be copied is 
highly fluid. By contrast, guidelines usually include rigorous quantity limits that 
hardly begin to reflect the robust character of fair use. One court has ruled that 
reprinting three hundred words from an earlier work was too much, while another 
case allowed several thousand words.505 These decisions are not inconsistent; 
they reveal that fair use depends on specific circW"nStances ofeach use. 
Staying within fair-use law prevents infringement, but the guidelines do not 
offer even a "safe harbor. " Most guidelines from the past and from CONFU are 
by their own description ''minimum'' measW"es of fair use, implying that they will 
protect compliant users from infringement liability. But representatives of many 
copyright owners have refused steadfastly to call the guidelines a "safe harbor," 
reserving the right to bring infringement actions even against an individual or 
institution that stays meticulously within the limits. If the guidelines are 
admittedly not a "safe harbor," then they most assW"edly are not any measW"e of 
fair use at all. 
Copyright law provides important protection for well-meaning faculty and 
others who apply fair use, but guidelines offer no actual protection. When 
members of university and libraty communities have "reasonable grounds" to 
believe their activities are within fair use, the Copyright Act exonerates these 
individuals and the institution from some of the monetary liability that may result 
if the aativities are found to be an infringement. Congress structW"ed the law to 
502 See, for example, many ofthe works listed in supra note 7. 
503 See supra text accompanying notes 171-72. 
504 See supra text accompanying notes 162-70. 
505 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) 
(quoting three hundred words was beyond fair use); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 
1253,1265 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting seven thousand words was within fair use). 
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encourage professors, librarians, and others within the non-profit educational 
arena to pursue fair use in good faith. The reduction ofdamages should motivate 
positive and constructive application of fair use, offer considerable peace ofmind, 
and discourage most threats of litigation. Congress granted an important 
protection in recognition oflingering uneasiness and the importance ofadvancing 
knowledge through a reasonable, balanced, and good-faith understanding ofrights 
and responsibilities. No set of guidelines can offer that same combination of 
promises. 
In the final analysis, the guidelines may actually have considerably less 
significance than might appear on first look. One might logically wonder, 
however, whether the community of educators and proprietors might not take 
steps to enhance the import of guidelines. After all, for those persons who desire 
greater certainty in their handling offair use-although not necessarily in the law 
itself-and do not prefer to make decisions based on the law of fair use, the 
guidelines are a convenient recourse. They streamline the decision about the 
content of a policy, while they actually compound the complexity of an 
individual's decision. 
C. Lessonsfor the Future Development ofGuidelines 
If fair-use guidelines serve some perceived practical purposes, and are 
compelling to influential parties, new guidelines will undoubtedly be the subject 
of future negotiation and development. This analysis ofexisting guidelines, while 
revealing their serious flaws, also suggests several lessons for developing 
improved guidelines in the future. 
Fair-use guidelines should be rooted explicitly in fair-use law. Future 
guidelines should begin with the framework of the factors in the statute and 
address their meaning for the application at issue.506 For example, a new set of 
guidelines on the subject of copying for electronic-reserve systems should be 
drafted around the statutory factors. The guidelines should begin with the actual 
law of fair use and summarize the procedural and implementation steps that one 
may take to meet the factors. In the case of electronic reserves, guidelines could 
address the "purpose" factor by noting, among other conditions, that the material 
placed on reserve must be solely for use by students in a particular course at the 
educational institution. The guidelines might list various other steps that one 
might take to meet obligations with respect to that factor, allowing the user 
implementing or adopting the guidelines to select from options that may be within 
fair use. 
506 One commentator urged that faculty should return to the law offair use and not rely on 
guidelines: "Universities, individually or together, should create a policy statement or faculty 
guide that will provide educators with the information they need to make infonned fair-use 
determinations. The Guidelines may be a suitable harbor for some, but infonned educators 
should fully assert their statutoryright offair use." Kasunic, supra note 415, at 291. 
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Fair-use guidelines must beflexible in their definition ofthe scope offair use. 
Fair use in an inherently flexible doctrine, dependent on the specifics of the 
relevant facts ofeach case. Courts established that principle from the origin ofthe 
fair-use doctrine. Congress affinned it in the enactment of the statute in 1976. 
More recent court rulings have militated repeatedly against any bright-line rules. 
Guidelines that attempt to isolate and identify a precise measure of fair use for 
many different situations are overtly rejecting the fimdarnental flexibility of the 
law.507 The Classroom Guidelines, the Multimedia Guidelines, and most of the 
fair-use guidelines make that crucial error with emphasis. They attempt to find 
and hit the bull's eye ofa moving target. 
The target is also ethereal. Almost never does a court or any other authority 
need to specify the boundary between fair and unfair uses. A court faced with 
particular facts need only determine whether those facts are on one side ofthe line 
or the other. The law does not need to define the line itself. Private parties should 
also not seek to define a line that is mmecessary to identify and perhaps even 
unknowable. The precise definition of fair use is akin to Heisenberg's 
"uncertainty principle" from physics: one cannot know both its empirical 
definition and its specific application simultaneously.508 Perhaps borrowing from 
a slightly more familiar, and legal, doctrine: we cannot strictly define fair use, but 
we can know it when we see it.509 
Fair-use guidelines should be flexible in their means for adhering to 
obligations under the law. The law of fair use is inherently flexible, and that 
flexibility is essential for fair use to meet unpredictable needs. Not only is the 
limit of fair use variable, but so are the means for addressing and satisfying the 
four factors in the statute. Thus, guidelines that offer only one means for 
addressing and meeting fair use subvert the essence of the law. Guidelines of the 
past do exactly that by, for example, setting exact quantity limits and barring any 
uses that may involve the making of anthologies or coursepacks. Moreover, the 
flexibility that the guidelines attempt to preserve by labeling them as "minimum" 
standards is also subverted whenever that language is stripped away, as it was in 
the settlement of the case against NYU. Educational institutions and other 
organizations that adopt the guidelines should be cautious about accepting 
guidelines that erode opportunities for creative application ofthe law. 
507 Klingsporn, supra note 1, at 122 ("Instead of a series ofnegotiated compromises, fair 
use guidelines should be primarily a statement ofprinciples, and secondarily a way to limit the 
effects oftechnological limits on fair use:1. 
508 See generally ALAsTAIR I.M. RAE, Uncertainty Principle. in 4 MACMILLAN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICS 1643 (1996) ("In its simplest fonnulation the uncertainty principle 
states that it is impossible to exactly define both the position and the momentum ofa particle at 
the same time.'1 
509 Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concuning) (regarding 
the effort to define pornography: "I know it when I see it.'1. 
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No governmental agency shouldsupport or endorse any ofthe guidelines that 
do not meet prescribed standards for their development. Those standards could 
begin with the recommendations on this list in this article. A congressional 
committee, for example, should not lend its support to guidelines that are not 
flexible and that are not explicitly founded on the law. Of all the government 
agencies with an interest in the development of guidelines, the most important 
and influential decisionmaker of all, of course, is Congress or a congressional 
committee. That decisionmaker is often called upon to offer support for fair-use 
guidelines. Yet, Congress especially must tread cautiously when reflecting on the 
fair-use law it enacted more than two decades ago. Statements of congressional 
intent long after passage ofa law may appear weighty and influential, but they are 
not likely to be accepted with great credulity by the citizens or the courts. Such ex 
post facto declarations are instead more likely to stir confusion as the guidelines 
often conflict with the letter or the spirit of the law itself. Similarly, statements 
that are not well considered or that do not reflect diverse perspectives may carry 
unintended influence on the marketplace ofideas. 
The process ofdeveloping guidelines should include adversarialjustifications 
and challenges of the guidelines based on law. SIO In particular, government 
agencies should not approve or support any fair-use guidelines without a public 
opportunity for supporters and detractors to present arguments with respect to the 
legal validity of the guidelines.511 At no point in the creation of any of the 
guidelines was any interested party ever called upon to support any position with 
a legal justification.512 At no point was any interested party called upon to be 
accountable publicly to the law. Government agencies should hold public 
510 That process already has occurred in some limited situations. To the extent that courts 
have considered applying any of the guidelines in a ruling, presumably the appropriateness of 
doing so has been the subject ofbriefs and oral argument. For example, in the rehearing en bane 
before the Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals in the MDS decision, the judges questioned critically 
the appropriateness of applying the Classroom Guidelines to the copying at issue. In the final 
decision, the court chose not to apply them. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document 
Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390-91 (6th Cir. 1996). 
511 With respect to the early guidelines, from 1976 through 1981, administrative agencies 
took no formal or public position. Members or subcommittees ofCongress, however, did offer 
general statements of support. Those statements actually focused on the process or idea of 
guideline development, rather than on the legal validity of the content of the guidelines. By 
contrast, some ofthe CONFU Guidelines have support from the U.S. Copyright Office and the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. See CONFU FlNAL REPoRT, supra note 4, at 57. Under the 
proposal offered here, the administrative agencies in particular would refrain from lending their 
name or auspices to the finished guidelines without a more formal scrutiny. 
512 At one point in the CONFU process, the present author gave a presentation to the 
assembled group, showing the relationship of various elements of the draft electronic-reserve 
guidelines to the factors in the fair-use statute. No other presentation even remotely comparable 
ever occurred in any of the CONFU proceedings. Nevertheless, I now contend that that 
presentation was still inadequate. I would urge that a future presentation be more formally 
defined, with cited authorities, and leave a permanent record for later analysis and scrutiny. 
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hearings and require written submission of documents that may approach legal 
briefs before rendering a decision to support or not support guidelines.513 One 
might even speculate that the endorsement of the CONFU guidelines by the U.S. 
Copyright Office and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office was beyond the 
authority ofthose agencies to act. 
Interestedparties should not independently lead the effort to develop publicly 
distributedfair-use guidelines.S14 The convening of interested parties, not only to 
articulate views, but to lead the effort to devise broad-based guidelines, has 
proved to be seriously flawed.sls The result is a negotiated statement supported 
only by the parties who choose to agree with the final analysis.sl6 A role for an 
independent voice with the duty of keeping a focus on the law of fair use was 
lacking from CONFU and all other efforts to develop most of the existing 
513 This proposal would easily be burdensome to many interested parties who may be 
unable to retain counsel for presenting a thorough and competitive argument for or against any 
set ofguidelines. I do not see an insunnountable concern with that argument. First, many parties 
in the negotiation of guidelines have been represented by well-paid legal counsel. Second, law 
professors and other attorneys have acted on behalf of various other parties to the negotiations. 
Third, even if a critical viewpoint is seriously overwhelmed by sophisticated lawyers, the 
government agency considering the views should be able to assess that inequality in reaching its 
detennination. Fourth, a possible outcome of such a process could be a determination by the 
agency to take no position at all on the guidelines in question-to refrain from supporting or 
rejecting them. The agency could well take such a neutral position when the representation is 
clearly lopsided. One possible model for the reform ofthe process for creating future guidelines 
is "negotiated rulemaking," which brings interested parties together with government officials 
in an attempt to achieve consensus support for new regulations. See generally Soo-Hun Park, 
Judicial Review ofNegotiated Rulemaking (1977) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, School of Law, 
Indiana University, Bloomington (on file with the Indiana University Law School Library». 
514 Brian D. Wassom, Note, Copyright Implications of "Unconventional Linking" on the 
World Wide Web: Framing, Deep Linking and lnlining, 49 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 181,249 
(1998) (urging establishment ofa governmental agency to lead the development ofguidelines). 
515 Naturally, parties with an interest in fair-use determinations can still develop 
guidelines or interpretations for application to their own activities. Indeed, they should take 
exactly those steps. Colleges and universities should develop interpretations for their own 
needs. They may even share ideas about fair use with other institutions, and those groups may 
choose to follow or reject the example. This article, however, is asserting that interested parties 
of diverse perspective should not lead efforts to devise guidelines that will gain some 
governmental support and have intended application to individuals or organizations that do not 
voluntarily choose to follow thern. 
516 Klingsporn, supra note 1, at 121. He states: 
As CONFU's results show, consensus has become too unwieldy. The number of organized 
interest groups demanding to be included in fonning any proposal to amend the copyright laws, 
combined with the speed of technological and market change, will only result in amendments 
that are obsolete as soon as they are passed. 
[d. 
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guidelines.517 Without that voice, and an obligation to give it heed, the parties 
again gravitated toward an "acceptable" result, and not a result founded in the 
law. 
VIT. CONCLUSION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITIES 
As guidelines encroach on the law of fair use and begin to displace its 
principles, the guidelines become a subversion ofthe law. The law offair use may 
be deficient in many ways, and may well demand change. Congress can amend 
the statute, and courts can interpret it, but private parties acting outside those 
channels can only influence perception of the law. Ifdistorting perceptions is the 
goal, the guidelines have succeeded in great measure. In the marketplace ofideas, 
where fair use enjoys daily application, the guidelines have shaped much of the 
understanding of the law. Yet in shaping perceptions, the guidelines have 
prevented accurate understandings of the law itself. The guidelines even have 
created perversions of legal understanding and prevented interested parties--and 
judges-from recognizing and meeting their rights and responsibilities under 
copyright law.518 
The stated intent of developers and proponents of guidelines, however, is 
considerably different. Guidelines are put forth as a means for simplifying 
application of an uncertain law. They are intended to bring a desired level of 
certainty, reduce risks of infringement liability, and minimize transaction costs 
associated with statutory interpretation for common needs.519 In these regards, 
this article demonstrates that the guidelines largely have failed. Rather than serve 
the needs of instructors, librarians, and other individuals, the guidelines have been 
517 Retired federal judges or members ofCongress, or other persons with solid credentials 
for independent decisionmaking and without a vested interest in the outcome could serve in this 
role. An agency, such as the Copyright Office or the Patent and Trademark Office, could 
facilitate the effort through the selection and compensation ofthe person. Ifthose agencies were 
to take a more formal and rigorous approach toward supporting or not supporting the final 
guidelines, see supra text accompanying notes 209-11, they should in the process bolster their 
own independence and credibility sufficiently to select such "arbitrators" who will in tum 
demonstrate competence and independence. Diverse interest groups could also select such 
independent parties, without any involvement from govemment agencies, in a manner similar 
to the common selection of arbitrators to settle numerous legal disagreements. A critical 
difference, of course, is that arbitrators in common disputes render decisions applicable only to 
the present parties. Under this proposal, the "arbitrators" would be shaping guidelines that 
inevitably will become models that many individuals not present will choose or be expected to 
follow. 
518 Kasunic, supra note 415, at 289-90 (commenting with respect to the inhibiting force 
of the guidelines: "This subverts Congress' intent in codifying fair use in section 107. If this 
course continues, the Guidelines will undermine fair-use analysis and impede the primary 
function ofcopyright law: to promote progres [sic] and benefit the public."). 
519 See generally Mary R. Barry, Multiple Photocopying by Edueators and the Fair Use 
Doctrine: The Court's Role in Reducing Transaction Costs, 1994 U. IlL. L. REv. 387, 394-95. 
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a crutch for judicial rulings and an externally validated structure to ease the task 
of policymaking-as distinguished from the responsibility of following the law. 
One can only find failure in guidelines that have missed their constructive goals 
and served destructive ends. The vast range of parties with an interest in proper 
application of fair use have been poorly served by existing guidelines, and they 
would be better served had the guidelines never existed. Better guidelines may be 
possible in the future, but developers must break from the constructs ofthe past in 
order to find a healthier and more productive vision offair-use standards. 
In the meantime, the influence of current guidelines should be resisted. 
Instead, they are often embraced, principally by individuals who are 
uncomfortable with the statute's flexibility. Proprietor groups who see guidelines 
as an opportunity to constrain fair use and to dilute the flexibility that gives the 
law its vitality have been accomplices. Whatever the intentions of drafters of 
guidelines, they have been used by diverse parties to generate the appearance of 
positive law. When publishers use them in litigation and urge their adoption in 
fair-use decisions, the publishers are seeking to have the guidelines transformed 
into positive law. 
When publishers disseminate the guidelines widely to the community of 
educators, librarians, and others parties seeking to apply fair use, they are 
effectively deceiving that community into believing that the guidelines have 
binding authority. When the user community accepts the guidelines in policy 
statements, in settlement of litigation, or in other ways that purport to articulate a 
legal standard, that community is mistakenly treating the guidelines as positive 
law. When that community actually uses the guidelines and adheres to them, they 
are reshaping the normative understanding ofthe law. The guidelines accordingly 
assume a normative appearance. 
These developments in the complex interrelationship between law and 
guidelines destroy many of the essential objectives of fair use and of the 
guidelines. The important flexibility of the law is sacrificed. Respect for the law 
in the community ofcopyright owners and users is also diminished when the law 
is interpreted to deviate from statutory language. The effort to craft future 
informal standards-whether labeled "guidelines" or otherwise-is hindered 
when the standards are later imposed as if they were binding on all citizens. The 
fair-use guidelines of the past have created a dangerous illusion; the community 
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ofowners and users ought to return to the factors ofthe statute and consider anew 
the role and structure ofguidelines and the process oftheir development.520 
520 The desire to develop new fair-use guidelines continues. As this article goes to press, 
Senators Hatch and Leahy have introduced a bill to amend section 110(2) ofthe Copyright Act, 
regarding the use of works in distance education, based on a proposal from the United States 
Copyright Office. See generally, Crews, supra note 176. The bill includes a directive that the 
Copyright Office "convene a conference of interested parties... to develop guidelines for the 
use of copyrighted works for digital distance education under the fair use doctrine." S. 487, 
107th Cong. § 4(b) (2001). The opportunity may soon arise either for repeating the problems of 
the past or for improving the process and outcome offormulating fair-use guidelines. 
